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I 
ABSTRACT 
 
With an increasing proportion of older people in a population, older people have a 
greater potential to be part of the future labour force. Their employment patterns therefore 
deserve governments’ attention. This thesis compares the employment patterns of older 
people to those of younger people in selected economies. In the first study we differentiate 
between the effects of explained and unexplained factors on age-employment gaps using 
data from the US CPS and UK LFS in the 2000s and Hong Kong Census and By-Census 
data from 1991 to 2006. Our non-linear Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions show that 
explained factors explain nearly the entire age-employment gaps in the U.S. and Hong 
Kong but not in the U.K. In the second study, we extend the work of Lissenburgh and 
Smeaton (2003) by investigating job preferences in addition to employment outcomes 
using the UK LFS from 2001q2 to 2012q1. Our binomial logit models on working part-
time involuntarily show that part-time employment is more likely to be a voluntary choice 
regardless of gender and age. In the third study we use the UK BHPS from 1991 to 2008 
to estimate competing risks Cox proportional hazards models on unemployment and 
various types of employment spells. We find that the older an individual is when he or 
she starts an unemployment spell, the longer he or she remains unemployed before getting 
a full-time or part-time job. However, the trend of decreasing hazards from leaving 
unemployment spells to part-time employment reverses after the spell starting age of 54. 
In addition, the older an individual is when he or she starts any type of employment spell, 
the longer he or she remains employed. 
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1 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Research background 
Over the twentieth century, decreasing fertility rates and longer life expectancy have 
given rise to population ageing. This has led to a “demographic time bomb” of changing 
population dynamics described as a “baby boom”. According to Mirkin and Weinberger 
(2000), the global number of older people in 2050 will be five times as large as that in 
2000. There has been a growing concern on the consequences of population ageing in 
many economies. On one hand, population ageing gives rise to continuous shrinking of 
the labour force, which in turn increases the dependency ratios. For example, starting 
from 1975 there has been an increasing trend in the US dependency ratio and this is 
projected to continue into 2018 (Toossi, 2009). On the other hand, average family saving 
rates will decrease when there is a larger proportion of retirees spending their savings. 
Capital supply in the economy will decrease, which in turn increases the interest rate. The 
supplies of labour and capital will become more expensive and hence slow down the pace 
of export growth. 
Many economies have been considering various measures to deal with the issue of 
population ageing. For example, Taiwan provides subsidies to citizens for giving birth. 
Singapore has set lower immigration criteria to attract foreign professionals. Hong Kong 
is considering encouraging older people to migrate to nearby less-densely populated 
provinces for retirement. These measures focus on enlarging the younger labour force or 
alleviating the consequences of population ageing on the economies. Nevertheless, there 
are some economies treating older people as a potential labour force rather than a burden 
to their societies. Many European countries have increased their retirement ages so as to 
encourage older people to stay in the labour market. Older people can be a potential labour 
2 
force rather than a “problem” of population ageing. For instance, Toossi (2009) noted that 
those aged 55 or over will account for nearly 90% of the additional workers in the US 
labour force in next 10 years. This group will become a quarter of the US labour force by 
2018. Older people working longer can offset some negative consequences of population 
ageing, such as a shrinking labour force, increased public expenditures associated with 
early retirement and increasing need for employers to replace retired workers (Keese, 
2006).  
Several issues deserve special attention if we want to promote longer working lives 
among older people. Are there any differences in employment probabilities between 
younger and older people? If so, do unknown factors such as age discrimination account 
much for differential employment probabilities by age? What are the differences in job 
preferences and employment outcomes between younger and older people? Do the 
employment and unemployment durations of older people differ from those of younger 
people? This thesis addresses the above issues.  
Research motivation and relevance 
Despite more attention being paid to the age issue in the U.S. compared to other 
economies, there still exist few economic studies on differential employment probabilities 
by age in the US labour market. Studies on employment probabilities among older people 
are common, but they often ignore the effect of unknown factors such as age 
discrimination on differential employment probabilities by age (Peracchi and Welch, 
1994). Friedman (1984) explained that evidence of discrimination against older people is 
less convincing than that for other demographic groups. Economic analyses measuring 
gender or racial discrimination often control for productivity-related factors and attribute 
the unexplained part as a consequence of discrimination. This approach may not be 
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appropriate in the study of age discrimination.  
Moreover, Johnson and Neumark (1997) stated that working experience and 
deterioration of skills can affect the comparability of productivity between younger and 
older workers. They deal with these two problems by analysing self-reported age 
discrimination. However, there may be bias in drawing conclusions from qualitative data. 
A quantitative analysis, which can differentiate contributions of differences in observable 
and unobservable characteristics to the differential employment probabilities between 
older and younger workers, is needed. The analysis of these new results can be used as a 
reference for governments to assess the competitiveness of older people compared to their 
younger counterparts in different economies. 
Also worthy of attention are the job preferences over and outcomes of flexible 
employment (such as part-time employment and self-employment) among older people. 
Laczko and Phillipson (1991) noted that, after the age of 50, employment status is likely 
to be characterized by greater flexibility, such as in the mode of part-time employment or 
self-employment. Nonetheless, despite the increasing worldwide popularity of various 
kinds of flexible employment among older people, there are few studies on this specific 
theme. Most studies on employment prospects of older people focus on regular full-time 
employment. There is little evidence on factors influencing older people’s preferences 
over and outcomes of various employment modes. Moreover, part-time employment 
might be an involuntary choice for older people if they cannot find their preferred 
employment mode such as full-time work. The voluntary and involuntary nature of 
flexible employment therefore deserves special attention (Hakim, 1987; Falzone, 2000; 
Morris and Mallier, 2003). All these features have implications for government policies 
aimed at helping older people find their favourite employment mode. 
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There are various duration studies focusing on more detailed information on when 
an individual leaves their original state and transits into another. Some of these focus on 
the duration of more than one type of economic activity (Theeuwes et al., 1990; Hunt, 
1999; Martinez-Granado, 2002). However, unemployment and employment durations of 
older people are still understudied. The limited number of papers such as Chan and Steven 
(2001), Haardt (2006) and Tatsiramos (2010) focus on employment in general without 
distinguishing employment modes. There are few studies on older people focusing on 
unemployment duration before transiting into various types of employment or inactivity, 
or the durations of various types of employment. Under population ageing, how to help 
older workers stay in their chosen employment mode for longer deserves policy makers’ 
attention.  
Thesis structure 
This thesis presents three studies within six core chapters plus this introduction and 
a conclusion. For each study, the first chapter presents a literature survey and the second 
presents new empirical results.  
The first study (Chapters 1 and 2) provides new insights on differential employment 
probabilities by age with two specific research objectives. Firstly, we provide new 
insights on the employment probabilities of older people in the U.S., the U.K. and Hong 
Kong. The first two are well-known developed western economies, whereas Hong Kong 
is a multi-cultural economy with both Chinese and western elements. A comparison 
among these three economies can shed light on any differences of older people’s 
employment patterns in different ageing societies. Secondly, we investigate the neglected 
aspect of gender. As pointed out by Ginn and Arber (1996) and Duncan and Loretto 
5 
(2004), researchers have focused on the employment of older males rather than older 
females. This may conceal important patterns on the issue. The labour force in the three 
economies under analysis has become older and more feminine. It is important to 
investigate whether there are any differences in employment probabilities between older 
males and older females. Chapter 1 provides a literature survey on the employment of 
older people in the aforementioned three economies which are known to be facing 
population aging. We first analyse the statistics on labour force participation rates and 
unemployment rates of older people, for the sake of learning more about the changes in 
the willingness of older people to work and their employment situation in the early 2000s. 
We then discuss empirical studies on employment probabilities of older people and 
studies on gender dimension. Lastly we summarise the various approaches under this 
theme.  
Chapter 2 discusses the data used, the empirical framework and the analysis results 
on the employment probabilities of older versus younger people in the first study. We first 
discuss the background and treatment of the data used in each analysis for the three 
economies and the summary statistics for the samples. The U.S. has the best and most 
steady level of labour force quality among the three. The qualities of the labour force in 
the U.K. and Hong Kong have improved over the last century. We then explain the 
estimation framework for the logit models and non-linear Oaxaca-Blinder 
decompositions and discuss the results. Five research questions are addressed in Chapter 
2. Firstly, which is the most important factor affecting the employment probabilities of 
younger and older people? Secondly, what is the magnitude of the difference in 
employment probabilities between younger and older people? Thirdly, to what extent are 
the differential employment probabilities attributable to explained factors (differences in 
observable characteristics) and unexplained factors (differences in unobservable 
6 
characteristics)? Fourthly, do the answers to the above three questions differ for males 
and females? Fifthly, do the answers to the above four questions differ in the U.S., the 
U.K. and Hong Kong? The decomposition results for the U.S. and Hong Kong show that 
the differences in observable characteristics (explained factors) can explain nearly the 
whole negative employment gap. In contrast, there are many more uncontrolled factors 
in our models which affect the UK age-employment gap. 
The second study (Chapters 3 and 4) focuses on the U.K. because richer information 
for the analysis purposes of this study is available in the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS). 
Also, the U.K. acts as a benchmark between heavily regulated economies like Europe and 
less regulated economies like the U.S. (Ajayi-Obe and Parker, 2005). We provide new 
insights on the issues of flexible employment modes among older versus younger people 
with three research objectives. Firstly, we study the preferences of older versus younger 
unemployed job-seekers over various employment modes. Secondly, we update the 
analysis on the entry of older people into various employment modes by considering more 
than one type of flexible employment, using a long time-span of data and considering the 
neglected issue of gender. Thirdly, we investigate the voluntary and involuntary nature of 
part-time employment. Chapter 3 provides a literature survey on the flexible employment 
of all workers but especially older ones. We first discuss the nature of three major types 
of flexible employment, namely: part-time employment, self-employment and temporary 
employment. Statistics on the employment rates of each flexible employment mode in the 
U.K. is also discussed for understanding the changes in the flexible employment situation. 
All types of flexible employment are more popular among older people than among 
younger people. We then review studies on each flexible employment mode and studies 
on more than one flexible employment mode. Lastly we summarise the approaches to this 
theme.  
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Chapter 4 discusses the data, the empirical framework and the analysis results on the 
preferences over and outcomes of flexible employment modes for older versus younger 
people in the second study. We discuss the background and treatment of the data and 
summary statistics for the samples. Younger people are more likely to prefer full-time 
work and work full-time, whereas older people are more likely to prefer flexible 
employment and work flexibly. Moreover, males have a higher preference for self-
employment and females for part-time work. We then present the estimation framework 
for the three analyses of multinomial logits and binomial logits and discuss the empirical 
results. There are five research questions in Chapter 4. Firstly, what are the significant 
factors affecting older people’s preferences over each type of employment? Secondly, 
what are the significant factors affecting older people’s entry into a particular mode of 
employment? Thirdly, what are the significant factors leading older people to work part-
time involuntarily? Fourthly, are the answers to the above questions different from those 
for younger people? Fifthly, do the results above differ between males and females? We 
find that people with a particular attribute may have a higher preference for a particular 
employment mode but they may have a higher probability of entering a different 
employment mode. Furthermore, both males and females are more willing to work part-
time as they age. Part-time employment is therefore more likely to be a voluntary choice 
regardless of gender and age. 
The third study (Chapters 5 and 6) analyses the unemployment and employment 
durations for older people and compares their situation to that of younger people with two 
specific research objectives. Firstly, we study the duration of four economic modes, 
namely unemployment, full-time employment, part-time employment and self-
employment. Secondly, we investigate the various exit states out of various economic 
modes. Thirdly, we aim to investigate the effect of spell starting age if it is after the age 
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of statutory retirement. Chapter 5 provides a deepening on the literature survey on 
employment in Chapter 3 by considering duration studies on various types of economic 
activity. We first discuss past empirical studies based on the initial economic state. We 
then discuss studies specific to older people and summarise the various approaches under 
this theme.  
Chapter 6 carries out empirical analyses on the ideas discussed in Chapter 5 by using 
competing risks Cox proportional hazards models on unemployment durations and 
employment durations. We first discuss the background and treatment of our spell data 
before discussing the summary statistics for the samples. Different patterns in each type 
of spell by exit state are identified. We present the estimation framework for the 
competing risks Cox proportional hazards models and then discuss the estimation results 
on various spells. Five research questions are addressed in Chapter 6. Firstly, what are the 
significant factors affecting the cause-specific hazards of exiting from spells of 
unemployment, full-time employment, part-time employment or self-employment into 
various exit states? Secondly, are there any differences in the effect of a particular factor 
on the cause-specific hazards of exiting from a particular spell into various states? Thirdly, 
what are the directions of the effects of age on the cause-specific hazards of exiting from 
each type of spell into various states? Fourthly, what are the differences (if any) of the 
effect of retirement age on exiting into various economic states? Lastly, do these results 
differ between males and females? In contrast to the common finding that duration 
dependences of unemployment or employment are negative, we find that the hazard rates 
of any types of spells except self-employment spells decrease during the early stage of 
spells and increase in the later stage. The older an individual is when he or she starts a 
unemployment spell, the longer he or she remains unemployed before getting full-time or 
part-time jobs. In addition, the older an individual starts any type of employment spell, 
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the longer time he or she remains employed. This shows the higher stability for older 
individuals to remain employed compared to the youngest group. 
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CHAPTER 1  
THE PROBABILITIES OF EMPLOYMENT FOR OLDER PEOPLE: 
A LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.1 Introduction 
Over the second half of last century population aging has been a growing concern in 
many economies. Reday-Mulvey (2005) suggested that some firms may encounter the 
problem of labour shortage due to the shrinking of younger labour force. Governments 
have been focusing on older people as a potential source of labour supply (Gunderson, 
2003). Employment rates for older people in many developed economies have been rising. 
For example, in the U.K. from 1998 to 2002 employment rates among people aged 50 or 
over rose which was in contrast to the downward trend before the mid-1990s (Disney and 
Hawkes, 2003). The reasons behind increasing employment rates among older people 
deserve governments’ attention if they want to promote healthy and productive ageing.  
This chapter provides a literature survey on the employment of older people in the 
U.S., the U.K. and Hong Kong, which are known to be facing population aging. The U.S. 
and the U.K. are well-known western developed economies, whereas Hong Kong is a 
multi-cultural economy with both Chinese and Western culture. A comparison among 
these three economies can shed light on any differences of older people’s employment 
patterns in different societies. We first explain the models of life-cycle labour supply in 
Section 1.2 to aid the discussion hereafter. By analysing labour force participation rates 
and unemployment rates of older people in Sections 1.3 and 1.4, we can learn more about 
the changes in the willingness of older people to work and their employment situation in 
the early 2000s. Section 1.5 discusses the pension arrangements and retirement age in the 
U.S., the U.K. and Hong Kong. Sections 1.6 and 1.7 discuss empirical studies on 
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employment probabilities of older people. Section 1.8 summarises the approaches for 
analyses on this theme. A final section concludes. 
1.2 The model of life-cycle labour supply 
Figure 1.1: Graphical illustration of life-cycle allocation of time 
 
Figure 1.1 shows an individual’s life-cycle allocation of time (Ehrenberg and Smith, 
2006). Individuals’ preferences for work and non-work activities vary over their own life 
time and so do the time they supply to the labour market. In early years, individuals devote 
relatively less time on work for more leisure and schooling than in later years because 
their productivity is low in young adult years and they need to accumulate human capital. 
When they age and their productivity rises, their time spent on work increases whereas 
their time spent on non-work activities decreases. This trend reverses when they further 
age and retire. Older people nowadays are more willing to continuously participate in the 
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labour market, for which we will discuss in next section. As shown in Figure 1.2, 
compared to the traditional model, individuals in their later years are willing to devote 
more time on work before they participate more in non-work activities.  
Figure 1.2: Graphical illustration of life-cycle allocation of time 
 
1.3 Changes in labour force participation rates for older people 
1.3.1 The United States 
As noted by Osberg (1993) and Hofacker (2010), the labour force participation rates 
of older people in the U.S. (and some other European countries) have decreased since the 
end of the Second World War. The trends reversed in 1996 and the participation rates are 
increasing (Mosisa and Hipple, 2006; Sok, 2010). Table 1.1 shows the US labour force 
participation rates by age group and gender from 2003 to 2010. As predicted by the model 
discussed in Section 1.2, it is unsurprising that the participation rates of the middle-age 
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group is the highest, followed by those of younger people and then of older people. The 
participation rates of the younger and the middle age groups are decreasing. In contrast, 
the participation rates of all people over 50 increased gradually from 2003 to 2010, despite 
the economic recession starting in 2007. This trend has also been noted by Gendell (2008), 
Toossi (2009) and Sok (2010). 
The overall participation rates of males have decreased from 2003 to 2010. This is 
the same for the participation rates of the youngest male age group (16 to 24) from 2005. 
The participation rates of middle-aged males fluctuated in the 2000s, whereas the 
participation rates of older males increased gradually. For females, the participation rates 
by various age groups show similar trends as those of the males. The increase in the older 
females’ participation rates is larger than that of older males. This shows that older 
females are increasingly more willing to work than older males. 
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Table 1.1: US labour force participation rates  
by age and gender 
Group Labour force participation rates (%) 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Total 
16 or over 68.09 67.77 67.71 67.61 67.84 67.71 67.21 66.74 
16 to 24 58.35 57.70 58.20 57.67 56.93 56.13 54.30 52.40 
25 to 49 83.83 83.45 83.45 83.51 83.87 83.90 83.50 83.28 
50 or over 48.09 49.06 49.21 49.70 50.71 51.32 51.59 51.57 
Male 
16 or over 75.02 74.81 74.70 74.81 74.78 74.55 73.68 73.09 
16 to 24 59.89 59.99 60.23 60.04 58.63 58.25 55.90 54.28 
25 to 49 92.01 91.92 91.94 92.24 92.48 92.12 91.42 91.23 
50 or over 55.75 56.24 56.43 57.02 57.87 58.42 58.51 57.95 
Female 
16 or over 61.93 61.46 61.42 61.11 61.57 61.56 61.37 60.96 
16 to 24 56.79 55.42 56.12 55.25 55.21 54.02 52.67 50.49 
25 to 49 76.50 75.90 75.89 75.68 76.17 76.54 76.43 76.10 
50 or over 41.49 42.88 42.99 43.38 44.47 45.16 45.57 46.01 
Note: Labour force participation rate:  
the proportion of labour force in the population in the respective age group 
Source: My own calculation using data from the CPS 
1.3.2 The United Kingdom 
As noted by Laczko and Phillipson (1991), the UK labour force participation rates 
of older people have decreased since the end of the Second World War. The trends 
reversed in the early 1990s and the participation rates continued to increase (Lluberas, 
2007; Benito, 2011). Table 1.2 shows the UK labour force participation rates by age group 
and gender from 2001 to 2010. The participation rates of the middle age group have a 
gradual increasing trend, while those of the younger age group show a declining trend. 
The participation rates of all people over 50 also increased gradually but to a larger extent. 
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Table 1.2: UK labour force participation rates  
by age and gender 
 
Group Labour force participation rates (%) 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Total 
16 or 
over 
80.93 81.14 81.31 81.32 81.71 82.08 82.19 82.47 82.36 82.30 
16 to 
24 
85.20 84.62 83.94 83.90 83.45 83.59 83.42 83.54 83.38 83.05 
25 to 
49 
84.21 84.37 84.21 84.18 84.67 85.03 84.91 85.32 85.47 85.30 
50 or 
over 
72.70 73.33 74.61 74.85 75.41 76.00 76.66 76.75 76.44 76.82 
Male 
16 or 
over 
86.63 86.72 86.92 86.65 86.76 86.99 86.91 86.92 86.45 86.38 
16 to 
24 
92.55 91.71 91.47 91.14 90.72 90.42 90.03 90.79 90.14 90.20 
25 to 
49 
92.43 92.58 92.47 92.09 92.19 92.75 92.66 92.72 92.67 92.43 
50 or 
over 
74.31 74.71 76.01 76.15 76.51 76.54 76.68 76.37 75.83 76.34 
Female 
16 or 
over 
75.30 75.63 75.77 76.06 76.71 77.26 77.56 78.07 78.31 78.27 
16 to 
24 
77.84 77.62 76.37 76.60 76.10 76.82 76.85 76.52 76.43 75.73 
25 to 
49 
76.80 76.98 76.89 77.18 77.96 78.20 78.09 78.70 79.12 79.05 
50 or 
over 
70.78 71.67 72.91 73.28 74.10 75.34 76.64 77.22 77.18 77.41 
Note: Labour force participation rate:  
the proportion of labour force in the population in the respective age group 
Source: My own calculation using data from the LFS 
The overall participation rates of male age groups fluctuated, which is in contrast to 
the increasing trend of females’ participation rates. Only the participation rates of older 
males show an increasing trend, whereas the participation rates of both middle-aged and 
older females increase. The increase in the participation rates of older females is much 
larger than that of the older males. This shows that older females are increasingly more 
willing to work than older males in the U.K. 
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1.3.3 Hong Kong 
Chiu and Ngan (1999) noted that the decline in the labour force participation rates 
of older people started in the 1970s. The trends reversed in the early 1990s and the 
participation rates increased. This is similar to the situations in the U.S. and the U.K. 
Table 1.3 shows the labour force participation rates by age group and gender in Hong 
Kong in 2000 and from 2005 to 2010. The participation rates of the younger age group 
have a decreasing trend. The rate of decrease became larger after the start of the 2007 
global financial crisis. In contrast, the participation rates of people over 50 show an 
increasing trend. The global financial crisis did not affect older people’s willingness to 
work. 
The general participation rates of males show a decreasing trend, which is in contrast 
to those of females. For males, only the participation rates of older males show an 
increasing trend. This differs from the situation for females. As noted by Chiu and Ngan 
(1999), the participation rates of females over 60 decreased from 21.7% in 1986 to 12.5% 
in 1995. This results in a relative decrease of 42.4% over 10 years, which is double the 
relative decrease in older males’ participation rates. Nonetheless, the participation rates 
of middle-aged and older females increased in the 2000s. The increase in the participation 
rates of older females is much larger than that of older males. This shows that older 
females are increasingly more willing to work than older males. 
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Table 1.3: Hong Kong labour force participation rates  
by age and gender 
Group Labour force participation rates (%) 
2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Total 
15 or over 61.4 60.9 61.2 61.2 60.9 60.7 59.7 
15 to 24 64.7 62.2 61.5 60.8 59.2 57.6 54.6 
25 to 49 81.7 83.1 83.5 84.1 83.9 84.3 83.6 
50 or over 55.8 57.4 58.1 58.5 59.6 59.8 59.6 
Male 
15 or over 73.5 71.1 70.9 70.5 69.7 69.4 68.6 
15 to 24 64.2 59.8 59.7 57.9 56.7 56.2 53.7 
25 to 49 97.0 95.9 95.8 96.0 95.5 95.5 95.4 
50 or over 73.2 73.7 73.7 74.0 74.6 74.8 74.5 
Female 
15 or over 49.9 51.8 52.6 53.1 53.1 53.1 52.0 
15 to 24 65.0 64.4 63.1 63.4 61.6 59.0 55.5 
25 to 49 69.2 73.0 74.0 74.9 75.3 76.0 75.0 
50 or over 37.6 41.8 43.6 43.9 45.4 45.6 46.0 
Note: Labour force participation rate:  
the proportion of labour force in the population in the respective age group 
Source: Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics 2011 
1.4 Changes in unemployment rates for older people 
1.4.1 The United States 
The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (1999) noted that the unemployment rates for 
older people are usually lower than those of younger ones. This is true for the U.S. in the 
2000s. Table 1.4 shows the US unemployment rates by age group and gender from 2003 
to 2010. As noted by Sok (2010), the unemployment rates for all age groups decreased 
until 2007 and then rose sharply at the start of the 2007 recession. Younger and middle-
aged people are less willing to find jobs during economic recessions, as shown by the 
decreasing labour force participation rates for these two groups in Table 1.1. In contrast, 
older people’s willingness to find jobs are unaffected by the increasing unemployment 
rates. Sok (2010) suggested that older people in the U.S. tend to remain unemployed 
longer than their younger counterparts. The trends for males and females are similar to 
those of the general workforce. 
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Table 1.4: US unemployment rates by age and gender 
 
Group Unemployment rates (%) 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Total 
16 or over 6.13 5.76 5.32 4.82 4.55 5.16 8.67 9.75 
16 to 24 13.44 12.84 12.68 11.58 10.85 12.35 17.60 19.37 
25 to 49 5.26 4.99 4.37 4.04 3.82 4.39 7.85 8.98 
50 or over 4.27 3.85 3.71 3.12 3.12 3.54 6.52 7.34 
Male 
16 or over 6.68 6.15 5.71 5.03 4.91 5.61 10.05 11.12 
16 to 24 14.92 14.24 14.54 12.54 12.07 13.75 20.72 22.42 
25 to 49 5.62 5.20 4.45 4.02 4.03 4.67 9.11 10.14 
50 or over 4.84 4.18 4.09 3.46 3.47 3.94 7.41 8.45 
Female 
16 or over 5.53 5.33 4.88 4.60 4.14 4.68 7.15 8.24 
16 to 24 11.83 11.31 10.61 10.50 9.52 10.83 14.15 15.99 
25 to 49 4.86 4.76 4.29 4.06 3.60 4.09 6.49 7.72 
50 or over 3.62 3.48 3.27 2.73 2.72 3.09 5.52 6.12 
Note: Unemployment rate:  
the proportion of unemployed people in the labour force in the respective age group 
Source: My own calculation using data from the CPS 
1.4.2 The United Kingdom 
Table 1.5 shows the UK unemployment rates by age group and gender from 2001 to 
2010. The unemployment rates of all people over 16 had a decreasing trend until 2004 
and later increased. The rates rose sharply by nearly 2% from 2007 to 2008 and remained 
over 6% in 2000. The unemployment rates of younger people increased gradually and 
then rose sharply between 2008 and 2009. The unemployment rate trend for middle-aged 
people is similar to that of older people, which decreased until 2004 and then rose 
afterwards. However, the rising unemployment rates seem to have no negative effect on 
the middle-aged and older people’s willingness to work. The trends for unemployment 
rates of males and females are similar to those of the general unemployment rates. 
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Table 1.5: UK unemployment rates by age and gender 
 
Group Unemployment rates (%) 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Total 
16 or over 4.32 4.44 4.18 3.83 3.95 4.37 4.28 4.69 6.46 6.67 
16 to 24 10.30 10.68 10.72 10.60 11.33 12.20 12.31 13.05 17.05 17.58 
25 to 49 3.96 4.00 3.72 3.33 3.42 3.97 3.76 4.12 5.85 6.14 
50 or over 2.84 3.04 2.82 2.50 2.51 2.60 2.65 3.11 4.42 4.51 
Male 
16 or over 4.84 4.96 4.69 4.21 4.36 4.71 4.54 5.14 7.46 7.60 
16 to 24 11.75 12.31 11.97 11.76 12.98 13.91 13.83 15.24 19.68 19.79 
25 to 49 4.22 4.28 4.04 3.45 3.52 4.00 3.63 4.21 6.38 6.66 
50 or over 3.58 3.71 3.43 3.11 3.07 3.08 3.22 3.68 5.69 5.67 
Female 
16 or over 3.73 3.85 3.60 3.40 3.49 4.00 4.00 4.19 5.36 5.67 
16 to 24 8.58 8.79 9.21 9.21 9.35 10.22 10.54 10.53 13.85 14.88 
25 to 49 3.68 3.71 3.38 3.20 3.31 3.93 3.91 4.02 5.29 5.60 
50 or over 1.92 2.21 2.05 1.73 1.83 2.02 1.95 2.42 2.93 3.12 
Note: Unemployment rate:  
the proportion of unemployed people in the labour force in the respective age group 
Source: My own calculation using data from the LFS 
1.4.3 Hong Kong 
Table 1.6 shows the unemployment rates by age group and gender in Hong Kong in 
2000 and from 2005 to 2010. It is not surprising to see that the unemployment rates of the 
youngest age group are the highest compared to those of other age groups. Most 
youngsters aged 15 to 19 have not completed their education and so have little working 
experience. Thus they are often not preferred by potential employers. Unemployment 
rates decreased until the start of the 2007 global financial crisis and then rose. 
Nevertheless, the general unemployment rates dropped again from 2009 to 2010. There 
was a decrease in the willingness of younger and middle-aged people to find jobs after 
2008. Similar to the situation of the U.S. and the U.K., older people’s willingness to find 
jobs are unaffected by changes in economic conditions. The trends for males and females 
are similar to that of the general workforce. 
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Table 1.6: Hong Kong unemployment rates  
by age and gender 
 
Group Unemployment rates (%) 
2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Total 
15 or over 4.9 5.6 4.8 4.0 3.6 5.4 4.4 
15 to 19 23.7 21.9 21.9 19.8 16.0 21.8 20.8 
20 to 29 5.8 6.2 5.6 4.6 4.6 7.2 6.6 
30 to 39 3.2 3.8 3.4 2.9 2.4 3.9 3.1 
40 to 49 4.3 5.3 4.3 3.5 3.1 4.6 3.5 
50 to 59 6.0 6.9 5.5 4.6 3.7 5.3 4.2 
60 or over 2.9 3.9 2.6 2.5 1.9 3.0 2.8 
Male 
15 or over 5.6 6.5 5.7 4.6 4.1 6.2 5.1 
15 to 19 23.9 24.2 24.8 20.7 18.1 23.8 22.9 
20 to 29 6.8 8.2 7.3 6.0 5.8 9.3 8.2 
30 to 39 3.7 4.6 4.2 3.4 2.7 4.4 3.6 
40 to 49 4.8 5.7 4.7 3.7 3.3 5.1 4.0 
50 to 59 7.1 7.7 6.3 4.9 4.3 6.1 4.9 
60 or over 3.3 4.3 3.0 2.8 2.2 3.2 3.2 
Female 
15 or over 4.1 4.4 3.8 3.4 3.0 4.4 3.6 
15 to 19 23.4 19.0 18.6 18.7 13.7 19.5 18.2 
20 to 29 4.8 4.4 4.1 3.5 3.6 5.4 5.1 
30 to 39 2.7 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1 3.4 2.6 
40 to 49 3.5 4.6 3.6 3.1 2.9 4.1 2.9 
50 to 59 3.3 5.5 4.1 4.0 2.7 3.9 3.1 
60 or over 1.3 2.4 nil1 1.5 0.9 2.3 1.4 
Note: Unemployment rate: the proportion of unemployed people in the 
labour force in the respective age group 
Source: Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics 2011 and Hong Kong 
Census and Statistics Department (2012) 
1.5 Pension arrangements and statutory retirement age 
Pension arrangements have implications on older people’s incentives to work and 
their retirement age. If older workers value leisure over work and they have no special 
financial difficulties forcing them to work, they would leave the labour market once they 
reach the age when pension benefits are available (Gruber and Wise, 2010) Workers may 
                                                 
1 The statistics is unpublished because of large sampling error (Census and Statistics Department, 2012). 
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invest part of his savings in terms of private or public pensions for different reasons. This 
allows portfolio diversification of his or her savings (Handa, 1994). 
Table 1.7: Pension arrangements and statutory retirement age for each economy 
 
 The U.S. The U.K. Hong Kong 
Public 
pensions 
OASDI: Old-Age, 
Survivors, and Disability 
Insurance program: 
 
- Runs on a pay-as-you-
go basis  
- 84% from social 
security taxes by 
employers and 
employees 
- 14 % from interest in 
accumulated trust 
funds reserves 
- 2% from tax revenues 
by upper-income 
social security 
beneficiaries 
3 components: 
 
- The Basic State 
Pension 
- The State Second 
Pension 
- The Pension Credit 
 
2 forms of the Social 
Security Allowance 
(SSA) Scheme:  
 
- Normal Old Age 
Allowance for people 
aged 65 to 69 (mean-
tested)   
- Higher Old Age 
Allowance for those 
aged 70 or over (not 
mean-tested) 
 
Comprehensive Social 
Security Assistance 
(CSSA) Scheme: 
  
- allows retirees over 
60 to receive social 
security benefits 
while settle in nearby 
provinces 
Occupational 
pensions 
- 60% of the labour 
force are eligible for 
retirement schemes in 
the private sector 
- Defined contribution 
(DC) schemes cover 
40%, whereas defined 
benefit (DB) schemes 
cover 20% 
- Voluntary occupational 
pension system 
- DC schemes become 
more and more 
common than DB 
schemes 
- Mandatory Provident 
Fund (MPF) scheme 
(DC in nature) started 
in 2000 and is 
mandatory for 
employees aged 18 to 
65 
- Occupational 
retirement Schemes 
Ordinance (ORSO), 
which started in 1993 
and can be of DB, 
DC or mixed type, 
continued to operate   
Statutory 
retirement 
age 
- 65-67 - 65 for males and 60 for 
females 
- 65 
Possible 
legislative 
changes 
- Ten states carried out 
reforms on their 
pension systems in 
- The 3-components 
public pension system 
will be replaced by a 
- Fine-tuning on the 
transparency and 
fund operation of the 
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2012, such as 
switching from DB to 
DC or mixed plan, 
raising employees’ 
contribution rates or 
retirement age 
 
full new State Pension 
(140 pounds a week) 
- The Pension Protection 
Fund was set up in 
2006 for compensating 
DB-scheme members 
when there are not 
enough assets in their 
pension scheme 
- Retirement age will be 
raised to 67 by 2028 
regardless of gender 
MPF system 
Sources: 
Pension Funds Online (http://www.pensionfundsonline.co.uk/content/country-profiles);  
GOV.UK (https://www.gov.uk/new-state-pension); 
GovHK (http://www.gov.hk/en/about/abouthk/factsheets/docs/mpf.pdf) 
 
Table 1.7 shows the pension arrangements and statutory retirement age for each 
economy. In all the three economies, DC schemes prevails over DB schemes in 
occupational pension arrangements. Compared to the U.S. and the U.K., “public pension” 
systems in Hong Kong are actually social security schemes which aim at providing safety 
net. In addition, the MPF schemes have started its operation for fourteen years only. Older 
people may not have enough funds for supporting their retirement, especially those who 
have been unemployed for long. Moreover, the possibility of increasing the retirement 
age and encouraging delayed retirement have been raised in the other two economies so 
as to lessen the demand on public financial security. All these encourage older people to 
continue staying in the labour market and can explain the strengthened commitment of 
older people to labour market activity in the 2000s. 
1.6 Studies on employment probabilities of older people 
1.6.1 The United States 
Studies on how different factors affect older people’s employment probabilities in 
the U.S. are common. Hu (2003) examined how firm size affects the age at hire. Hu (2003) 
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first estimated OLS regressions2. His results show that workers hired by the largest firms 
(with more than one thousand employees) are on average, ceteris paribus, 1.89 years 
younger than those hired by the smallest firms (with less than twenty-five employees). 
Furthermore, Hu (2003) plotted a curve of mean age-at-hire against mean training cost by 
industry and found a negative relationship. This suggests that the higher the training cost, 
the lower the hiring age is. Nevertheless, in our view Hu (2003) only shows how firm size 
and training cost affect the age at hire separately. Although he provided evidence that 
training investment increases with firm size, there is no direct evidence to test the theory 
that larger firms tend to invest more in firm-specific human capital and hence prefer to 
hire younger workers. 
As suggested by Hutchens (1988), there are some jobs in which employers find 
difficulty in monitoring employees’ performance. Employers may deal with the problem 
by offering delayed payment contracts to shift the compensation to the end of the 
employees’ service period. Employees who work hard and stay in the firm in order to get 
the high wage reward at a later stage. Those who shirk would risk in getting fired before 
reaping their final compensation. This can discourage workers from leaving too early or 
shirking and thus induce higher productivity. Also, younger workers who are paid below 
their productivity level under this scheme know that their wage will increase over time. 
This gives them a sense of comfort in their jobs (Reday-Mulvey, 2005). Reday-Mulvey 
(2005) suggested that such implicit contracts are common in countries such as Belgium, 
France and Germany. Implicitly, the higher wages of older workers are subsidized by their 
younger colleagues. 
Hutchens (1986) noted that deferred compensation scheme incorporates a fixed cost 
                                                 
2 The data adopted are from the Benefits Supplements to the CPS in 1979, 1983, 1988 and 1993. 
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in the employment relationship. As firms pay the cost each time they hire a new worker, 
they prefer to have long-term employment relationships with younger workers so as to 
minimize hiring costs. Thus firms do not prefer to hire older workers. In addition, Reday-
Mulvey (2005) suggested that older workers are often paid more than their productivity 
and are often the first groups of workers to be made redundant. This creates an obstacle 
to longer working lives.  
Hutchens (1986) is one of the early study on the above issue. He computed an index 
to identify jobs which did not hire older people (Hutchens, 1986, p.452)3 where i indexes 
the industry and j indexes the occupation: 
I (i,j) = 
(𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 ℎ𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 55 𝐴𝑙𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 ℎ𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑠⁄ )𝑖𝑗
(𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 55 𝐴𝑙𝑙 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠⁄ )𝑖𝑗
 
As pointed out by Hirsch et al. (2000), the denominator measures the age structure of an 
occupation, while the numerator reflects the types of occupations in which older people 
are hired. The latter measure can be a misleading indicator of employment probabilities 
because it shows the preferences of both employers and employees. Nevertheless, a low 
value of I implies that the number of new hires of older people relative to the total 
employment of older people in that occupation are small (Hirsch et al., 2000). 
Occupations such as lawyers and janitors have low and high I index values respectively. 
Hutchens (1986, p. 453) further argued that if the occupations in which older people 
are employed but not hired have characteristics of a deferred compensation scheme, 
workers in occupations with low index values should have “long job tenures, high wages, 
pensions and should be subject to mandatory retirement”. He then estimated two logit 
                                                 
3 The data sources are the 1970 census and the National Longitudinal Survey of Men aged 45-59. 
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models on dummy for receiving pensions and dummy for mandatory retirement and two 
OLS models on job tenure and log wage. The index is one of the control variables. The 
empirical result supports the above argument. Also, employment of older people is 
concentrated in sectors without deferred compensation schemes, implying that they have 
less job opportunities than younger people. 
Hutchens (1988) also investigated the hypothesis that job opportunities decline with 
age. If older people really have limited job opportunities, newly hired older workers 
should be less evenly distributed, over different industries and occupations, than newly 
hired younger workers. In addition, if older people are discouraged from certain 
occupations, newly hired older workers should be less evenly distributed than all older 
workers over different industries and occupations. Hutchens used the 1983 CPS and tested 
the above two hypotheses by comparing segregation curves of different groups of 
workers4. If the hypotheses are valid, the segregation curves of newly hired older workers 
should be below those of newly hired younger workers and of all older workers. His 
results support the two hypotheses and provide evidence that job opportunities decline 
with age. 
Hirsch et al. (2000) extended the work of Hutchens (1988) in two ways. Firstly, they 
examined whether Hutchens’s findings are valid by using more years of data5 to plot 
segregation curves and compute Gini measures of occupational segregation. Secondly, 
they examined whether age segregation across industries and occupations has changed 
between 1983 and 1998. Their results supported the finding in Hutchens (1988) that 
                                                 
4 A segregation curve is similar to a Lorenz curve, which gives the cumulative fraction of group 1 people 
on the vertical axis and group 2 people on the horizontal axis. Fractions are ranked from low to high values. 
One segregation curve is “less equal” than the other if it lies all points below or at some points below the 
other. See Hutchens (1988). 
5 In addition to the 1983 CPS, Hirsch et al. (2000) used CPS data from 1987, 1991, 1996 and 1998. 
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occupational segregation of newly hired older workers is greater than that of newly hired 
younger workers and of all older workers. Descriptive statistics for age structures of 
selected occupations shows that older workers’ hiring opportunities are fewer in 
occupations with steep wage-age profiles, pension benefits, and computer usage (a proxy 
for skills). 
In addition to the above issues, economists have paid attention to the employment 
patterns of older people after job loss. As suggested by Chan and Stevens (1999), 
unemployed older people may have lower expectations of finding new jobs and so choose 
to retire. Nevertheless, there are some early studies such as Rones (1983) showing that 
retirement may not be a voluntary choice among older workers. Unemployed older people 
may find greater difficulty in getting a new job than younger workers and so more likely 
to withdraw from the labour market (Hutchens 1988). 
The papers discussed so far studied the economic reasons that can lead to lower 
employment probabilities for older workers. If firms prefer to hire younger people for 
pure economic considerations, we cannot say that they are discriminating against older 
workers. Johnson and Neumark (1997) are among the few papers which studied the 
effects of age discrimination on job separations 6  and spells of non-employment by 
analyzing self-reported age discrimination. The data are from the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Older Men (NLSOM) which collected information on men aged 45 to 59 from 
1966 to 1983. Questions include whether they had a feeling of being discriminated against 
in the workplace on the grounds of age. 
Johnson and Neumark (1997) compared the employment status of older people who 
                                                 
6 The term “job separation” in Johnson and Neumark (1997) refers to quitting the job and leaving the 
employer. 
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claimed they experienced discrimination with those who did not. Three percent of the 
sample reported they had experienced age discrimination in the workplace. The authors 
estimated discrete-time hazard models for job separations and employment status. They 
found that older people who reported age discrimination are more likely to be fired and 
to remain unemployed. There was no robust evidence that age discrimination results in 
longer spells of unemployment or early retirement. Johnson and Neumark (1997) pointed 
out a problem of their study that respondents may differ in their willingness to report 
discrimination. They dealt with this problem by comparing the respondents’ responses at 
different points of time. Another problem about the data, in our view, is that only 
information on male workers is collected. The conclusions may not be applicable to older 
female workers. 
Since the implementation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) in 
1967, researchers have been interested in the effect of the legislation on labour market 
efficiency (Adams, 2004). The legislation is effective if it can increase employment or 
reduce unintended retirement of older workers. Nonetheless, there may be unintended 
consequences. If workers above or below a certain age range are excluded from the law 
coverage, firms may substitute uncovered younger workers with older covered workers. 
This may lead to higher unemployment rates among uncovered workers (see Adams, 
2004). 
Neumark and Stock (1999) investigated the effect of age discrimination legislation 
on the employment of both covered and uncovered workers. They estimated linear 
probability models (LPM) using the US census data in 1940, 1950, 1960, 1970 and 1980. 
Different specifications are used to control the effect of variation in different states and 
changes in federal legislation over the years. Their results show that the legislation has a 
28 
positive employment effect for older, protected workers without affecting the 
employment of younger, unprotected workers.  
Adams (2004) pointed out that Neumark and Stock (1999) did not include those 
above the protected age range in their analyses. Adams provided a more comprehensive 
study by including workers above the protected age range7. His difference-in-difference 
analysis showed that in states with anti-discrimination legislation the probability of 
employment for covered workers increased by 2.75 percent. There was also a decrease in 
retirement among covered workers. In contrast, there were reductions in employment and 
increases in retirement for uncovered workers. 
Scott et al. (1995) noted that anti-discrimination legislation may increase health 
insurance costs to employers. The ADEA requires all the workers having the same 
experience within a firm to receive the same fringe benefits including health insurance. 
Facing potentially costly benefits, employers may avoid hiring older people as this may 
raise the insurance costs. Scott et al. (1995) studied the effects of fringe benefit provision 
such as health insurance on firms’ decision to hire older workers8. Their tobit and probit 
estimates show that the probability of hiring a new worker aged 55-64 is much lower in 
firms with health care schemes or firms with costly fringe benefit plans.  
Garen et al. (1996) conducted a similar study using another US dataset9 and focused 
on the role of pensions in the compensation structure of firms. The two kinds of pension 
plans are “defined contribution pensions” and “defined benefit pensions”. Defined 
                                                 
7 The data comes from the annual demographic files of the CPS from 1964 to 1967. 
8 The data used are the nationwide survey of employers in 1991 and the Employee Benefits Supplement of 
the CPS in 1979, 1983, 1988 and 1993. 
9 Garen et al. (1996) collected the data by conducting a nationwide survey of employers in 1991. They 
obtained information on the employment experiences of older workers, characteristics of the firms they are 
working in, etc. 
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contribution pensions are tax-deferred savings plans which require both employer and 
employee to make contributions. For defined benefit pensions, employees’ retirement 
benefits are determined based on employees’ service years, salary and a generosity factor 
(see Garen et al., 1996). Their tobit model estimates show that firms offering defined 
contribution pensions hire workers regardless of their age. However, firms offering 
defined benefit pensions are willing to keep older workers, but they tend not to hire them 
at entry level. This practice is similar to firms offering deferred compensation schemes. 
1.6.2 The United Kingdom 
UK studies on employment probabilities for older people are much fewer than those 
for the U.S. Campbell (1999) is a detailed study on these issues. Using statistics derived 
from the LFS and the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), he found that two-fifths 
of workers aged 55 to 65 were unemployed and displaced older workers found re-
employment difficult. Campbell (1999) then investigated five features contributing to the 
fall in employment rates among older workers. He investigated the increase in the 
voluntary retirement of older workers, more limitations on job choices, more widespread 
availability of occupational pensions (OP), skill-biased technological change and 
increasing age discrimination. From his statistical analysis, he found that only the first 
four played a significant role in reducing older workers’ employment. 
For the fifth factor of age discrimination, Campbell (1999) cited a qualitative study 
of McKay and Middleton (1998) and presented percentages of older people who feel that 
they have been discriminated against on the grounds of age. He concluded from the results 
of McKay and Middleton (1998) that age discrimination is relatively rare and so it is 
unlikely to be a major cause of the fall in older workers’ employment. Nonetheless, in our 
view this conclusion is not convincing as the author did not carry out any direct tests on 
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the effects of age discrimination. Moreover, as suggested by Campbell (1999), people can 
be discriminated against without being aware of it. Others may even attribute any 
undesired treatment received in the workplace to age discrimination. This creates biases 
on drawing conclusions from qualitative data. 
Similarly to Hutchens (1986, 1988) and Hirsch et al. (2000), Daniel and Heywood 
(2007) explored how deferred compensation schemes affect the hiring of older workers10. 
They used the proportion of newly hired workers over 50 as the dependent variable in 
ordinary least squares (OLS) models. The coefficient on the dummy for firms using 
deferred compensation had a significant negative sign, suggesting that firms adopting 
deferred compensation schemes hired a smaller share of older workers.  
McQuaid et al. (2004) examined whether the UK labour market policies effectively 
targeted the unemployed job seekers. 306 unemployed job seekers were initially drawn 
from 13 Employment Service Job Centres in Bathgate and Edinburgh. After a follow-up 
survey, 169 responses were finally traced successfully and the data was analysed. Their 
binary logistic models show that being older and long-term unemployed is negatively 
associated with finding a job11. McQuaid et al. (2004) suggested that older people deserve 
special attention for reasons such as age discrimination. Government employment 
policies often target the long-term unemployed workers but provide no special measures 
for older job seekers. 
1.6.3 Hong Kong 
Studies on employment probabilities of older people in Hong Kong are much fewer 
                                                 
10 They used individual and establishment level data based on the Workplace Employment Relations 
Survey (WERS) in 1998 for their analysis. 
11 McQuaid et al. (2004) studied different groups of job seekers with different demographic background. 
We only discuss their findings on older workers. 
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than those in western economies. Heywood et al. (1999) studied the determinants of older 
workers’ employment probabilities such as deferred compensation schemes. They 
conducted a survey in 1996 and collected information on the age structure of employment, 
education levels by occupation and other characteristics. They computed the opportunity 
I index developed by Hutchens (1986)12 with 35 as the cut-off between younger and older 
people instead of 55. This allowed them a closer look at the hiring probabilities of younger 
workers. The index was regressed against a series of independent variables and their 
results show that long-term employment and the use of deferred compensation schemes 
are correlated with lower hiring probabilities of older workers. One of their findings was 
that larger firms seem to be more willing to hire older workers, which differs from the 
result found by Hu (2003). Heywood et al. (1999) also estimated probit models on 
managers’ preference for hiring younger workers. The dependent variable was one if a 
manager hired a younger worker and zero otherwise. Most of the estimated coefficients 
were positive, which supports their OLS regression results, showing that older people are 
less likely to be hired. 
Ho et al. (2000) compared the employment and unemployment conditions between 
younger and older people in the labour market13. The claim is that the major challenges 
faced by the unemployed are “longer unemployment duration, fewer job-offers, and lower 
wage expectations” and the challenges faced by the employed are “a relative paucity in 
the opportunities for promotion and for training offered by their employers” (Ho et al., 
2000, p.284). Their OLS results show that unemployment duration increases with age and 
that job offers received by unemployed people aged between 45 and 54 are less than those 
                                                 
12 The study of Hutchens (1986) is discussed in sub-section 1.3.1. For the definition of the index, see the 
paragraph on Hutchens (1986). 
13 Data from the Public Survey and the Job Centre Survey in 1996 were used for analysis. 
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by younger age groups14. Ho et al. (2000) also estimated probit models on employment 
status, presence of promotion and training opportunities. They found that older people are 
more likely to be unemployed and less likely to get promotion and training. To summarise, 
they presented evidence that older people are disadvantaged compared to younger people 
in Hong Kong. However, they did not resolve the riddle of whether the disadvantage 
arises from pure economic motives or anything else. 
1.7 Studies on the gender dimension 
Many studies on employment probabilities focus on either the gender aspect 
(Johnson, 1983; Mohanty, 1998; Chen and Hamori, 2008, 2010) or the age aspect 
(Johnson and Neumark, 1997; McKay and Middleton, 1998). Not many of these address 
both the gender and age dimension. As pointed out by Ginn and Arber (1996), researchers 
have put emphasis on the employment of older males rather than older females. One of 
the origins for such bias is the intermittent nature of female employment (Duncan and 
Loretto, 2004). Female workers may leave the labour market temporarily during instances 
such as child rearing. This distracts researchers’ attention from studying older females. 
Nonetheless, Ginn and Arber (1996) noted that the female labour force participation rate 
is high when women are in their 40s but drops remarkably afterwards. This draws 
attention to the difference in employment probabilities between younger and older 
females. 
Peracchi and Welch (1994) used the matched and unmatched March Current 
Population Survey (CPS) to study the changes in participation rates of US older male and 
female workers in the 1970s and 1980s. Their descriptive statistics show that there was a 
                                                 
14 Further discussion on studies on unemployment and employment durations is made in Chapter 5. 
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decreasing trend in labour force participation among men of all ages. This might be the 
result of early retirement and fewer opportunities for less skilled workers 15 . The 
participation rates of female workers increased since the 1970s except for those aged 60 
or over. Peracchi and Welch (1994) predicted that when those younger female workers in 
the 1970s and 1980s got older in later years, they should have more working experience 
and became more competent than any previous cohorts. Thus they would be more willing 
to stay in the labour market. The participation rates of older female workers would 
increase afterwards. However, Mosisa and Hipple (2006) noted that the participation rate 
of older females was steady in the 1990s, which differed from the prediction of Peracchi 
and Welch (1994). 
1.8 Approaches to studying employment probabilities 
1.8.1 General overview 
The studies discussed above used various regression techniques to examine older 
workers’ employment probabilities. For example, Adams (2004) applied a difference-in-
difference approach to study the effects of age discrimination legislation on employment. 
Hirsch et al. (2000) run weighted least squares (WLS) regressions to study the 
employment opportunities of male and female older workers. Among the different 
methods, probability models are most commonly used to estimate the employment 
probabilities of older workers. For instance, Scott et al. (1995) used tobit and probit 
models to study the effects of fringe benefit provision, such as health insurance, on US 
firms’ decisions to hire older workers. Neumark and Stock (1999) estimated LPMs to 
investigate the effect of US age discrimination legislation on the employment of older 
                                                 
15 Peracchi and Welch (1994) did not pay attention to the possible effect of age discrimination. 
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and younger workers. Heywood et al. (2010) used German data to estimate probit models 
on the relationship between deferred compensation schemes, training, and hiring of older 
people using data in Germany. Many of the above studies found that older people have 
lower employment probabilities. Nonetheless, they cannot tell whether this is purely due 
to factors under their control because other uncontrolled factors such as age 
discrimination can also affect employment probabilities (Peracchi and Welch, 1994; Scott 
et al., 1995; Ho et al., 2000). 
The complex link between age and workers’ performance makes the analyses of 
unknown factors difficult. There are no standard regression approaches to study the effect 
of unknown factors on employment probabilities (Adams and Neumark, 2006). Johnson 
and Neumark (1997) provided two explanations on this point. Firstly, older people 
generally have more working experience and hence higher productivity, which 
differentiates them from their younger counterparts. Secondly, there may be skill 
deterioration as workers become older (Hellerstein et al., 1996). The two effects may 
cancel out each other and produce complex results (Adams and Neumark, 2006).  
Researchers may rely on specially designed surveys to study the effect of otherwise 
unidentifiable factors. Levitt (2004) and Adams and Neumark (2006) discussed the use 
of audit studies to detect racial and gender discrimination in employment. Information on 
matched pairs of similar job applicants is sent to employers for entry assessment. Any 
differential treatment is attributed to discrimination. Adams and Neumark (2006) 
commented that this approach is not appropriate for studying the effect of unknown 
factors on differential employment probabilities by age for two reasons. Firstly, audit 
studies are often conducted for positions requiring simple hiring decisions such as entry-
level positions. This may not be relevant for older people who already have many years 
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of working experience and tend to apply for senior positions. Secondly, masking the 
differences between older and younger people on paper is difficult. Employers can tell 
the approximate age of applicants from job-related information such as working 
experience.  
Johnson and Neumark (1997) provided an alternative way of investigating the issue. 
They analysed self-reports of age discrimination and estimated discrete-time hazard 
models of job separations and employment status. However, there may be spurious 
correlations between self-reported age discrimination and negative labour market 
outcomes (Adams and Neumark, 2006). Workers who are fired due to their bad 
performance but not age discrimination may report something negative about their 
previous employers. Conclusions drawn from the analyses of survey data are not highly 
convincing. As suggested by Johnson and Neumark (1997), finding alternative 
approaches to study the issue should be the focus for future research. An approach, which 
can differentiate contributions of differences in observable and unobservable 
characteristics to the differential employment probabilities between older and younger 
workers, is needed. The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition technique can provide a way of 
doing so.  
1.8.2 Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 
The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, proposed by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973), 
is a common technique used to study wage gaps (or other inter-group differences at mean 
levels) between two groups of people such as whites and blacks or males and females in 
the labour market. It is also commonly used in other fields to study group differences in 
any outcome variable. For instance, Chung, Lim and Lee (2010) applied the 
decomposition methods to study the gender differences in smoking in South Korea. The 
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technique decomposes the outcome into contributions of the differences in observable 
characteristics under control and those in unobservable characteristics such as 
discrimination. The procedure only requires estimates from linear regressions on the 
outcome of interest and the sample means of independent variables (Fairlie, 2005). The 
conceptual framework discussed hereafter is based on Chi et al. (2007) with some 
modifications. Suppose workers’ wages are the outcome of interest. The first step in the 
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition involves OLS estimation on the wages of the two groups: 
(1) =  +  
where i indexes workers in group 1 or group 0, 𝑋𝑖  is the row vector of workers’ 
characteristics, 𝛽𝑖  is the parameters and 𝑒?̂?  is the residual term. Three mean wage 
vectors usually in logarithmic form, 𝑌1̅, Y0̅̅̅ and Yc̅, are defined. Y1̅ is the mean log-
wage vector with both workers’ characteristics and wage structure in group 1 as follows: 
(2) 𝑌1̅ = 𝑋1̅̅ ̅𝛽1̂  
where X1̅̅ ̅ is the row vector of average workers’ characteristics in group 1 and 𝛽1̂  is 
the estimated parameters for workers in group 1. The residual term drops out by definition 
because the mean value of residuals is zero. 𝑌c̅ is the counterfactual mean wage vector 
with workers’ characteristics in group 1, but the wage structure in group 0 16 . The 
decomposition of workers’ mean wage gap is carried out as follows: 
(3) 𝑌1̅ − 𝑌0̅ = (𝑌1̅ − 𝑌c̅) + (𝑌c̅ − 𝑌0̅) 
                                                 
16 Depending on which group is chosen as the reference, the counterfactual wage vector can be defined 
alternatively as a mean wage vector with workers’ characteristics in group 0, but wage structure in group 1 
(Jann, 2008a).  
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           = (𝑋1̅̅ ̅𝛽1̂ − 𝑋1̅̅ ̅𝛽0̂) + (𝑋1̅̅ ̅𝛽0̂ − 𝑋0̅̅ ̅𝛽0̂) 
           = 𝑋1̅̅ ̅ (𝛽1̂ − 𝛽0̂) + 𝛽0̂ (𝑋1̅̅ ̅ − 𝑋0̅̅ ̅) 
The first term measures the mean wage difference due to differences in unobservable 
characteristics such as discrimination, and the second term measures the mean wage 
difference due to differences in observable characteristics under control. Many studies 
such as Neuman and Oaxaca (1998), Chi et al. (2007) and Richard (2007) adopted this 
method to investigate the issue of wage gaps. 
In recent years, the technique has been extended by Gomulka and Stern (1990) and 
Nielsen (1998) to allow for decompositions based on logit or probit models respectively. 
The conceptual framework discussed hereafter is based on Gomulka and Stern (1990) 
with some modifications. Consider the probability of employment conditional on a set of 
independent variables X and model parameters 𝛽: 
(4) Pr (y = 1 | X) = P (𝛽, X)  
The estimated sample average is shown as follows: 
(5) ?̂? ≡ P(?̂? , ?̅?) 
where P(?̂? , ?̅?) is the average predicted probability in the sample using the estimated 
parameters ?̂?  and average X. The decomposition of the difference in average value 
between group 1 and group 0 can be carried out as follows: 
(6) 𝑦1̂ − 𝑦0̂ = [P (𝛽1̂ , 𝑋1̅̅ ̅) − P (𝛽0̂ , 𝑋1̅̅ ̅)] + [P (𝛽0̂ , 𝑋1̅̅ ̅) − P (𝛽0̂ , 𝑋0̅̅ ̅)] 
The first term measures the difference in probability of employment due to differences in 
unobservable characteristics such as discrimination. The characteristics of younger and 
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older people are assumed the same here. The second term measures the difference in 
probability of employment due to differences in observable characteristics. The 
parameters of younger and older people are assumed to be the same. Fairlie (2005) 
compared the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition results on probit models and those on LPM 
by studying the difference in computer ownership between blacks and whites in the U.S. 
The estimates do not differ substantially. Nonetheless, Fairlie (2005) noted that the 
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition on LPM may not perform well when the gap is located 
near the tails of the distribution, or the differences in independent variables between the 
two groups are very large. Also, under the LPM the estimated results may be larger than 
1 or less than 0, which are difficult to interpret in terms of probability. Oaxaca-Blinder 
decompositions on probit or logit models do not have these problems. 
Studies using this technique have become common. Fairlie (1999) used the US Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) from 1968 to 1989 to examine the causes of 
differences in self-employment between blacks and whites. His results of decompositions 
on logit models show that African-American men are less likely to be self-employed than 
white men by two-thirds. Wealth levels and probabilities of having self-employed fathers 
are the factors contributing to a large part of the difference in the self-employment rate. 
However, the two factors do not contribute to the gap in the exit rate.  
Livanos et al. (2009) used data from the Greek and U.K. LFSs in the early 2000s to 
study the gender-based employment discrimination. Their results for decompositions on 
logit models show that a large residual gap of unemployment between males and females 
exists for both countries. One explanation for the more favourable position of males is 
gender discrimination in the labour market. 
Chen and Hamori (2010) used pooling data of the 2004 and 2006 China Health and 
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Nutrition Survey (CHNS) to examine the difference between male and female formal 
employment in urban China. Their decomposition results on univariate probit models 
show that about 87% of the difference in formal employment probability is explained by 
discrimination against females. Nevertheless, the decomposition on bivariate probit 
models gave a different result. The differences in observable characteristics accounts for 
about 72% of the probability differential in formal employment. 
1.9 Final remarks 
To summarise, older people in all the three economies had a strengthened 
commitment to labour market activity in the 2000s. Facing higher unemployment rates 
after the 2007 start of the global financial crisis, only younger and middle-aged people 
are less willing to participate in the labour market. Changes in economic conditions do 
not affect older people’s willingness to find jobs in the three economies. Furthermore, 
older females in all the three economies experienced a larger increase in willingness to 
work than older males. This supports the suggestion of Reday-Mulvey (2005) that the 
labour force in many European economies, such as the U.K., has becomes older and more 
feminine. The U.S. and Hong Kong have faced a similar situation. An increase in the 
retirement age in the U.S. and the U.K. and unreliability of the “pension system” in Hong 
Kong are the possible causes of this situation. It is therefore important to study to what 
extent older people, especially older females, remain competitive in getting jobs 
compared to their younger counterparts. 
There are more studies on employment probabilities in the U.S. than in the other two 
economies for two reasons. First, micro-level labour force data are more widely available 
in the western economies than in Hong Kong. Governmental data such as the US CPS are 
freely available, whereas governmental data in Hong Kong is available only upon 
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purchase. Second, there was earlier concern about the issue in the U.S. than in the other 
two economies. Age discrimination and employment prospects of older people have 
aroused public concern in the U.S. before the enactment of anti-discrimination legislation 
in 1967. In the U.K., age-related legislation was enacted in the 2000s (Gaster, 2002). 
There is no age discrimination legislation in Hong Kong. A comparative study of older 
people’s employment probabilities among these three economies is therefore meaningful. 
Also, the gender aspect on the issue or age-related work patterns should be investigated 
because ignoring these gender differences may conceal important patterns. 
Despite more attention being paid to the age issue in the U.S., there still exist few 
economic studies on differential employment probabilities by age in the US labour market. 
Studies on employment probabilities among older people are common, but they often 
ignore the effect of unknown factors such as age discrimination on differential 
employment probabilities by age (Peracchi and Welch, 1994). Friedman (1984) provided 
an explanation for the lack of studies on age discrimination in economics. Evidence of 
discrimination against older people is less convincing than that for other demographic 
groups. Discrimination is suspected in the labour market when workers’ employment is 
affected by factors unrelated to productivity. Thus economic analyses measuring gender 
or racial discrimination often control for productivity-related factors and attribute the 
unexplained part because of discrimination. However, this approach may not be 
appropriate in the study of age discrimination. Johnson and Neumark (1997) stated that 
two factors, working experience and deterioration of skills, can affect the comparability 
of productivity between younger and older workers.  
Nonetheless, in our view these two factors do not really cause a serious problem. 
Working experience is often controlled for in many statistical analyses. The matter here 
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is how working experience is measured, which can affect the accuracy of capturing the 
effect of experience17. The second issue is related to the quality of workers’ skills, which 
is often a potential problem commonly found in labour research but is not a problem 
unique to the study of age discrimination. Studies, such as Johnson and Neumark (1997), 
deal with these two problems by analysing self-reported age discrimination. However, as 
pointed out before, there is bias in drawing conclusions from qualitative data. A 
quantitative analysis is needed which can differentiate contributions of differences in 
observable and unobservable characteristics to the differential employment probabilities 
between older and younger workers. The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition on employment 
probabilities is a possible method for doing so. The next chapter discusses our empirical 
framework to address this issue and the estimation results. 
  
                                                 
17 The information on working experience may be absent in some datasets and researchers may need to 
derive this measure from other variables in the dataset. An example of such datasets is the Hong Kong 
Census and By-census. A more detailed account is provided in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2  
OLDER VERSUS YOUNGER PEOPLE’S EMPLOYMENT 
PROBABILITIES: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the data used, the empirical framework and the analysis 
results on the employment probabilities of older versus younger people. We suggested in 
the previous chapter that, despite the increase in labour force participation rates of older 
people in ageing societies such as the U.S., the U.K. and Hong Kong, so far there are few 
economic studies on differential employment probabilities by age. This study aims to 
provide new insights on this issue with two specific research objectives. Firstly, it aims 
to provide new insights on the employment probabilities of older people in the U.S., the 
U.K. and Hong Kong. As suggested in the previous chapter, there are more studies on 
employment probabilities in the U.S. than in the other two economies because more 
attention has been paid to this issue in the U.S. Many studies found that older people have 
lower employment probabilities than younger people. However, they cannot tell whether 
this is purely due to the factors under the control in the analyses because other 
uncontrolled factors such as age discrimination can also affect employment probabilities 
(Peracchi and Welch, 1994; Scott et al., 1995; Ho et al., 2000).  
We use the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition to differentiate contributions of 
differences in observable and unobservable characteristics to the differential employment 
probabilities between older and younger people. The framework for Fuller Working Lives 
proposed by the Department for Work and Pensions in June 2014 finds that in 2013 the 
UK economy would have been boosted by 18 billion pounds if the employment gap 
between people aged 40s and those aged 50s to SPA had been halved (Department for 
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Work and Pensions, 2014). The decomposition results can be used as a reference by 
governments to assess the competitiveness of older people compared to their younger 
counterparts in different economies and help narrow age-employment gaps.  
Secondly, this study aims to investigate the neglected aspect of gender in this context. 
As suggested in the previous chapter, many studies on employment probabilities focus on 
either gender (Johnson, 1983; Mohanty, 1998; Chen and Hamori, 2008, 2010) or age 
(Johnson and Neumark, 1997; McKay and Middleton, 1998). Not many of these address 
both the age and gender dimension. Ginn and Arber (1996) and Duncan and Loretto (2004) 
pointed out that researchers focus on the employment of older males rather than older 
females. This may conceal important patterns. As suggested in the previous chapter, the 
labour force in those three economies has become older and more feminine. It is important 
to investigate whether there are any differences in employment probabilities between 
older males and older females. 
The two research dimensions identified above lead us to apply the binomial logit 
models and the non-linear Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition to investigate five specific 
research questions. Firstly, which is the most important factor affecting the employment 
probabilities of younger people and older people? Secondly, what is the magnitude of the 
difference in employment probabilities between younger people and older people? 
Thirdly, to what extent are the differences in employment probabilities attributable to the 
explained factors (differences in observable characteristics) and the unexplained factors 
(differences in unobservable characteristics)? Fourthly, do the answers to the above three 
questions differ for males and females? Fifthly, do the answers to the above four questions 
differ between the U.S., the U.K. and Hong Kong? 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a 
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discussion on the background and treatment of the data. Section 2.3 discusses the 
summary statistics for the samples. Section 2.4 presents the estimation framework for our 
analyses. Section 2.5 and 2.6 discuss the estimation results. Section 2.7 concludes. 
2.2 Data 
All the datasets for the three economies are time-series of independently pooled 
cross-sectional data. The datasets of each economy are constructed by pooling data of the 
same population at various points of time. This increases the sample size so as to 
strengthen the robustness of the estimation results (Wooldridge, 2006). Many studies in 
labour economics, such as Gomulka and Stern (1990) and Chen and Hamori (2010), use 
independently pooled cross-sectional data. The background to the data of each economy 
is introduced in the following sub-sections18.  
2.2.1 The United States: The Annual Social and Economic (ASEC) Supplements to 
the Current Population Survey (CPS) 
The CPS is a monthly household survey sponsored jointly by the U.S. Census 
Bureau and the U.S. Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS) since the 1940s. It collects 
monthly socio-demographic data for 60,000 US households sampled from all the US 
states. The households are surveyed once within a four-month period, are excluded in the 
next eight months and then are surveyed again once within a four-month period before 
leaving the sample permanently. This sampling scheme allows for constant replenishment 
of the sample and avoids exerting excessive burden on respondents. The respondents are 
interviewed either face to face or by telephone (see U.S. Census Bureau, n.d. and U.S. 
                                                 
18 All the data sources are acknowledged in the References. 
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Bureau of Labour Statistics, n.d.).  
In addition to the basic monthly CPS files, supplementary CPS files are available. 
These have the same data as the basic files plus supplemental data gathered periodically 
(National Bureau of Economic Research, 2012). The supplementary files include 
information relevant for the analyses of labour markets such as work activity (U.S. Census 
Bureau, n.d.). CPS supplementary files are widely used for research. Peracchi and Welch 
(1994) used the matched and unmatched March CPS to study changes in the labour force 
participation rate of older male and female workers in the 1970s and 1980s. Hu (2003) 
used the Benefits Supplement to the CPS to examine how firm size affects the age at hire. 
Fairlie (2005) used the Computer and Internet Use Supplement to the CPS in August 2000 
to estimate racial gap in home computer rates. The CPS is widely used for various 
purposes such as constructing economic indicators and conducting econometric analyses 
for the U.S. (Hutchens, 1988; Hirsch et al., 2000; Adams, 2004). 
We use the Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) Supplements to the 
CPS from 2003 to 2010 for our analyses. We cannot use earlier years because the race 
variables before 2003 are not comparable to those from 2003 onwards. As noted by the 
National Bureau of Economic Research (2012), the ASEC Supplement was formerly 
known as the Annual Demographic File. It contains the basic data included in the basic 
monthly files plus additional data relevant for this study such as income, noncash benefits, 
and migration. The data are accessed from the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER) website. 
2.2.2 The United Kingdom: The Labour Force Survey (LFS) 
The LFS, conducted by the Social and Vital Statistics Division of the Office for 
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National Statistics (ONS) and the Central Survey Unit (CSU) of the Northern Ireland 
Statistics and Research Agency (NISRA), is a quarterly household survey designed to 
collect socio-demographic data on the UK population. It ran on a biennial basis between 
1973 and 1983, on an annual basis between 1984 and 1991, and a quarterly basis since 
the spring of 1992. To comply with EU regulations, the LFS moved from seasonal 
quarters (spring, summer, autumn, winter) to calendar quarters (January-March, April-
June, July-September, October-December) in 2006 (UK Data Archive Study Group, 
2009). According to ESDS Government (2011a, 2011b), each quarterly sample consists 
of five waves with roughly 57,000 households. Each wave has around 12,000 households. 
Each wave of households is interviewed in five consecutive quarters. All adults within a 
household are interviewed face to face when they are included in the survey for the first 
time. They are interviewed by telephone in the next four successive waves. The LFS is 
widely used for econometric analyses (Campbell, 1999; Livanos et al., 2009). We use the 
LFS from 2001q2 to 2010q4 for the analysis of the U.K because the data prior to 2001q2 
do not have any ethnicity variables. The data are accessed from the UK Data Archive 
website. 
2.2.3 Hong Kong: The Population Census and By-census 
As described by the Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department (2007b), the 
Hong Kong Population Census is a citywide survey conducted by the Hong Kong Census 
and Statistics Department since 1961. They collect socio-demographic data of the Hong 
Kong population. Respondents provide their information by completing questionnaires 
during interviews. The By-census, which is a smaller-scale version of census and has an 
incomplete headcount of the population, has been being conducted since 1966. The 
Population Census is conducted every ten years and the By-census is conducted in the 
middle of the intercensal period (see Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, 
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2007b). According to Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department (1992, 1997, 2002, 
2007a), the original samples of the censuses and by-censuses do not strictly follow the 
principle of EPSEM19. Proper action has been taken by the department statisticians to 
ensure that individuals in all districts have an equal probability of being selected for 
interviews. The Hong Kong Census and By-census are widely used for econometric 
analyses of labour markets (Lui and Suen, 1998; Chan, Sung and Zhang, 2001; Ng, 2001; 
Lui, 2008).  
We use four Population Census and By-census 5% sample datasets from 1991 to 
2006 for the analyses on Hong Kong. The number of observations included is not as large 
as those in the U.S. and the U.K.20 This is due to the limitation of the data frequencies 
and the consideration of providing an up-to-date analysis. The data were purchased from 
the Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department.  
2.2.4 Variables and data treatment 
The choice of variables is based on the literature and availability of relevant 
information in the datasets (Chan and Steven, 2001; Adams, 2004; Daniel and Heywood, 
2007; Chen and Hamori, 2008; Livanos et al., 2009). Table 2.1 shows the categories of 
variables included in the regression analyses for each economy. The variables included 
cover the demographic, human capital and household characteristics of the respondents. 
Most variables related to the demographic and human capital characteristics can be found 
in the regression equations of all the three economies. Although the same variables may 
have different categories and definitions in different economies, we standardise these 
                                                 
19  EPSEM (Equal Probability of SElection Method) is a principle of selecting sample so that every 
individual within the population has an equal chance of being selected (Healey, 2005). 
20 Tables 2.3 to 2.5 in the Appendix show the number of observations for analysis of each economy. 
48 
variables for comparison among the three economies.  
Table 2.1: Categories of independent variables  
included in the regression analyses for each economy 
Regressions for: The 
U.S. 
The 
U.K. 
Hong 
Kong 
Demographic characteristics 
Gender    
Marital status    
Nationality    
Ethnicity    
Health status    
Human capital characteristics 
Education    
Working experience    
Household characteristics 
Number of dependent children aged 4 or less    
Number of dependent children aged between 5 and 9    
Number of dependent children aged between 10 and 15    
Total unearned income    
Region of residence    
Others 
Year dummies    
The analyses for Hong Kong do not include the ethnicity dummies due to the 
absence of the ethnicity information in the 1990s datasets. The analyses for each economy 
include different sets of household variables subject to the availability of information. As 
noted by Wooldridge (2006), the distribution of the population may change over time in 
pooled cross-sectional data. Thus, year dummies are included to reflect the possible 
changes in year-specific effects. 
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Table 2.2: Description for the variables 
Dependent variable 
Employed Employment dummy for being employed 
Independent variables 
Male Male gender 
MS_Married* Marital status for being married 
MS_Single Marital status for being single 
MS_Separ_Divor Marital status for being separated or divorced 
MS_Widowed Marital status for being widowed 
Foreign Nationality for being foreigner 
Ethn_White* Ethnicity for being White 
Ethn_Black Ethnicity for being Black 
Ethn_Asian Ethnicity for being Asian 
Ethn_Mixed Ethnicity for being mixed 
Ethn_Other Ethnicity for being in other ethnic group 
Health_problems Health-status for having health problems limiting kinds of 
work 
Qual_Degree Qualification for having a university degree or above 
Qual_Postsec Qualification for having a college or associate degree 
Qual_Secondary Qualification for having a secondary school qualification 
Qual_Primary* Qualification for having a primary school qualification or 
below 
Exp Potential working experience = (age at the time of survey 
minus age completed education) 
ExpSq Square term of working experience 
#KidsAged_0to4 Number of dependent children in family aged 4 or less 
#KidsAged _5to9 Number of dependent children in family aged 5 to 9 
#KidsAged_10to15 Number of dependent children in family aged 10 to 15 
UnearnedY_per1000 Total unearned income = (total family income minus total 
personal income)/1000 
R_South* Region of residence for living in the South (for the U.S.) 
R_West Region of residence for living in the West (for the U.S.) 
R_Midwest Region of residence for living in the Midwest (for the U.S.) 
R_Northeast Region of residence for living in the Northeast (for the 
U.S.) 
R_England* Region of residence for living in England (for the U.K.) 
R_Wales Region of residence for living in the Wales (for the U.K.) 
R_Scotland Region of residence for living in Scotland (for the U.K.) 
R_NorthIreland Region of residence for living in North Ireland (for the 
U.K.) 
(Year dummies) Survey year (the earliest year is the control group) 
* Denotes control variables 
Table 2.2 provides the descriptions for the variables. Data on actual working 
experience is not available in all three economies. We calculate the potential working 
experience (Exp) as the substitute of the actual working experience, which is equal to the 
age of the respondents when they are surveyed minus the age they completed education. 
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It is assumed that an individual starts gaining working experience as soon as he or she 
has graduated. The age at which education is completed is inferred from the 
corresponding year of achieving the highest educational qualification21. Our method of 
calculating the potential working experience is similar to the common practice of 
subtracting age by years of schooling and the value 622 (Lui and Suen, 1998; Ng, 2001; 
Boudarbat and Lemieux, 2007).  
In theory, the level of family income affects an individual’s employment probability. 
However, individual’s personal income is included within the family income, which is 
affected by one’s employment status. Thus the variable on family income is endogenous 
in the regressions on employment probability. We use the variable on the total unearned 
income (UnearnedY/1000), which is equal to the total family income minus the total 
personal income and then divided by 1000, as an instrumental variable of the total family 
income to control for endogeneity. The division by 1000 is to scale the estimated 
coefficients. The estimated parameter on UnearnedY/1000 should in theory be negative, 
which is the same as that on family income. The values of UnearnedY/1000 are deflated 
to 2010 prices23. 
There is no consensus on the cut-off age between being younger or older in the 
literature. Some studies defined the cut-off as 55 (Hutchens, 1986), while others defined 
it as 35 (Duncan and Loretto, 2004). There are a few studies using 45 as the cut-off age 
(Osberg, 1993; Johnson and Neumark, 1997). The most widely used cut-off age is 50 
(Peracchi and Welch, 1994; Hirsch et al., 2000; Chan and Stevens, 2001; NOP Social and 
                                                 
21 The inference is done for the data of the U.S. and of Hong Kong only. The data of the U.K. has the 
variable on age completed education ready for use. 
22 The age completed education should be equal to the years of schooling plus the number of 6, assuming 
an individual started his or her education at the age of 6. 
23 The composite price index data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics in the US Department of Labor and 
the Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department are used for the price adjustment of data in the U.S. and 
Hong Kong respectively. 
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Political, 2001; Adams, 2004; Chou and Chow, 2005). Thus we use age 50 as the cut-off 
between younger and older people. 
We exclude any data irrelevant for the analysis. Firstly, people who are below the 
minimum employment age are excluded 24 . Secondly, data with inconsistencies and 
incomplete answers are excluded. Thirdly, a “top-coding” problem, that any data above 
an upper bound is censored, may arise for some continuous variables such as 
UnearnedY/1000. These data are top-coded to protect the respondents’ privacy. Since the 
proportion of top-coded data is extremely small, we exclude these. We include both 
economically active and inactive people to avoid any sample-selection bias arisen from 
excluding the economically inactive. After dropping irrelevant cases, the final samples 
for the U.S., the U.K. and Hong Kong consist of 1,208,032 individuals, 2,627,852 
individuals and 988,183 individuals respectively. 
2.3 Summary sample statistics 
Tables 2.3 to 2.5 in the Appendix show the summary statistics of the samples in the 
U.S., the U.K. and Hong Kong. The values for the categorical variables represent the 
proportion of people with that characteristic in the corresponding samples. The total 
numbers of valid cases in the U.S., the U.K. and Hong Kong are 1,208,032, 2,627,852 
and 988,183 respectively. They are all individuals over the minimum working age of the 
economy they belong.  
The employment gaps being decomposed are based on differences in average 
employment rates derive from the variable Employed. For instance, in Table 2.3, 71.77% 
                                                 
24 The minimum working age in the U.S. is 14 and those in the U.K. and Hong Kong are 16. 
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of the younger people and 47.95% of the older people are employed in the pooled US 
sample. The non-linear decomposition technique decomposes the difference of 0.4795 − 
0.7177 = −0.2382 into an explained part (due to differences in observable characteristics 
under control) and an unexplained part (due to differences in unobservable 
characteristics). Section 2.6 discusses the decomposition results in more detail. 
The U.K. has the largest proportion of employed people across the three economies 
in all kinds of sub-samples. In all three economies, it is not surprising to see that there is 
a larger proportion of younger people with a job compared to older people. The proportion 
of employed is larger for males than that of females. The mean ages of the individuals in 
all the three economies are roughly the same (the range of mean age is 42 to 44). As for 
gender, the proportion of older females is larger than that of younger females only in the 
U.K. All the three economies have more female workers than male workers across both 
age groups. This matches the results by Reday-Mulvey (2005) that the labour force in 
many European economies has become older and more feminine. Hong Kong also has 
the same situation. Nevertheless, there is a larger proportion of older males under 
employment than older females in the U.K. This may be due to the earlier retirement age 
of females25. Older males can stay in the UK labour market longer.  
The values for the education categories and the variable Exp capture the 
employability of the individuals in the samples. In Hong Kong, over 50% of the full 
sample and younger sub-sample completed secondary school. However, the proportion is 
much smaller in the older people sample. Most older people in Hong Kong only 
completed primary school. This shows that Hong Kong had an improvement in the quality 
of its labour force over the last century. The U.K. also had an improvement in the quality 
                                                 
25 The retirement age in the U.K. is 65 for males 60 for females. 
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of its labour force, as shown by the larger proportions of younger people in the top three 
education categories compared to those of older people. In the U.S., the proportion of 
people among the four education categories is similar in the younger people and the older 
people samples. This shows that the U.S. had a steady level of labour force quality over 
the last century. 
It is not surprising to see that older people have many more years of working 
experience than younger people in all the three economies. The U.K. has the highest mean 
years of working experience in the younger sub-sample, whereas the older people in Hong 
Kong have the highest mean years of working experience across the three economies. The 
U.S. has the best and most steady level of labour force quality among the three economies. 
The qualities of the labour force in the U.K. and Hong Kong have improved over the last 
decade. Moreover, the difference in the proportion of those employed between the 
younger and the older sub-sample is the largest in Hong Kong. The maturity of the labour 
market between Hong Kong and the other two economies differs. The next two sections 
discuss the results of the binomial logit models and the non-linear decompositions.  
2.4 Estimation framework 
In Chapter 1, we discussed the background of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 
for linear and nonlinear models. This section explains how we apply the decomposition 
approach. All the estimation procedures are carried out using Stata. Consider the 
probability of employment conditional on a set of independent variables X and model 
parameters 𝛽, which was shown in Chapter 1: 
(7) Pr (y = 1 | X) = P (𝛽, X) 
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The estimated sample average is defined as: 
(8) ?̂? ≡ P (?̂? , ?̅?) 
where P (?̂? , ?̅?) is the average predicted probability in the sample using the estimated 
parameters ?̂? and average X. In this study P (y = 1 | X) is the employment dummy for 
being employed (Employed). P (?̂? , ?̅?) is estimated by binomial logit modelling with 
the log-likelihood function l as follows (Nielson, 1998; Livanos et al., 2009): 
(9) l (β, δ) = ∑ {𝑦0𝑖ln𝐹[𝑋0𝑖𝛽] + (1 − 𝑦0𝑖)ln (1 − 𝐹[𝑋0𝑖𝛽])}
𝑁0
𝑖=1  
+ ∑ {𝑦1𝑖ln𝐹[𝑋1𝑖(𝛽 + 𝛿)] +  (1 − 𝑦1𝑖)ln (1 − 𝐹[𝑋1𝑖(𝛽 + 𝛿)])}
𝑁1
𝑖=1  
where F is the logistic cumulative density function, y is the indicator variable which is 
the variable Employed in our study, X is the set of independent variables and N is the 
sample size. Subscripts 0 and 1 indicate the group 0 (younger people) and group 1 (older 
people). Subscript i indexes the individuals. Maximisation of Equation (9) gives ?̂? (the 
estimated parameter vector for younger people) and ?̂? (the estimated parameter vector 
for older people).  
The logit model is preferred over the probit model for two reasons. Firstly, in a logit 
model, the proportion of the occurrence of the dependent variable in the sample is equal 
to the predicted probability P (?̂? , ?̅?) . The decomposition equation, which is Equation 
(10) below, holds exactly (Nielson, 1998; Fairlie, 2005). Secondly, maximum likelihood 
estimation is asymptotically normal in large samples, which means that the advantage of 
following normal distribution for probit models is less important. Thus probit models do 
not have any comparative advantage over logit models in carrying out the decompositions.  
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The results of the binomial logit models on employment probabilities are expressed 
in terms of marginal effects for ease of inference26 . This implies that the estimated 
parameters can be directly interpreted as the change in employment probabilities 
contributed by a unit change in an independent variable. Including a gender dummy as 
one of the independent variables is not enough in studying gender differences. The 
problem is that this implicitly assumes the effects of all other variables to be the same for 
males and females (Berndt, 1990). We therefore estimate three sets of binomial logit 
models in the pooled, male and female samples with age dummies included. The estimates 
on the age dummies can shed light on the effect of various age bands on employment 
probabilities. We also estimate six sets of binomial logit models on younger or older 
people in the pooled, male and female samples separately for each economy, leading to a 
total of twenty-seven estimated logit models.  
The decomposition of the difference in average employment probability between 
younger people (denoted as group 0) and older people (denoted as group 1) is carried out 
as follows: 
(10) 𝑦1̂ − 𝑦0̂ = [P (𝛽1̂ , 𝑋1̅̅ ̅) − P (𝛽0̂ , 𝑋1̅̅ ̅)] + [P (𝛽0̂ , 𝑋1̅̅ ̅) − P (𝛽0̂ , 𝑋0̅̅ ̅)] 
The first term measures the difference in probability of working due to differences in 
unobservable characteristics such as discrimination. The characteristics of younger and 
older people are assumed to be the same. The second term measures the difference in 
probability of working due to differences in observable characteristics. The parameters of 
younger and older people are assumed to be the same. Three sets of decomposition results 
                                                 
26 We calculate the marginal effects by using the command “mfx” in Stata. 
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are generated for each economy based on the samples: pooled, male and female.27 
2.5 Binomial logit model estimates on employment probabilities 
Tables 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8 show the marginal effects from the binomial logits for the 
employment probabilities on the younger and older samples in the U.S., the U.K. and 
Hong Kong respectively. The results of interest are with respect to individuals’ gender, 
marital status, nationality, education, working experience, number of children and year. 
Most estimated parameters are statistically significant at the 1% level. As often predicted 
in other studies such as Livanos et al. (2009) and Loretto and Vickerstaff (2011), males 
have higher employment probabilities than females regardless of age and location. The 
gender employment gaps among younger people are larger than those among older people 
in the U.S. and the U.K. In contrast, the gender employment gaps in Hong Kong, 
regardless of age, are larger than those in the two western economies. Also, older people 
have larger gender employment gaps than younger people in Hong Kong. 
It is not surprising to find that single, separated/divorced or widowed males have 
lower employment probabilities than married males in all the three economies. This is 
because married males often have more financial needs and responsibilities towards their 
families. Also, there is evidence that married workers are more productive than unmarried 
workers (Hellerstein et al., 1996). In contrast, single or separated/divorced females, 
regardless of age, have higher employment probabilities than married females in the U.S. 
and Hong Kong.  
                                                 
27 The Stata program package “oaxaca” created by Jann (2008b) is used to estimate the decomposition 
parameters. As explained by Jann (2008a), the “oaxaca” command first estimates the individual group 
models using any specified estimation command (which is “logit” in our case). The command “suest” and 
“mean” are then applied to calculate the combined variance-covariance matrix of the models and the group 
means of the regressors. The last step of the “oaxaca” command is to generate the various decomposition 
results and the standard errors. 
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In the U.S., the employment probabilities of the younger foreigners are lower than 
those of the younger locals in the pooled sample. Locals are often more familiar with the 
local labour market than foreigners and so get a job more easily. Nevertheless, the older 
foreigners are 3.02% more likely to be employed than the younger locals. A possible 
explanation is that the older foreigners have been in the U.S. for a long time. They are 
well acquainted with the labour market and so they have no disadvantages in seeking jobs 
compared to the locals. It is interesting that male foreigners have higher employment 
probabilities than male locals, whereas the opposite is true for females regardless of age. 
A possible explanation is that male foreigners are over-represented in some industries, 
such as finance, or take up senior positions. They will emigrate only when they have 
secured a job. In the U.K., foreigners have lower employment probabilities than locals 
regardless of age and gender, which is opposite to the situation in Hong Kong. 
Both younger and older people with higher education tend to have higher 
employment probabilities in the U.S. and the U.K. However, the opposite is true for older 
people in Hong Kong. The returns to degree and postsecondary education are actually 
negative in Hong Kong. This implies that the deterioration of education for older people 
in Hong Kong is much more serious than in the two western economies. In addition, the 
difference in the effect of education between the younger people and the older people is 
larger for higher education in all the three economies. As noted by many studies, such as 
Reday-Mulvey (2005) and Keese (2006), the skills learnt by older people may become 
outdated. Their higher education does not earn them the same levels of employment 
probability as their younger counterparts. 
The estimated parameters on the education dummies in the male and female samples 
show similar patterns as those in the pooled sample. Females generally have higher 
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employment probabilities than males at the same education level in all the three 
economies. This implies that education can effectively reduce the employment gap 
between males and females regardless of age. The premiums in employment probability 
decrease with higher education for older males (the parameter estimate of older males 
completed degree or above in the U.K. is even negative). This implies that higher 
education cannot earn older males higher employment probabilities compared to those 
completed primary education or with no qualification. In contrast, older females can still 
enjoy premiums in employment probabilities with higher education in the western 
economies. 
The estimated parameters on Exp and ExpSq show the expected signs (positive and 
negative respectively) for the younger people regardless of gender in all the three 
economies This shows a concave shape of employment probabilities over one’s life time 
similar to the typical age-earning profile. For older people, the signs of estimates of both 
Exp and ExpSq are negative for the older people in the U.S. because most over-50s are at 
the later stage of their working life. Older females still have the typical age-employment 
profile. In the U.K. and Hong Kong, the signs of Exp and ExpSq for older people are 
opposite to the typical age-employment profile. Older people may have a reverse trend in 
having higher employment probabilities with more working experience. 
We include number-of-children variables for the UK analyses. Having younger 
children are commonly believed to reduce the employment probabilities (especially for 
most women), whereas having older children increases the employment probabilities. 
Nevertheless, our results show that the more children one has regardless of the children’s 
age, the lower employment probabilities he or she has. However, if one has more older 
children, his or her employment probabilities decrease less. Females, regardless of age, 
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have much lower employment probabilities than males when they have one more children. 
In the U.S. and the U.K., both younger and older people in the pooled sample have 
higher employment probabilities after the early 2000s. Only in the U.S. do younger people 
have lower employment probabilities after the start of the global financial crisis in the 
late 2000s. In the U.S., older males have lower employment probabilities after the start 
of global financial crisis, whereas older females’ employment probabilities are not 
affected. The financial tsunami seems to decrease the employment probabilities in the 
U.K.’s older people regardless of gender. In Hong Kong, compared to people in 1991, 
people (except younger females) in later years have lower employment probabilities. It is 
not surprising because Hong Kong experienced a series of economic downturn such as 
the Asian Financial Crisis in 1998 and the SARS in 2003. 
Tables 2.9 to 2.11 show the marginal effects within the binomial logits for the 
employment probabilities in the U.S., the U.K. and Hong Kong respectively. The 
differences between these sets of results with those in Tables 2.6 to 2.8 are that there is 
no splitting of younger and older samples and, instead, age dummies are included in the 
regressions. The estimates on the age dummies can shed light on the effect of various age 
bands on employment probabilities. The U.S. has the largest employment probabilities 
over all age bands regardless of gender. Its age employment profile shows a typical 
inverted U-shape and the peak occurs in the age band 45 to 49. The peak for the U.K. 
occurs in a slightly younger age band (40 to 44). In contrast, the position of the peak 
differs between males and females in Hong Kong. Females’ employment probabilities 
peak at the 45 to 49 age band, whereas males’ employment probabilities rise to the peak 
in the 25 to 29 age band but drop thereafter. 
The decreasing trend of employment probabilities reverses over the age of 65 in the 
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U.S. for both genders. There is a possibility that flexible work arrangements allow older 
people to continue their working lives after they have reached their retirement age and 
have left their main career. Nevertheless, the decreasing trend continues over the age of 
65 in the U.K. and Hong Kong and some age effect estimates even turn negative. The 
employment probabilities of Hong Kong females remain stable after the age of 60. 
2.6 Non-linear Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions on employment gaps 
As introduced in Section 2.4, the differences in the mean values of Employed 
between younger and older people are the employment gaps to be decomposed. The 
differences are calculated by subtracting the employment probability of older people from 
that of younger people. Negative values mean lower employment probabilities of older 
people than younger people, and vice versa. Each employment gap is decomposed into 
two parts: the explained part and the unexplained part. The explained part is due to 
differences in observable characteristics. The unexplained part is due to differences in 
unobservable characteristics such as discrimination.  
Detailed results of the decompositions are presented beneath the overall results in 
Tables 2.12 to 2.14. These detailed results describe the marginal contribution of each 
individual characteristic. The explained estimates represent the marginal effects on 
employment probabilities purely due to differences in observable characteristics 
[ P̅ (𝛽0̂ , 𝑋1̅̅ ̅)  −  P̅ (𝛽0̂ , 𝑋0̅̅ ̅) ]. The unexplained estimates represent the marginal 
effects on employment probabilities due to differences in unobservable characteristics 
such as discrimination [P̅ (𝛽1̂ , 𝑋1̅̅ ̅) − P̅ (𝛽0̂ , 𝑋1̅̅ ̅)]. The counterfactual employment 
probability P̅ (𝛽0̂ , 𝑋1̅̅ ̅) is the probability with younger people’s parameters but older 
people’s characteristics. Negative values in the decompositions imply effects of enlarging 
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the employment gap, and vice versa.  
The summary statistics and the results of the logit models help explain the signs of 
the detailed decomposition parameters. For example, on one hand males enjoy higher 
employment probabilities in the U.S. (as shown in Table 2.6). The status of being a male 
benefits the age group with a larger proportion of males, which is the younger age group 
(as shown in Table 2.3). Thus the variable Male enlarges the employment gap in the 
explained part (with the same parameters for the younger and older people). The 
explained estimates of Male show a negative effect in Table 2.12. On the other hand, 
younger males have a larger premium of employment probabilities than older males (as 
shown in Table 2.6). Thus assuming the proportions of younger and older people to be 
the same, the variable Male enlarges the employment gap in the unexplained part (with 
the same characteristics for the younger and older people). The unexplained estimates of 
Male show a negative sign in Table 2.12. Our discussion will focus on the overall results 
and compare the total contributions of the observable characteristics and the unobservable 
characteristics on employment gaps. 
2.6.1 The United States 
Table 2.12 shows the Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions for older versus younger 
employment probabilities in the U.S. In the pooled sample, the employment probabilities 
are 0.4795 for older people and 0.7177 for younger people, yielding an employment gap 
of -0.2382. The total explained part explains nearly all the employment gap. The 
differences in observable characteristics enlarge the employment gap between younger 
and older people by 24%. The total unexplained part, which is related to differences in 
unobservable characteristics, helps little in narrowing the gap.  
62 
The employment gaps in the male and the female samples have similar magnitudes 
as that in the pooled sample. The employment gap for females is slightly larger than that 
of males (-0.2446 > -0.2273). For males, differences in observable characteristics enlarge 
the employment gap by nearly 36%, whereas differences in unobservable characteristics 
narrow the gap by 13%. This shows that the lower employment probabilities of older 
males compared to younger males are largely due to differences in observable 
characteristics. For females, both differences in observable and unobservable 
characteristics enlarge the employment gap. The effect of unobservable characteristics is 
slightly larger than that of observable characteristics by 2.68%.  
2.6.2 The United Kingdom 
Table 2.13 shows the Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions for the older to younger 
differences in employment probabilities in the U.K. In the pooled sample, the 
employment probabilities are 0.6606 for older people and 0.8011 for younger people, 
yielding an employment gap of -0.1405. Differences in observable and unobservable 
characteristics enlarge the employment gap by 7.53% and 6.52% respectively. 
The employment gap in the male sample is larger than that in the pooled sample (-
0.1773 > -0.1405), whereas that in the female sample is smaller (-0.1131 < -0.1405). Both 
differences in observable and unobservable characteristics enlarge the employment gaps 
of males and females. The male employment gap is larger than the female gap mainly due 
to differences in observable characteristics. 
2.6.3 Hong Kong 
Table 2.14 shows the Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions for older to younger 
differences in employment probabilities in Hong Kong. In the pooled sample, the 
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employment probabilities are 0.3326 for older people and 0.7477 for younger people, 
yielding an employment gap of -0.4151. Similar to the results in the U.S., the total 
explained part can explain nearly all the employment gap. The differences in observable 
characteristics enlarge the gap by over 50%, whereas the differences in unobservable 
characteristics only narrow the gap by 9.6%.  
The employment gap in the male sample is smaller than that in the pooled sample (-
0.3745 < -0.4151), whereas that in the female sample is larger (-0.4584 > -0.4151). The 
differences in observable characteristics explain nearly all the employment gaps in both 
the male and the female samples. The differences in unobservable characteristics narrow 
the male gap by a large portion (17.9%). However, it helps narrow the female gap by only 
4.9%. 
2.6.4 Comparison among the three economies 
In the pooled sample, the employment probabilities of older people are lower than 
those of younger people in all three economies. In the U.S. and Hong Kong, the negative 
employment gaps are largely due to the differences in observable characteristics. This 
implies that the factors under control explain almost all of the employment gaps. 
Differences in unobservable characteristics narrow the employment gaps to a small extent. 
In contrast, both differences in observable and unobservable characteristics contribute to 
the negative employment gap in the U.K. The factors under control can explain slightly 
more than half of the negative employment gap. Compared to the U.S. and Hong Kong, 
there are much more uncontrolled-for factors in our UK models which affect the age-
employment gaps. 
The employment probabilities of older males are also lower than those of younger 
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males in all three economies. The negative male employment gaps in all the three 
economies are largely due to the differences in observable characteristics. The factors 
under control explain almost all of the employment gaps. Differences in unobservable 
characteristics help to narrow the employment gaps in the U.S. and Hong Kong. In the 
U.K., the differences in unobservable characteristics enlarge the male employment gap. 
However, the effect of unexplained part is much smaller than that of the explained part. 
The factors under control explain most of the negative male employment gap. 
Similar to the results in the pooled and the male sample, the employment 
probabilities of older females are lower than those of younger females in all three 
economies. Both differences in observable and unobservable characteristics enlarge the 
employment gaps in the U.S. and the U.K. There are significant portions of the negative 
employment gaps unaccountable by the factors under control. Differences in 
unobservable characteristics narrow the employment gap in Hong Kong, but the effect is 
small. 
2.7 Conclusion 
Population ageing has been a growing concern in many economies. Many studies 
have found that older people have lower employment probabilities than younger people. 
Nonetheless, they cannot tell whether this is purely due to the observable characteristics 
because other unexplained factors such as age discrimination can also affect employment 
probabilities. By applying binomial logit models and a non-linear version of the Oaxaca-
Blinder decomposition, this study provides new insights on the age-employment gaps in 
the U.S., the U.K. and Hong Kong. The decomposition method decomposes the 
differential employment probabilities between older and younger people into two parts: 
one due to differences in observable and the other due to unobservable characteristics. 
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This allows us to be surer about the extent of our model specifications in explaining the 
employment gaps. The gender dimension on this issue is also investigated. Our results 
can be used as reference for governments to assess the competitiveness of older people 
compared to their younger counterparts in different economies. We note the significant 
results and provide some policy recommendations. 
Our binomial logit models show that the gender employment gap in Hong Kong is 
the largest among the three economies. Marital status seems to be an important factor in 
affecting males’ employment probabilities in all the three economies. It is surprising that 
education rather than marital status affects females’ employment probabilities the most. 
The gender employment gaps for younger people are slightly larger than those of older 
people in the U.S. and the U.K. However, the opposite is true for Hong Kong. It is not 
surprising that economic cycles can affect people’s employment probabilities in all the 
three economies, especially a small open economy like Hong Kong. The exceptions are 
older females in the U.S. and older males and females in the U.K. Their employment 
probabilities are unaffected by the global financial crisis. 
Education is believed to be an important factor in affecting people’s employment 
probabilities. However, the logit model results show that higher levels of education do 
not give older males significantly higher employment probabilities. Some estimates of 
higher education qualifications even show negative effects. This may be due to 
deterioration in skills for older males. The deterioration in skills may be more serious for 
higher education, leading to a lower employment premium for highly educated older 
males. In contrast, older females can enjoy higher employment probabilities of higher 
education in the U.S. and the U.K. Older females in Hong Kong do not gain from having 
higher education. The returns of degree are even negative. This implies that, for older 
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females, skill deterioration is greater for older females in Hong Kong than those in the 
U.S. and the U.K. 
The typical age-employment profile shows a concave shape of employment 
probabilities over one’s lifetime. The signs of estimates of Exp and ExpSq should typically 
be positive and negative respectively for younger people, and all negative for older people. 
The result for younger people matches the typical age-employment profiles. However, 
older females in Hong Kong still have the same age-employment profile as that of 
younger people. Both older males and females in the U.K. and older males in Hong Kong 
have an age-employment profile opposite to the typical one. This implies that it is possible 
for older people to gain from their high working experience when they find for jobs. 
Hong Kong has the largest employment gap between younger and older people 
among all the three economies. The decomposition results of the U.S. and Hong Kong 
show that the differences in observable characteristics (explained factors under control) 
can explain nearly the whole negative employment gap. In contrast, there are many more 
uncontrolled-for factors in our UK models of age-employment gaps. In the U.K., there 
are other unobserved factors which further enlarge the employment gap for males and 
females. 
There are two suggestions for raising the employment probabilities of older people, 
which are especially relevant for Hong Kong. Firstly, as noted by McGregor and Gray 
(2002), older people tend to be disadvantaged by lack of education. However, our logit 
results show that highly educated older people may suffer from serious deterioration of 
skills rather than lack of education and so find difficulties in obtaining jobs. Older people 
can emphasise their greater working experience rather than their education when they 
look for jobs. Secondly, governments can provide subsidies to employers who recruit and 
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provide training for older people, or set up training programs for older people to update 
their skills. 
The application of binomial logit models and Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions has 
low data requirements and provides a good start for the investigation on the employment 
prospect of ageing workforces. Older people who search for flexible employment such as 
part-time jobs may have different employment patterns from full-time job seekers. 
Further research on different employment modes of older people is carried out in the next 
four chapters. 
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CHAPTER 3  
FLEXIBLE EMPLOYMENT FOR OLDER PEOPLE: A 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Introduction 
Flexible employment 28  modes are becoming increasingly more common than 
traditional full-time employment. In the U.S., the proportion of part-time workers in the 
total labour force has been rising gradually since the mid-1950s. In 1993, nearly 20% of 
the total workforce worked part-time (Falzone, 2000). In 1980, self-employment 
accounted for around 10% of the total labour force in many developed countries such as 
the U.S. and the U.K. (Martinez-Granado, 2002; Parker, 2004). About 9% of workers in 
the U.S. were self-employed in 1994 (Bregger, 1996). This ratio rose to 11% in 2009 
(Hipple, 2010). From 1983 to 1991, the average proportion of temporary workers in the 
European Union increased by 5.4% (De Grip et al., 1997). 
There is a stereotype on the kind of people who find flexible work. For example, 
part-time workers are often believed to be younger, less skilled and less experienced than 
full-time workers because part-time jobs often pay lower wages (Falzone, 2000). 
Deutermann and Brown (1978) suggested that the increasing proportion of females and 
school-age youths in the labour force increased the part-time labour supply significantly. 
However, studies such as Johnson and Zimmermann (1993) and Delsen and Reday-
Mulvey (1998) show that many older people do not follow the traditional employment 
profile over time: working as regular full-time workers and then retiring. Increased life 
                                                 
28 Similar to De Grip et al. (1997) and Lissenburgh and Smeaton (2003), we use the term “flexible 
employment” as a collective label for part-time employment, self-employment and temporary employment. 
We do not imply that all types of employment we discuss share the same kind of flexibility. Section 3.2 
discusses the meanings of “flexible” employment commonly defined in the literature. 
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expectancy has led to increased participation rates for older people and they tend to work 
more flexibly (Ruhm, 1990; Kim and DeVaney, 2005).  
Christensen (1990) and Ajayi-Obe and Parker (2005) noted that many older people 
seek flexible employment because this earns them greater freedom to control their 
working hours and working environment than full-time employment does. Older people 
consider flexible employment a suitable bridge to transit from a full-time work life to 
retirement. We have reviewed studies on employment of older people in Chapter 1 and 
most of them focus on the regular full-time employment of older people. Little attention 
has been paid to the diversity of older people’s employment options such as flexible 
employment. This is an important issue if we wish to help older people achieve their 
favourite employment mode.  
This chapter provides a literature survey on the flexible employment of all workers 
but especially older ones. Section 3.2 discusses the meaning of “flexible” employment in 
the literature. Section 3.3 extends the discussions of Section 1.2 on life-cycle labour 
supply by considering flexible employment as bridge employment between career 
employment and non-work activities. Sections 3.4 to 3.6 discuss the nature of, and studies 
on, three major types of flexible employment, namely: part-time employment, self-
employment and temporary employment. We use the U.K. as an example for discussing 
the changes in the rates of those three types of flexible employment by age. Section 3.7 
discusses the studies on more than one type of flexible employment. Section 3.8 
summarises the approaches for analyses on this theme. Final overall remarks on the whole 
literature survey are made in the last section. 
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3.2 What is meant by “flexible” employment? 
Early studies such as Atkinson (1984) predicted that under the trend of changes in 
labour supply and training costs and advancement in technology, many firms would 
switch to adopting a more flexible approach to workforce management. Companies 
around the world have been increasingly adopting flexible employment practices for 
lowering labour costs, increasing employee retention and attracting new desirable 
employees (Raghuram, London and Larsen, 2001). Literature discussing the process of 
employment change for facilitating greater levels of flexibility are therefore abundant 
(Cook, 1998).  
Figure 3.1: Atkinson’s model of employment 
 
Note: Figure from Humphreys, Fleming and O’Donnel (2005) 
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As shown in Figure 3.1, Atkinson (1984) proposed a model on segmenting the 
workforce into three categories, namely the core centre, two peripheral groups and an 
outer circle. The key activities of a firm are undertaken by the fixed and full-time 
positions in the core centre. Changes in demand distinguish the peripheral groups from 
the core centre. Employees in the peripheral group 1 have permanent contracts but less 
job security and chances for career advancement than those in the core centre, whereas 
those in the peripheral group 2 have flexible contracts. The outer circle relates to the 
management of trivial tasks or outsourcing (MacVaugh and Evans, 2012).  
Atkinson suggested that firms can achieve three kinds of flexibility through strategic 
segmentation of their workforce. The first one is functional flexibility which refers to the 
possibility for employers to distribute labour among different tasks and redefine job 
demarcations (Cook, 1998; MacVaugh and Evans, 2012). It stress innovations in 
production and new management skills such as team working and multi-skilling 
(Crompton, 2002). The second one is numerical flexibility in which employers adjust the 
number of workers so as to correspond with labour demand (Cook, 1998). It focuses on 
reducing the costs of factors of production giving rise to efficiency gain (Crompton, 2002). 
The third one is financial flexibility which allows the reflection of demand in the external 
labour market by employment costs (Dyer, 1998). Actions taken to achieve functional 
and numerical flexibility can facilitate the objectives of financial flexibility (MacVaugh 
and Evans, 2012). As shown in Table 3.2, full-time employment is the least flexible, 
whereas self-employment show all the three kinds of flexibility. 
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Table 3.1: Degree of flexibility for each type of employment 
 
 Functional 
flexible? 
Numerical 
flexible? 
Financial 
flexible? 
Position in Atkinson’s 
model 
Full-time 
employment 
Yes No No Core group 
Part-time 
employment 
Yes No Yes Peripheral group 2 
Self-employment Yes Yes Yes Outer Circle 
Temporary 
employment 
No Yes Yes Peripheral group 2 
Note: from MacVaugh and Evans (2012) 
Many studies define flexible employment from the perspective of employers similar 
to Atkinson (1984). Cook (1998) classified flexible employment as achieving either 
functional or numerical flexibility. Reilly (2000) distinguished four dimensions of 
flexible employment, namely the number of employees (numerical flexibility), the 
working hours (temporal flexibility), the workplace (spatial flexibility) and income 
(financial flexibility). There are differences in the range of activities subsumed under each 
dimension such as employment contracts, working hours, work location, remuneration 
arrangement and job tasks (Chiu, So and Tam, 2008). Temporal employment per se is 
actually part-time employment. Numerical flexibility, which is defined similarly as Cook 
(1998), Crompton (2002) and MacVaugh and Evans (2012), relates to any work 
arrangements which allow employers to adjust the number of employees to correspond 
with demand, such as the period of employment or the switch of employment status (Cook, 
1998; Chiu, So and Tam, 2008).  
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From the perspective of older people as the labour supplier, there are five main 
advantages for them to work part-time (Lissenburgh and Smeaton, 2003; Morris and 
Mallier, 2003; Reday-Mulvey, 2005; Loretto et al., 2009; Gannon and Roberts, 2011). 
Firstly, reduced working hours in part-time employment allows them to work with 
reduced stress and so have better health. Secondly, part-time employment can be a bridge 
between career employment and full retirement. Thirdly, part-time employment enables 
older people to enjoy the social integration offered by the working environment, which is 
absent from retiring. Fourthly, part-time employment provides older people more time to 
carry out their parenting or grand-parenting duties at home. Finally, the income earned 
from part-time employment can be a supplement to their savings for sustaining retirement. 
Self-employment provides the second and the fifth benefit to older people. In addition, it 
allows workers have more autonomy over their working hours, work schedule and 
content. Temporary employment provides similar sets of benefits to older people. We 
discuss each type of employment in more details in Sections 3.4 to 3.6. 
3.3 The life-cycle labour supply hypothesis revisited 
As discussed in Section 1.2 on life-cycle labour supply, compared to the traditional 
model, individuals in their later years are willing to devote more time on work before they 
participate more in non-work activities such as retirement. The choice between full-time 
jobs (with higher pay and longer working hours) and flexible jobs (with lower pay but 
shorter working hours or higher autonomy) in later life is influenced by the preferences 
for leisure when an individual ages (Gustman and Steinmeier, 1986). Reize (2000) 
discussed a theoretical framework explaining the transitions from unemployment to self-
employment. It treats the decision to choose self-employment rather than paid work as a 
problem of dynamic utility maximization. The alternative employment modes (and non-
74 
work activities) have different attractiveness for individuals, depending on preference-
determining factors such as individuals’ financial conditions, human capital and risk 
aversion. If the present value of the stream of expected utilities is higher for self-
employment compared to other alternatives, an individual will choose self-employment. 
This theoretical framework can also be applied to explanations of other kinds of state 
transitions such as from full-time employment to part-time employment. 
3.4 Part-time employment 
3.4.1 General overview 
Part-time employment is the most popular kind of flexible work among older people 
(Loretto et al., 2009). The International Labour Office (ILO) has defined part-time 
employment as a regular form of wage employment with working hours substantially 
shorter than those of normal jobs within an establishment (Thurman and Trah, 1990).  
Reday-Mulvey (2005) studied the European LFS in 2002 and noted that full-time 
jobs prevail among younger workers but, surprisingly, part-time jobs prevail among older 
workers rather than retirement. The worldwide phenomenon of older people entering 
flexible work before entering full retirement is relatively recent phenomenon. For the U.S., 
Christensen (1990) noted that before the 1990s over 75% of people aged 55 to 64 showed 
willingness to work part-time after retirement. The U.S. Department of Labor (1999) 
shows that in 1999, 16% of employed males aged 60 to 64 and 50% of employed males 
aged 65 or over were part-time workers, whereas 33% of employed females aged 60 to 
64 and 60% of employed females aged 65 or over were part-timers. In Europe, there was 
an increasing trend for part-time employment relative to full-time employment among 
older people except for Greece since the 1970s (ILO, 1997).  
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In the U.K. between 1992 and 2008, the increase in part-time workers aged 60 to 64 
was larger than that for full-time workers (Khan, 2009). Table 3.2 shows the changes in 
UK part-time employment rates by age group and gender in the 2000s. The proportions 
of part-timers in the younger age groups have been increasing in the 2000s while the 
opposite is true for older workers. However, the proportions of older people working as 
part-time were still the largest within the period, the greatest proportion being those over 
the state pensionable age (SPA) and from 50 to the SPA. This shows that part-time 
employment is much more popular among older people. It is not surprising to find that 
the proportions of females working part-time have been larger than for males among all 
age groups. The differences between the proportions of part-timers over the SPA and in 
other age groups were much larger for males than females. This implies that males 
become much more willing to work part-time after they reach the SPA. 
Table 3.2: UK part-time employment rates  
by age group and gender in the 2000s 
Group Part-time employment rates (%) 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
q1 
Total 
16 or over 19.68 19.70 19.86 19.85 19.56 19.46 19.50 19.22 19.45 19.92 20.09 20.06 
16 to 24 11.88 12.51 12.90 12.54 13.23 13.52 14.32 14.24 16.06 17.30 17.60 17.58 
25 to 39 18.19 18.10 18.19 18.39 17.63 17.44 17.16 16.67 16.76 17.42 17.68 18.11 
40 to 49 19.81 19.87 19.88 19.89 19.51 19.38 19.44 19.44 19.42 19.87 19.30 19.36 
50 to SPA 20.51 20.54 20.31 19.83 19.82 19.11 19.00 19.01 18.91 19.05 19.04 18.93 
Over SPA 54.72 53.18 53.23 52.22 51.21 51.73 51.50 51.20 49.20 47.05 46.20 43.65 
Male 
16 or over 4.24 4.51 4.88 5.04 5.16 5.28 5.46 5.42 5.77 6.28 6.54 6.83 
16 to 24 5.85 6.54 7.70 7.09 5.51 7.88 8.63 8.77 10.45 12.50 11.71 11.21 
25 to 39 2.29 2.48 2.55 2.80 3.10 3.20 3.10 3.27 3.68 4.04 4.30 4.76 
40 to 49 2.10 2.34 2.27 2.39 2.25 2.55 2.61 2.62 2.98 3.52 3.44 3.68 
50 to SPA 5.92 6.22 6.54 6.80 6.94 6.41 6.83 7.36 7.15 7.17 6.96 7.68 
Over SPA 37.09 34.86 36.73 36.02 34.49 36.81 35.72 34.01 31.40 29.93 31.53 30.88 
Female 
16 or over 37.31 36.99 36.92 36.55 35.77 35.23 35.06 34.48 34.48 34.86 34.78 34.25 
16 to 24 18.94 19.43 19.11 19.01 20.13 20.06 20.92 20.50 22.81 23.10 24.29 24.65 
25 to 39 35.49 35.09 34.97 35.11 33.42 32.73 32.15 30.82 30.37 31.25 31.56 31.63 
40 to 49 39.15 38.85 38.70 38.16 37.36 36.82 36.87 37.24 36.54 36.66 35.45 35.58 
50 to SPA 41.53 41.03 40.42 38.81 38.30 37.23 36.57 35.99 36.15 36.45 36.14 34.69 
Over SPA 63.62 62.71 62.34 60.87 59.82 59.35 58.62 57.26 55.63 53.80 53.77 50.06 
Note: Part-time employment rate: the proportion of part-timers in the labour force aged 16 or over 
Source: My own calculation using data from the UK LFS 
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3.4.2 Studies on part-time employment 
Studies on part-time employment have considered many countries (Pagan, 2009, 
2012; Kjeldstad and Nymoen, 2012). There are many studies investigating the situation 
of the U.S. Miller (1997) used the 1976 and 1986 US PSID to study the part-time 
employment of married females. Ordered probit models on the probabilities of non-
participation, part-time employment or full-time employment were estimated to examine 
the changes between 1986 and 1976. Miller’s results show that there was a structural 
change in the preferences of married females between these years. In 1976 more educated 
and experienced married females tended to shift from non-participation to full-time or 
part-time employment. In 1986 they tended to work full-time regardless of whether they 
were previously unemployed or part-time.  
Falzone (2000) focused on the part-time employment of married females. He used 
the US PSID in 1992 to estimate multinominal logit models on the probabilities of being 
employed full-time, employed part-time or economically inactive. His results supported 
the view that part-time employment is an efficient employment choice for married 
females. The number and ages of children and the spouse’s income increase the 
probabilities of working part-time instead of full-time for married females. Nevertheless, 
the number of years in education has an opposite effect. This supports the findings of 
Miller (1997) that education increases the likelihood for married females to work full-
time rather than part-time. Falzone further divided the sample into younger (18 to 24), 
mature (25 to 44) and older age groups (45 or over) to study the effect of age on married 
women to choose their employment modes. He found that older married females 
accounted for the largest proportion of inactive people or part-time workers. Younger 
married females preferred to work full-time. 
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Studies on the part-time employment of older people increased in the 1990s. Many 
of them focused on partial retirement rather than part-time employment per se. They 
treated part-time employment as a partial retirement decision. Ruhm (1990) is among the 
few early studies on the theme. They used all the six waves of the Social Security 
Administration Retirement History Longitudinal Survey (RHLS) from 1969 to 1979 to 
estimate several binomial logit models on various dependent variables such as being 
partially retired or not29. His results suggested that more education, higher pay and having 
pension coverage tend to increase the probability of older Americans to remaining in their 
full-time employment. Moreover, older people tend to seek bridge employment in 
industries different from their previous career employment. 
A study on the U.S. by Kim and DeVaney (2005) analysed the factors affecting older 
people’s choice of economic status (full-time work, partial retirement or full retirement). 
They used the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) in 1992 and in 2000 to estimate 
multinomial logit models on the probabilities of being employed full-time, partially 
retired or fully retired. Partial and full retirements are defined based on respondents’ self-
reported retirement status and changes in the number of working hours. Their results show 
that age and gender have similar effects on the probabilities of having partial or full 
retirement. Older people’s decisions on full retirement were affected by health and wealth 
factors such as investment assets, pension coverage and health insurance. Education, self-
employment status and chronic health conditions affect older people’s decisions on partial 
retirement. The result that the more educated tend to have partial retirement (or part-time 
employment) is in contrast to the findings of Miller (1997) on married females. This 
implies that different demographic groups with the same level of education can have 
                                                 
29 Ruhm (1990) also estimated OLS regressions on various dependent variables such as retirement age and 
Cox proportional hazards models on exit probabilities from the current economic state. 
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different preferences over their modes of employment.  
Health is commonly believed to be an important factor affecting older people’s 
employment decisions. Several studies analysed the effect of health on older people’s 
choice of employment modes. Gannon and Roberts (2011) investigated the issue in the 
U.K. and Ireland. They used the Living in Ireland (LII) Survey from 1995 to 2001 and 
the BHPS from 1991 to 2004 to estimate multinomial probit models on the probabilities 
of being employed full-time, employed part-time or fully retired. They found that older 
people with health problems are unsurprisingly more likely to retire in both countries. 
Those with health problems are more likely to work part-time rather than full-time in the 
U.K. However, health problems have no effect on the probabilities of working part-time 
in Ireland. 
Apart from health problems, disability status is also an important factor affecting 
older people’s choice of employment mode. Nevertheless, as noted by Pagan (2012), 
studies which analysed the relationship between part-time work and disability are scarce. 
Most of them focus on the situation of the U.S. (Schur, 2002, Hotchkiss, 2004). Pagan 
(2009) is among the few non-US studies that analysed the effect of being disabled on the 
probabilities of working part-time among older people in Europe. He used the Europe 
Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement (SHARE) in 2004 to estimate binomial probit 
models on the probabilities of working part-time. His results show that older people with 
disabilities are more likely to work part-time compared with their non-disabled 
counterparts. Many older people with disabilities work part-time to achieve a balance 
between their health and work life. 
Pagan (2012) differs from other studies by comparing SHARE data in 2007 to that 
in 2004 and carrying out a dynamic analysis on workers’ transitions into and out of part-
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time employment. Pagan compared transitions among employment statuses for disabled 
and non-disabled older people. He also estimated binomial probit models to study the 
determinants of the probabilities of part-time older workers in 2004 remaining in part-
time work in 2007. His results show that older people with long-term disabilities are more 
likely to stay in their part-time jobs compared to their non-disabled counterparts. Part-
time employment is an important means for disabled older people to earn money for 
sustaining their future retired life. 
3.4.3 Voluntary and involuntary part-time employment 
Part-time employment is attractive to older people for a number of reasons: enabling 
them to work with reduced stress, acting as a bridge from career employment to full 
retirement, offering social integration offered by the working environment and providing 
extra income. Based on the theoretical framework discussed in Section 3.3, if the present 
value of the stream of expected utilities is higher in part-time employment compared to 
other alternatives, an individual will choose to work part-time. Nonetheless, it is assumed 
that his or her choice is voluntary, which means choosing part-time employment is an 
efficient labour market option (Falzone, 2000). Part-time employment can be an 
involuntary choice for older people if they face constraints due to market failure such as 
information asymmetry or age discrimination. This would indicate a marginalization of 
older people in the labour market. 
Tilly (1991) noted that before the 1970s the growth in U.S. part-time employment 
was driven by the growth in voluntary part-time employment due to the increasing desire 
of females and younger people to work part-time. However, this growth in voluntary part-
time employment started to level off and involuntary part-time employment started to 
increase. For older people, there has been a substantial increase in the share of voluntary 
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part-time workers in the early 1970s (Deutermann and Brown, 1978). The trend continued 
in the 2000s (Loretto and Vickerstaff, 2011). Nardone (1995) examined the US CPS in 
1994 and found that many older people who work part-time are voluntary workers. He 
also found that they are not disproportionately represented in the involuntary group. 
Morris and Mallier (2003) noted that for Europe in 1997, 45% of older males and 
66% of older females reported that they choose to work part-time voluntarily. However, 
Reynolds (2003) suggested that some older part-time workers would prefer more working 
hours. This may imply that they do not choose their part-time jobs voluntarily and they 
may prefer full-time work. Morris and Mallier (2003) noted that one-third of older males 
and one-fifth of older females in Europe stated that they work part-time involuntarily due 
to a lack of suitable full-time opportunities. These figures are significant and highlight 
the need to investigate the voluntary and involuntary nature of part-time employment 
among older people. 
Despite the importance of the voluntary and involuntary nature of part-time 
employment, few studies on this issue exist for any demographic groups. Hotchkiss (2004) 
studied the voluntary and involuntary nature of part-time employment among disabled 
people. He used the US CPS from 1984 to 2000 to estimate binomial probit models on 
the probabilities of working part-time voluntarily (versus working involuntarily). His 
results show that the increase in part-time employment among disabled people is mainly 
voluntary. Part-time employment has become an attractive choice of employment mode 
to disabled people since 1992.  
Kjeldstad and Nymoen (2012) studied the issue from the gender perspective. They 
used the 2005 Norwegian LFS to estimate binomial logit models to study the job 
characteristics of different kinds of part-time employment. Three types of part-time 
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employment, namely voluntary short, voluntary long and involuntary work, are classified. 
Their results show that voluntary long part-time work is the most prevalent and is a 
female-dominated type of part-time employment. This reflects employers’ consideration 
on women’s preference on working hours. Voluntary short part-time employment is less 
gendered and is provided mainly in low-skilled service industries for flexibility reasons. 
The probability of working part-time involuntarily is affected by secondary labour market 
factors such as the type of contract and non-Western citizenship. These factors have 
greater effects on females than males. 
3.5 Self-employment 
3.5.1 General overview 
Self-employment is another type of flexible employment commonly chosen by older 
people. As noted by Loutfi (1991, p.1), self-employed workers are typically defined as 
“working proprietors of unincorporated businesses, own-account workers, members of 
producers’ co-operatives and unpaid family workers”. The difference in the mode of 
remuneration distinguishes self-employed workers from employees. Self-employed 
workers not only receive returns to their labour but also receive returns to their capital 
and entrepreneurship.  
Many studies noted that self-employment rates increase with age (Bregger, 1996; 
Morris and Mallier, 2003; Karoly and Zissimopoulos, 2004; Taylor, 2011). As noted by 
Zissimopoulos and Karoly (2007), workers aged 45 or over accounted for 54% of the US 
self-employed (in unincorporated business only) in 2002. Some have been self-employed 
for most of their career, or become self-employed at a later stage of their career. In 2009, 
self-employment rates of older people were higher than those of younger people (Hipple, 
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2010). Moreover, self-employment is more popular among males than among females. 
The U.S. Department of Labor (1999) noted that before the 2000s, 13% of employed 
males aged 55 to 64 and 25% of employed males aged 65 or over were self-employed, 
compared to 8% of those aged 25 to 54. For employed females, 9% of those aged 55 to 
64 and 14% of those aged 65 or over were self-employed, compared to 6% of those aged 
25 to 54. 
In the U.K., the self-employment rates of older people have been increasing since 
the early 1980s (Laczko and Phillipson, 1991). As noted by Khan (2009), 18% of people 
aged 50 or over were self-employed in 2008. This figure was higher than that of people 
aged 25 to 49 (12%). In the U.S., older males were more likely to be self-employed than 
older females (25% and 11% respectively). Khan further noted that the gender difference 
in self-employment was larger in the group aged over the SPA (65 for males and 60 for 
females). 40% of males aged 65 or over and 13% of females aged 60 to 64 were self-
employed in 2008.  
Table 3.3 shows the changes in UK self-employment rates by age group and gender 
in the 2000s. These trends are similar to those found in other studies. The proportion of 
self-employed among all age groups has been increasing in the 2000s. The over-SPA 
group had the largest proportion of self-employed, followed by those in the 50-to-SPA 
group. All figures were smaller than those of the part-time employment rates in Table 3.2, 
implying that part-time employment is more widespread than self-employment in the U.K. 
It is not surprising to find that the proportions of male self-employed are larger than those 
of female self-employed. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 provide supporting evidence for the common 
belief that males prefer to be self-employed, whereas females prefer to work part-time. 
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Table 3.3: UK self-employment rates 
by age group and gender in the 2000s 
Group Self- Employment rates (%) 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
q1 
Total 
16 or over 12.09 12.08 12.86 13.03 12.87 13.10 13.26 13.00 12.92 13.34 13.61 13.97 
16 to 24 3.05 3.29 3.84 4.38 4.14 4.24 4.20 4.05 4.00 4.38 4.48 4.40 
25 to 39 9.67 9.62 10.34 10.41 10.08 10.51 10.70 10.62 10.25 10.03 10.22 10.08 
40 to 49 13.14 13.20 13.83 13.81 13.83 13.76 13.73 14.03 14.15 14.19 14.04 14.87 
50 to SPA 16.94 16.60 17.32 17.30 17.06 17.16 17.53 17.29 16.84 17.78 17.29 18.09 
Over SPA 26.31 26.80 27.06 27.38 26.76 26.63 26.05 20.37 21.14 23.85 28.55 28.38 
Male 
16 or over 16.43 16.43 17.43 17.86 17.54 17.72 17.93 17.61 17.30 17.66 18.06 18.45 
16 to 24 4.52 4.81 5.46 6.61 6.31 6.37 6.22 5.65 5.67 6.04 5.81 5.98 
25 to 39 12.85 12.98 13.98 14.14 13.70 14.03 14.33 14.34 13.70 13.05 13.35 13.30 
40 to 49 17.91 17.87 18.71 19.10 18.92 18.71 18.78 19.05 18.64 18.66 18.52 19.46 
50 to SPA 22.57 22.06 22.81 22.90 22.59 22.67 22.84 22.72 22.22 23.38 23.00 23.87 
Over SPA 47.69 47.06 46.63 47.93 46.85 45.51 45.86 37.64 38.95 41.07 46.41 43.92 
Female 
16 or over 7.12 7.14 7.66 7.58 7.60 7.96 8.09 7.91 8.11 8.61 8.79 9.16 
16 to 24 1.32 1.52 1.91 1.72 1.52 1.78 1.86 2.22 1.99 2.38 2.96 2.64 
25 to 39 6.21 5.96 6.44 6.41 6.15 6.72 6.84 6.69 6.67 6.91 6.97 6.83 
40 to 49 7.93 8.15 8.62 8.28 8.58 8.64 8.50 8.72 9.47 9.60 9.48 10.13 
50 to SPA 8.83 8.77 9.31 9.13 9.14 9.31 9.87 9.37 8.97 9.59 9.19 9.97 
Over SPA 15.52 16.25 16.25 16.41 16.42 16.99 16.41 14.29 14.71 17.06 19.33 20.58 
Note: Self-employment rate: the proportion of self-employers in the labour force aged 16 or over 
Source: My own calculation using data from the UK LFS 
3.5.2 Studies on self-employment 
Although self-employment is increasingly prevalent among older people, it is still a 
relatively understudied area (Reize, 2000). Previous research on self-employment has 
studied various factors affecting individuals to choose self-employment compared to 
wage work or unemployment (Evans and Leighton, 1989; Bruce et al., 2000; 
Zissimopoulos and Karoly, 2007). Much of the previous research on analysing the effect 
of individuals’ demographic characteristics found that self-employed workers are more 
likely to be male, married, older and more educated (Aronson, 1991).  
For example, Blanchflower (2000) investigated the role and influence of self-
employment across the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) countries. He used data from various sources such as the International Social 
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Survey Programme in 1989 to carry out a macro-econometric analysis on self-
employment rates and micro-econometric analysis on employment status and job 
satisfaction. His results show that the self-employment rates and unemployment rates are 
negatively correlated for most OECD countries. The probabilities of being self-employed 
are higher for people who are males, older and the least educated. Nevertheless, the most 
highly educated people also have high probabilities of being self-employed. These self-
employed workers have higher job satisfaction than employees. 
However, the results from early studies tend to differ from the common findings in 
more recent studies. Evans and Leighton (1989) is an example. They studied the 
determinants of being self-employed among white males in the U.S. They used the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men (NLS) from 1966 to 1981 and the CPS from 
1968 to 1987 to estimate binomial probit models on the probabilities of moving from paid 
work to self-employment. One of their findings is that the probabilities of entering self-
employment are unaffected by age or work experience for the first 20 years of 
employment. This is not consistent with findings of other research. However, the common 
belief, that males with more assets are more likely to be self-employed is supported. 
As noted by Zissimopoulos and Karoly (2007), one strand of research has examined 
the potential positive benefits of being self-employed. Taylor (1996) used the 1991 BHPS 
to study the effect of various factors such as job aspects on the probabilities of being self-
employed. Their results of binomial probit models show that the higher autonomy and 
expected income offered by self-employment are important to attract people to be self-
employed. However, the lack of job security deters risk-averse people from taking self-
employment. Factors such as marital status and parents’ economic status are examples of 
important determinants of being self-employed. 
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Much of the literature on self-employment focuses on the workforce as a whole. 
Only a few studies investigated the issue among older people (Zissimopoulos and Karoly, 
2007; 2009). Fuchs (1982) is an early study on the switch of waged workers to self-
employment and the switch from working to non-working among older white males in 
the U.S. He used the Retirement History Study (RHS) in 1969, 1971 and 1973 to estimate 
binomial logit models on the probabilities of continuing to work and on the probabilities 
of switching from wage work to self-employment. His results show that self-employed 
older males are more likely to continue to work than their waged counterparts. There are 
other significant factors affecting older males’ willingness to stay in work such as good 
health, white-collar occupation and shorter hours of work. Older males who are self-
employed in the later stage of their career are mainly those who have experienced self-
employed in the past, or are in occupations with characteristics similar to self-
employment such as managers or salesmen. 
Parker and Rougier (2007) focused on the retirement decisions of older self-
employed U.K. workers. They used the Retirement Survey in 1988 and in 1994 to 
estimate multinomial logit models of dynamic employment and retirement choices. They 
found that higher earnings decrease the probability of retirement among older self-
employed workers. There is no evidence that gender, health or any family characteristics 
affect the retirement decisions of older self-employed workers. Moreover, their results of 
dynamic analysis show that relatively few wage workers and virtually no retirees chose 
self-employment in their later life. As pointed out by Parker and Rougier (2007) 
themselves, their study suffered from the weakness of a very small sample size (197 
individuals). 
Several studies have used the HRS in the U.S. to investigate the determinants of self-
86 
employment among older people. Bruce et al. (2000) used the HRS in 1992, 1994 and 
1996 to estimate multinomial logit models on the transition probabilities between self-
employment, regular full-time employment and unemployment. They found that health 
insurance provision is not a significant factor in affecting older people’s probabilities to 
be self-employed. Also, more wealth contributes to higher probabilities of transiting to 
self-employment. 
Zissimopoulos and Karoly (2007) studied the transitions of older people into self-
employment in their middle and later life. They used the HRS from 1992 to 2000 to 
estimate multinomial logit models on the probabilities of transitions among self-
employment, retirement or unemployment. Their results show that health is a push factor 
for older people into self-employment, whereas wealth is a pull factor. There are other 
results consistent with those in prior research such as the effect of pension coverage on 
decreasing the probabilities of being self-employed. 
Zissimopoulos and Karoly (2009) differ from the previous study by also considering 
the transitions of older non-workers. They used one more wave of the HRS in 2002 to 
estimate binomial probit models on the probabilities of transitions from non-employment 
to self-employment or regular full-time employment, and on the probabilities of 
transitions from regular full-time employment to self-employment. They found that prior 
job characteristics and wealth are significant factors in determining the transitions of both 
older workers and non-workers to self-employment.  
3.6 Temporary employment  
3.6.1 General overview 
In addition to part-time employment and self-employment, temporary employment 
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is another option for older people. Houseman and Osawa (1995) summarized the 
definitions of temporary workers from various labour surveys in Japan. They found that 
temporary workers are generally defined as workers employed on a temporary contract 
which lasts for more than a month but less than a year. This general definition is similar 
to those adopted by studies such as Booth et al. (2002). De Grip et al. (1997) noted that 
the average proportion of temporary workers in Europe increased by 5.4% from 1983 to 
1991. The growth of temporary employment continued in the early 1990s albeit at a 
slower pace (1.1%).  
Table 3.4 shows the changes in the UK temporary employment rates by age group 
and gender in the 2000s. These changes show a U-shape trend in the 2000s. The over-
SPA group had the largest proportion of temporary workers. The proportions of temporary 
employment rates in other age groups were similar to each other. The proportions of males 
working temporarily were smaller than female ones except in the 16-to-24 and over-SPA 
groups. In general, there are larger proportions of females working temporarily than those 
of males in younger age groups. The pattern is reversed when people have reached the 
SPA. One possible reason for this is that older males have to work temporarily to sustain 
their family expenses. 
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Table 3.4: UK temporary employment rates  
by age group and gender in the 2000s 
Group Temporary employment rates (%) 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
q1 
Total 
16 or over 5.65 5.40 5.15 4.99 4.70 4.73 4.71 4.34 4.63 5.09 5.09 5.06 
16 to 24 9.54 8.81 8.59 8.73 8.14 8.58 8.90 7.96 7.85 10.40 9.80 9.54 
25 to 39 5.18 5.01 4.82 4.80 4.35 4.55 4.55 4.33 4.80 5.19 5.05 5.10 
40 to 49 4.72 4.50 4.05 3.72 3.68 3.65 3.48 3.15 3.44 3.71 3.82 3.87 
50 to SPA 4.90 4.61 4.42 4.34 4.33 3.88 3.86 3.60 3.70 3.97 4.06 3.96 
Over SPA 11.94 12.43 12.51 10.66 9.07 9.54 9.35 8.55 9.66 8.86 9.50 9.53 
Male 
16 or over 4.85 4.61 4.46 4.48 4.24 4.14 4.19 3.79 4.26 4.73 4.76 4.54 
16 to 24 9.70 8.72 8.48 8.90 7.64 8.33 9.09 8.14 8.54 11.08 10.39 9.52 
25 to 39 4.17 3.91 3.78 3.84 3.77 3.89 3.77 3.58 4.22 4.59 4.62 4.50 
40 to 49 3.39 3.12 2.79 2.85 2.69 2.54 2.47 2.33 2.67 2.87 3.12 3.05 
50 to SPA 4.62 4.59 4.53 4.62 4.47 3.86 3.86 3.43 3.74 4.02 3.93 3.84 
Over SPA 16.62 19.06 18.44 13.36 13.16 12.65 14.14 12.25 15.23 13.09 13.00 12.24 
Female 
16 or over 6.46 6.20 5.85 5.50 5.16 5.30 5.22 4.88 4.99 5.43 5.41 5.56 
16 to 24 9.36 8.91 8.72 8.54 8.68 8.84 8.70 7.79 7.13 9.67 9.21 9.55 
25 to 39 6.19 6.12 5.83 5.74 4.92 5.19 5.31 5.07 5.35 5.75 5.46 5.67 
40 to 49 6.00 5.82 5.24 4.51 4.59 4.67 4.42 3.91 4.14 4.48 4.45 4.62 
50 to SPA 5.24 4.63 4.29 4.00 4.15 3.91 3.85 3.82 3.66 3.91 4.21 4.10 
Over SPA 10.47 10.25 10.43 9.76 7.73 8.50 7.84 7.63 8.28 7.72 8.31 8.60 
Note: Temporary employment rate: the proportion of temporary employees (either full-time or part-time 
workers) in the labour force aged 16 or over 
Source: My own calculation using data from the UK LFS 
3.6.2 Studies on temporary employment 
Studies on temporary employment, especially among older people, are very few 
compared to those on part-time employment and self-employment. A possible reason is 
that, though on the increase, the proportion of temporary workers is still much smaller 
than in the other two types of flexible employment (De Grip et al., 1997; Booth et al., 
2002). Most studies on temporary employment are at the firm level (Davis-Blake and 
Uzzi, 1993). There are also studies investigating the relationship between temporary 
employment and permanent employment such as transitions from temporary employment 
to permanent employment (Berton et al., 2011) and wage differentials (Ghinetti, n.d.). As 
pointed out by Loretto et al. (2009), some workers are forced into temporary work 
because they cannot find a permanent job. This implies that they are involuntary 
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temporary workers. Not many studies focus only on the determinants of temporary 
employment. Studies on more than one type of flexible employment, including temporary 
employment, are more common30. 
Amuedo-Dorantes (2000) investigated whether temporary employment in Spain is 
voluntary or involuntary. He used the Spanish LFS from the second quarter of 1995 to the 
second quarter of 1996 to estimate multinomial logit models on the probabilities of being 
inactive, unemployed or temporarily employed. Proportional hazard models on 
transitions from temporary work to permanent work were also estimated. His results show 
that most temporary workers in Spain are involuntary and they have limited access to 
permanent employment. 
Booth et al. (2002) are among the few UK studies on temporary employment that 
investigated whether UK temporary jobs are unpromising with poor pay and prospects, 
or promising jobs helping to transit to permanent employment. They addressed three main 
research questions. First, who held temporary jobs in the U.K. during the 1990s? Second, 
were there any differences in job satisfaction and the levels of wage and training received 
between temporary workers and permanent workers? Third, how long would it take 
temporary workers to get a permanent job? They used the BHPS from 1991 to 1997 to 
estimate various econometric models such as ordered probit models on job satisfaction 
and proportional hazard models on transitions from various kinds of temporary workers 
to permanent workers. Their results show that temporary employment is in general 
undesirable compared to permanent employment. This means many temporary workers 
are involuntary. They receive less training, have lower levels of job satisfaction and earn 
                                                 
30 Related studies are discussed in next section. 
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less compared to permanent workers. 
3.7 Studies on more than one type of flexible employment 
As mentioned above, there are studies on more than one type of flexible employment. 
Some of them do not make a clear distinction on each type of flexible employment. 
Loretto et al. (2009) noted that full-time workers are usually permanent workers, whereas 
part-time workers are usually temporary workers. Kim and DeVaney (2005) and Pagan 
(2012) included a dummy of being self-employed in their regressions for analysing part-
time employment of older people. 
On the contrary, studies such as Morris and Mallier (2003) and Wenger and Reynold 
(2009) treated various kinds of flexible employment as distinct from each other and made 
comparisons on their relative popularity among workers. Johnson and Zimmermann 
(1993) noted that self-employment is preferred to part-time employment by people who 
value its greater degree of autonomy. Morris and Mallier (2003) pointed out that older 
females often prefer part-time employment, whereas older males prefer self-employment. 
Taylor (2011) found for the U.K. that in 2009 a larger proportion of males worked as self-
employed workers, whereas a larger proportion of females worked part-time. 
De Grip et al. (1997) is one of just a few macro level studies on the importance of 
part-time employment and temporary employment in Europe. They were interested in the 
occupations in which the types of flexible workers are employed. They used the LFS for 
11 EU member states in 1983 and in 1991 to estimate separate binomial logit models on 
part-time employment rates or temporary employment rates. They found that the 
differences in the proportions of temporary employment among the EU countries are 
much smaller than those in part-time employment. The production sector has the widest 
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inter-country differences in the share of temporary employment. Furthermore, the 
popularity of the two types of flexible employment is not the same across various EU 
countries. 
Farber (1999) is an example of micro study which focused on the association 
between job loss and alternative work arrangements including temporary employment or 
part-time employment in the U.S. They matched the Displaced Worker Supplements 
(DWS) of the CPS in February 1994 and 1996 to the Contingent and Alternative 
Employment Arrangements Supplements (CAEAS) to estimate binomial probit models 
on the probabilities of various types of employment. Their results show that job losers 
working temporarily are more likely to work full-time, whereas non-losers working 
temporarily are more likely to work part-time voluntarily. Moreover, temporary 
employment and involuntary part-time employment seem to be a bridge between job loss 
and subsequent regular full-time employment. 
There are studies on various types of flexible employment among older people. 
Lissenburgh and Smeaton (2003) studied all three types of flexible employment discussed 
in previous sections. They used the UK LFS from 1997 to 2000 to estimate binomial logit 
models on the probabilities of exiting from permanent full-time jobs among older people. 
Multinomial logit models on the probabilities of transitions from economic inactivity to 
part-time employment, self-employment or temporary employment were also estimated. 
Their results show that factors affecting the probabilities of older people doing flexible 
work vary based on gender and the type of flexible employment under concern.  
Lissenburgh and Smeaton (2003) found that self-employment offers the most 
comparable job quality to permanent full-time employment among the three types of 
flexible employment. Self-employed older workers reported high levels of job 
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satisfaction. Nonetheless, only professionals or owners of rare businesses have higher 
income than permanent full-time workers do. Temporary employment is ranked next in 
terms of job quality. Temporary workers are more likely to receive training. However, 
earning potential varies according to the type of work. Managers or professionals with 
fixed-term contracts are more likely to earn more than permanent full-time workers. Part-
time employment has the poorest job quality among the three types of flexible 
employment. It is inferior to permanent full-time employment. 
Wenger and Reynold (2009) studied the effect of health and health insurance 
coverage on the probabilities of the three types of flexible employment and regular full-
time employment among US older married people. They used the CPS in February and 
March of 1997, 1999, 2001 and 2005 to estimate multinomial logit models on the 
probabilities of six kinds of flexible or regular full-time employment. They found that 
older married people with fair or poor health are less likely to be regular full-time workers. 
Poor health causes older people to seek flexible employment rather than regular full-time 
employment. However, they are more likely to be regular full-time workers when their 
spouses’ health is poor. 
3.8 Approaches to studying flexible employment 
The studies discussed above used various kinds of probability models to investigate 
the determinants of flexible employment. For example, ordered logit/probit models are 
widely used by many studies (Miller, 1997; Blanchflower, 2000; Booth et al., 2002). In 
these studies, it is implicitly assumed that the various employment modes can be ordered. 
For example, Miller (1997) estimated ordered probit models on the probabilities of non-
participation, part-time employment and full-time employment among married females. 
He assumed that knowing the preferred single choice of individuals among the unordered 
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employment alternatives is sufficient to grant the use of ordered probit model.  
Nevertheless, in our view he neglected the voluntary and involuntary nature of the 
employment modes chosen by individuals. This is difficult to show based on the 
information on individuals’ choices among employment modes alone. If one does not 
have sufficient information on determining the voluntary and involuntary nature of 
individuals’ economic status (such as the reasons for individuals’ choice), ordered 
logit/probit models may not be a suitable estimation approach to study the issue. 
In addition to ordered logit/probit models, binomial logit/probit models and 
multinomial logit/probit models are common estimation methods used. For instance, 
Taylor (1996) estimated binomial probit models to study the effect of various factors such 
as UK job aspects on the probabilities of being self-employed. Falzone (2000) estimated 
multinomial logit models to study part-time employment of married females in the U.S. 
Binomial logit/probit models are often used in studies comparing the probabilities of 
voluntary and involuntary flexible employment, provided that information for classifying 
the two (such as the reasons for individuals’ choice) is available (Hotchkiss, 2004; 
Kjeldstad and Nymoen, 2012). For studies on more than one type of flexible employment, 
the use of multinomial logit/probit models is more common (Lissenburgh and Smeaton, 
2003; Wenger and Reynolds, 2009). As noted by DeVaney and Kim (2005), multinomial 
logit (and probit) models assume that the choice outcomes are independent to each other 
and no clear hierarchy exists among them. Thus multinomial logit/probit models are more 
suitable than ordered logit/probit models in studying various kinds of flexible 
employment. 
94 
3.9 Final remarks 
To summarize, despite the increasing popularity of various kinds of flexible 
employment among older people worldwide, there are few studies on this specific theme. 
Most studies on the employment prospects of older people, as discussed in Chapter 1, 
focus on regular full-time employment. Little attention has been paid to the flexible 
employment of older people (Lissenburgh and Smeaton, 2003; Kim and DeVaney, 2005; 
Wenger and Reynold, 2009). There is little evidence on factors influencing older people’s 
choices on various modes of employment. There are also few studies on the factors 
affecting the shift between different employment modes among older workers 
(Lissenburgh and Smeaton, 2003).  
Wenger and Reynold (2009) suggested two reasons for the lack of related studies. 
Firstly, many labour studies on older people, such as Blundell et al. (2002) and Hairault 
et al. (2010), focus on retirement, rather than on employment. Secondly, many studies on 
partial retirement or bridge employment31, such as Ruhm (1990) and Adams and Rau 
(2004), only focus on whether older people can remain in the workforce. Work is 
considered as something which older people can do or not, rather than choose to do in 
different ways. As noted by Loretto et al. (2009), relatively little is known about existing 
patterns of flexible employment among older people. Little is also known about older 
people’s motivation to work flexibly. A deep investigation on these issues is therefore 
needed. 
Among studies on different kinds of flexible employment, most focus on younger 
people or the whole workforce (Zissimopoulos and Karoly, 2007; 2009). There are studies 
                                                 
31  Bridge employment is commonly defined as employment pursued between the period of career 
employment and full retirement.  
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which focus on a particular group, e.g. on married workers (Wenger and Reynold, 2009), 
on married females (Miller, 1997; Falzone, 2000) or on people with disabilities (Schur, 
2002; Hotchkiss, 2004). Studies, which consider older people, only focus on males (Fuchs, 
1982). Not many studies have investigated the flexible employment of older people by 
gender. Thus a study on this theme is needed because the work patterns for older males 
and older females may differ significantly. A comparison between the flexible 
employment prospects of younger people and older people should also be made. 
Moreover, many studies focus on one type of flexible employment only such as 
Zissimopoulos and Karoly (2009) and Pagan (2012). Studying the determinants of older 
people’s choices on various kinds of employment mode is worthwhile because these may 
affect policy considerations on helping older people to achieve their favourite 
employment mode. 
In addition to the above issues, the voluntary and involuntary nature of flexible 
employment deserves special attention (Hakim, 1987; Falzone, 2000; Morris and Mallier, 
2003). The focus so far has been placed on part-time and, sometimes, temporary 
employment). As discussed in Section 3.2, there are various potential benefits for older 
people in working part-time, such as working with reduced stress. Nonetheless, part-time 
employment can be an involuntary choice for older people if they cannot find their 
preferred employment mode such as full-time work. This may show the marginalization 
of older people in the labour market.  
There is a similar concern on the self-employment of older people. Kruppe et al. 
(1998) suspected that being self-employed could be a consequence of the lack of other 
employment opportunities. Nevertheless, in our view, studies on the voluntary and 
involuntary nature of self-employment are uncommon for two reasons. Firstly, in contrast 
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to part-time and temporary employment, being self-employed requires people’s 
commitment to entry such as capital investment. Older people who hope to find a regular 
full-time job but cannot do so may not “force” themselves to choose self-employment. 
Most of them hope to earn enough to sustain their retirement and may not be willing to 
risk start-up capital investment. Secondly, there are not many datasets eliciting 
information on voluntary and involuntary self-employment. The above issues can be 
addressed using binomial or multinomial logit/probit estimation. The next chapter 
discusses our empirical framework for addressing these issues and our estimation results. 
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CHAPTER 4  
OLDER VERSUS YOUNGER PEOPLE’S PREFERENCES OVER 
AND OUTCOMES OF FLEXIBLE EMPLOYMENT MODES: AN 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the data, the empirical framework and the analysis results on 
preferences over, and outcomes of, flexible employment modes for older versus younger 
people. As suggested in the previous chapter, most studies on the employment prospects 
of older people focus on regular full-time employment. Little attention has been paid to 
the flexible employment modes available to older people (Lissenburgh and Smeaton, 
2003; Kim and DeVaney, 2005; Wenger and Reynold, 2009). This study aims to provide 
new insights on this theme with three research objectives.  
Firstly, we study the preferences of older versus younger unemployed job-seekers 
over various employment modes. We restrict our analyses to unemployed job-seekers 
instead of all job-seekers as we wish to focus on the preference priority of workers over 
various employment modes when they do not have any work at hand. Most studies on 
flexible employment discussed in the previous chapter focus on the factors that affect the 
actual outcomes, i.e. which type of employment individuals actually move into. Little 
research has been done on unemployed job-seekers’ preferences. People with certain 
characteristics may have higher probabilities of entering particular employment modes 
even if their preferred mode was different. It is therefore important to study this issue 
because it affects policy makers’ decisions on how to help older people seek their 
favoured mode of employment.  
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Secondly, as suggested in Chapter 2, older people have lower employment 
probabilities than younger people. However, the situation may be different for different 
employment modes. My study provides three new insights on this question. 
A) We consider more than one type of flexible employment. Many studies such as 
Zissimopoulos and Karoly (2009) and Pagan (2012) only focus on one type of flexible 
employment. We focus on part-time employment and self-employment and treat working 
temporarily as a control variable. This is due to the complexity of classifying part-time 
employment and temporary employment separately32.  
B) We use a long time-span of the UK LFS from 2001q2 to 2012q1 and conduct updated 
analyses.  
C) We study the neglected issue of gender, as suggested in the previous chapter. Few 
studies have investigated issues of gender when considering the flexible employment of 
older people. 
Thirdly, my study investigates the voluntary and involuntary nature of part-time 
employment. As discussed in the previous chapter, older people may choose to work part-
time for various reasons. Nonetheless, part-time employment can be an involuntary 
choice if they cannot find their preferred employment mode such as full-time work. As 
noted by Falzone (2000), there are policy implications if involuntary part-timers are 
concentrated in a particular group of workers. It is therefore important to study whether 
older part-timers tend to work voluntarily or involuntarily. 
The three research dimensions identified above lead us to use binomial logit models 
                                                 
32 A more detailed account is provided in Section 4.2. 
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and multinomial logit models to investigate five specific research questions. Firstly, what 
are the significant factors affecting older people’s preferences over each type of 
employment? Secondly, what are the significant factors affecting older people’s entry into 
a particular mode of employment? Thirdly, what are the significant factors leading older 
people to work part-time involuntarily? Fourthly, are the answers to the above questions 
different from those of younger people? Fifthly, do the results above differ between males 
and females? 
In contrast to Chapter 2 that looks at three economies, we only study the U.K. The 
UK LFS has much richer information for the analysis of unemployed job-seekers and 
part-timers, compared to similar datasets for the U.S. and Hong Kong. Also, the U.K. can 
act as a benchmark between heavily regulated economies like Europe and less regulated 
economies like the U.S. (Ajayi-Obe and Parker, 2005). The remainder of this chapter is 
organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides a discussion on the background and treatment 
of the data. Section 4.3 discusses the summary statistics for the sub-samples. Sections 4.4 
to 4.6 present the estimation framework and discuss the empirical results for the three 
analyses. Section 4.7 concludes the discussion. 
4.2 Variables and data treatment on the UK LFS 
In this study, UK LFS data from 2001q2 to 2012q1 are used as prior to this there 
were no ethnicity measures. The data are accessed from the UK Data Archive website33. 
As in the previous empirical chapter, we pool the LFS at each quarter to construct a time-
series of independently pooled cross-sectional data. This can increase the sample size so 
as to strengthen the robustness of the estimation results (Wooldridge, 2006). Many studies 
                                                 
33 The data source of the UK LFS is acknowledged in the Reference. 
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in labour economics, such as Gomulka and Stern (1990) and Chen and Hamori (2010), 
use independently pooled cross-sectional data. 
The choice of LFS variables is based on the literature (Evans and Leighton, 1989; 
Butcher and Hutchinson, 1996; Miller, 1997; Lissenburgh and Smeaton, 2003; 
Zissimopoulos and Karoly, 2009; Pagan, 2012) and the availability of relevant data. Table 
4.1 shows the categories of variables included in each regression analysis. The included 
variables cover respondents’ demographic, household, human capital and job 
characteristics. All variables related to demographic and household characteristics are 
included in all the regression equations. Information related to job characteristics is only 
available for regressions on workers in the third analysis, which studies the voluntary and 
involuntary nature of part-time work.  
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Table 4.1: Categories of independent variables  
included in each regression analysis 
Regressions: 1 2 3 
Demographic characteristics 
Gender    
Marital status    
Nationality    
Ethnicity    
Health status    
Age    
Household characteristics 
Number of dependent children aged 4 or less    
Number of dependent children aged between 5 and 9    
Number of dependent children aged between 10 and 15    
Region of residence    
Human capital characteristics 
Education    
Unemployment duration    
Job characteristics 
Sector (private or public)    
Industry    
Industry (last job)    
Usual working hour    
Temporary work or not    
Tenure    
Being home workers or not    
Whether having second job    
Others 
Benefit claimant status    
Year dummies    
The variables for unemployment duration and for industry of the last job are only 
included in the first analysis. This is because the first analysis studies the unemployed 
job-seekers’ preferences and these information are available for unemployed job-seekers 
only. As noted by Wooldridge (2006), the population distribution may change over time 
in pooled cross-sectional data. Thus a series of year dummies is included to reflect the 
possible changes in year-specific effects.  
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Table 4.2: Description for the dependent variables in each analysis 
Variables Description 
JobPreference Dependent variable for the first set of regression analyses; dummy 
for searching which type of employment with four categories: 
0: no preference* 
1: want full-time work 
2: want part-time work 
3: want to be self-employed 
EconActivity Dependent variable for the second set of regression analyses; 
dummy for economic activity with four categories: 
0: unemployed* 
1: work full-time 
2: work part-time 
3: self-employed 
InvoluntaryPT Dependent variable for the third set of regression analyses; dummy 
for working part-time involuntarily (=1,0) 
* Denotes control variables 
Table 4.2 provides the description for the dependent variables in each analysis. 
JobPreference and EconActivity are the multinomial dependent variables in the first and 
second analysis. Many studies choose the category for full-time work as the reference 
group in their regressions (Falzone, 2000; Kim and DeVaney, 2005; Wenger and Reynolds, 
2009; Kjeldstad and Nymoen, 2012). We use unemployed job-seekers with no preference 
and unemployed workers as the reference groups of JobPreference and EconActivity 
respectively. This is for ease of comparison among the employment modes.  
There are a number of alternative definitions for each flexible employment mode in 
the literature. Part-time employment is often defined by the number of working hours. 
Most studies define part-timers as people working less than 35 hours a week, either during 
the survey week or as usual (Blau, 1994; Falzone, 2000; Nardone, 2005). There are 
studies that define part-timers as people working less than 32 hours (Pagan, 2009) or less 
than 30 hours (Gannon and Roberts, 2011). The self-employed are defined differently 
from part-timers. They are not defined by working hours but often by their report as self-
employed in the survey (Carrasco, 1999; Lissenburgh and Smeaton, 2003; Ajayi-Obe and 
103 
Parker, 2005). Although the self-employed can be either part-time or full-time workers, 
what sets the self-employed apart is the autonomy in their work so as to allow them to 
choose their number of working hours. For this reason the distinction between full-time 
and part-time employment is seldom made among the self-employed. 
Temporary workers are defined by whether their contracts are seasonal/casual/short-
term (Booth et al., 2002). Classifying temporary workers is complicated by the fact that 
both full-time and part-time workers can be temporary. Lissenburgh and Smeaton (2003) 
used a priority rule to classify part-time employees, the self-employed and temporary 
employees. According to their priority rule, the self-employed are defined by self-
reported status. Part-timers are also defined by self-reported status regardless of whether 
they hold temporary or fixed contracts. Other full-timers who hold temporary contracts 
are classified as temporary workers. 
However, the proportion of temporary workers classified by the above priority rule 
can be much smaller compared to those of other flexible workers. Therefore we focus on 
part-time employment and self-employment only and treat working temporarily as a 
control. This means that we allow part-timers and full-time workers to be either temporary 
or permanent employees. Temporary workers are also defined by self-reported status. Our 
study defines part-timers and the self-employed by respondents’ self-reported status. 
Unemployed people are defined as ILO unemployed who are without work, currently 
available for work and seeking work (International Labour Office, 2012). 
InvoluntaryPT is the binomial dependent variable in the third analysis. There are 
various definitions adopted in the literature to classify voluntary and involuntary part-
timers. Most definitions are based on the concept of under-employment. Hotchkiss (2004) 
defined voluntary part-timers as those who work for less than 35 hours a week and do not 
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want to work full-time. Kjeldstad and Nymoen (2012) considered part-timers who want 
longer working hours as involuntary part-timers. We define involuntary part-timers as 
those who looked for different or additional paid work, or who would like to work longer 
hours at their current rate of pay34 (UK Data Archive Study Group, 2011). 
Table 4.3: Description for continuous independent variables in each analysis 
Variables Description 
#KidsAged_0to4 Number of dependent children in family aged 4 or less 
#KidsAged_5to9 Number of dependent children in family aged from 5 to 9 
#KidsAged_10to15 Number of dependent children in family aged from 10 to 15 
WorkHour Total usual hours worked in main job 
Tenure Number of years in current job 
 
  
                                                 
34 The UK LFS variables used for this definition are difjob and undemp. 
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Table 4.4: Description for binary (0,1) independent variables in each analysis 
Variables Description  
Male Male gender 
MS_Married* Marital status for being married 
MS_Single Marital status for being single 
MS_Separ_Divor Marital status for being separated or divorced 
MS_Widowed Marital status for being widowed 
Foreign Nationality for being foreigner 
Ethn_White* Ethnicity for being White 
Ethn_Black Ethnicity for being Black 
Ethn_Asian Ethnicity for being Asian 
Ethn_Mixed Ethnicity for being mixed 
Ethn_Other Ethnicity for being in other ethnic group 
Health_problems Health status for having health problems limiting kinds of work 
Age_16to19* Age group for being aged from 16 to 19 years old 
Age_20to24 Age group for being aged from 20 to 24 years old 
Age_25to29 Age group for being aged from 25 to 29 years old 
Age_30to34 Age group for being aged from 30 to 34 years old 
Age_35to39 Age group for being aged from 35 to 39 years old 
Age_40to44 Age group for being aged from 40 to 44 years old 
Age_45to49 Age group for being aged from 45 to 49 years old 
Age_50to54* Age group for being aged from 50 to 54 years old 
Age_55to59 Age group for being aged from 55 to 59 years old 
Age_60to64 Age group for being aged from 60 to 64 years old 
Age_over64 Age group for being aged over 64 
R_England* Region of residence for living in England 
R_Wales Region of residence for living in the Wales 
R_Scotland Region of residence for living in Scotland 
R_NorthIreland Region of residence for living in North Ireland 
Qual_Degree Qualification for having a university degree or above 
Qual_Postsec Qualification for having a college or associate degree 
Qual_Secondary Qualification for having a secondary school qualification 
Qual_Primary* Qualification for having a primary school qualification or below 
DurUnemp_Less1* Unemployment duration, less than 1 year 
DurUnemp_1to3 Unemployment duration, from 1 year to less than 3 year 
DurUnemp_3to5 Unemployment duration, from 3 years to less than 5 year 
DurUnemp_5plus Unemployment duration, 5 years or more 
Private Sector for working in the private sector 
Ind_Agri_Fish  Industry for working agriculture and fishing 
Ind_Energy_Water Industry for working energy and water 
Ind_Manuf* Industry for working manufacturing 
Ind_Constr  Industry for working construction 
Ind_DisHote_Rest Industry for working distribution, hotels and restaurants 
Ind_TranspComm  Industry for working transport and communication 
Ind_BankFinIns Industry for working banking, finance and insurance, etc 
Ind_PubEduHealth  Industry for working in public administration, education and health 
Ind_Others Industry for working other services 
LInd_... Industry of last job (same classification as Ind_... variables) 
Temporary Whether the current job is temporary 
Homeworker Homeworker or not 
SecJob Has a second job 
Benefit Claiming any State Benefits/Tax credits 
(Year dummies) Survey year (the earliest year is the control group) 
(* Denotes control variables) 
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Tables 4.3 and 4.4 provide the descriptions for the independent variables in the three 
analyses. Different sets of age dummies are included in the separate analyses for younger 
people and older people with Age_16to19 and Age_50to54 as the control groups 
respectively. There is no consensus on the cut-off between younger and older people in 
the literature. There are studies defining the cut-off as 55 (Hutchens, 1986), as 35 (Duncan 
and Loretto, 2004) or as 45 (Osberg, 1993; Johnson and Neumark, 1997). The most 
widely-used cut-off age is 50 (Peracchi and Welch, 1994; Hirsch et al., 2000; Chan and 
Stevens, 2001; NOP Social and Political, 2001; Adams, 2004; Chou and Chow, 2005). 
Therefore as in our previous empirical chapter, we choose age of 50 as the cut-off age 
between younger and older people. We include the variable Temporary in the third 
analysis to capture any differences due to temporary employment.  
We exclude any data irrelevant for the analysis. Firstly, people who are below the 
minimum employment age are excluded as all the analyses deal with those at or above 
the minimum working age35. The behaviour of people above the State Pension Age (SPA) 
deserves policy attention and hence we include them in the regression. Secondly, data 
with inconsistencies and incomplete answers are excluded. Thirdly, top-coded data are 
excluded for consistent and unbiased estimation. Lastly, we exclude unpaid family 
workers and participants in government employment and training programmes. This is 
because the proportions of people in these two groups over the whole sample are very 
small (less than 1%) and the results for this sub-group are therefore unreliable. After 
dropping irrelevant cases, the final samples for the three analyses consist of 111,275 
individuals, 2,341,527 individuals and 460,664 individuals respectively.  
In the first analysis, only unemployed job-seekers are included for studying their job 
                                                 
35 The minimum working age in the U.K. is 16. 
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preferences. As stated in Section 4.1, we restrict our analyses to unemployed job-seekers 
instead of all job-seekers when we wish to focus on the preference priority of workers 
over various employment modes when they do not have any work at hand. Information 
on job preferences (the employment mode which respondents are looking for) is only 
available for those who reply that they are looking for jobs. In the second analysis, only 
economically-active people (either employed or unemployed) are included for studying 
the factors affecting the entry of people into various employment modes. In the third 
analysis, only part-timers are included for studying the voluntary and involuntary nature 
of their employment. 
4.3 Summary sample statistics 
Tables 4.5 to 4.10 in the Appendix show the summary statistics for three samples of 
respondents: unemployed job-seekers, the economically-active and the subsample of the 
economically-active who work part-time. The values for the categorical variables 
represent the proportion of people with that characteristic in the corresponding samples. 
Some statistics are similar for all the three samples. Therefore we combine the discussion 
on those important statistics for brevity. 
Most unemployed job-seekers, as shown by Tables 4.5 and 4.6, want to look for full-
time jobs followed by part-time jobs and self-employment regardless of age and gender. 
Over 70% of males and over 50% of females want to look for full-time jobs. The 
proportions of older people wanting to seek full-time jobs are smaller than those of 
younger people, whereas the proportions of older people wanting to seek part-time jobs 
or self-employment are larger than those of younger people. This pattern is the same for 
both genders. Although most females want to work full-time, the values for the 
proportions of females wanting to work part-time are much larger than those of males by 
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over 30%. This shows that females are generally more willing to work part-time than 
males.  
The values for the unemployed in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 are the unemployment rates of 
various samples from 2001 to 2012. The unemployment rates of younger people are 
higher than those of older people. The unemployment rates of all males, regardless of age, 
are higher than those of females. Most people work full-time regardless of age and gender. 
The proportions of younger full-timers are larger than those of older full-timers, whereas 
the proportions of older flexible workers (part-timers and self-employed) are larger than 
those of younger flexible workers. This pattern is the same for both genders. We can see 
that younger people are more likely to prefer full-time work and work full-time. Older 
people are more likely to prefer flexible employment and work flexibly. The proportions 
of female part-timers are larger than those of male part-timers, whereas the proportions 
of the male self-employed are higher than those of female self-employed regardless of 
age. This further supports the common belief that males have a higher preference for self-
employment and females for part-time work. 
Table 4.9 shows that 78% of all part-timers do so voluntarily. The proportion of older 
voluntary part-timers is larger than that of younger voluntary part-timers. In Table 4.10 
the proportions of the two kinds of part-timers are similar for younger males, whereas 
over 70% of younger part-time females are so voluntarily. The proportions of older 
voluntary part-timers are over 80% for both genders. This shows that most female part-
timers want to work part-time. Younger males tend to work part-time involuntarily. In 
contrast, most older male part-timers are satisfied with their part-time work.  
Most unemployed job seekers are within the age range 20 to 24, whereas most of the 
economically-active are within the age range 35 to 44 irrespective of gender. The largest 
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proportion of male part-timers are over 64, whereas the largest proportion of female part-
timers are 35 to 44. It is notable that people aged 50 or over account for significant 
proportions of all unemployed job-seekers, the economically-active and part-timers 
(around 20% to 30%). There are larger proportions of male unemployed job-seekers or 
economically-active than those of their female counterparts. The proportions of male 
unemployed job-seekers and economically-active in the older sample are larger than that 
in the younger sample. Nevertheless, younger males account for only 10% of all part-
timers. This figure doubles for older males. Although males become more willing to take 
part-time jobs when they get older, part-time work is still much more popular for females. 
4.4 Multinomial logits: job preferences of unemployed job-seekers 
4.4.1 Estimation framework 
In this first analysis, we estimate multinomial logit models for unemployed job-
seekers’ preferences over various employment modes36. An unemployed job seeker i 
faces j job preference choices, where j=0 is no preference, j=1 is preference for full-time 
work, j=2 is preference for part-time work and j=3 is preference for self-employment. A 
multinomial logit model is run to estimate the probability that an unemployed job seeker 
has for one of the four distinct choices of job preferences. Let Y be the choice made 
(JobPreference in this case). A four-choice multinomial logit model is estimated as 
follows: 
                                                 
36 All the estimation procedures are carried out using Stata. We use logit models instead of probit models 
because it is more popular in this field of research and it therefore makes it easier to compare our results to 
those of others (Amuedo-Dorantes, 2000; Lissenburgh and Smeaton, 2003; Kim and DeVaney, 2005; Parker 
and Rougier, 2007; Wenger and Reynold, 2009). Also, estimation program of multinomial logit models in 
Stata (mlogit) runs faster than that of multinomial probit models (mprobit). The framework discussed 
hereafter is based on Falzone (2000) with some modifications. 
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(11) P (Y = j | X) = ℯ𝛽𝑗𝑋𝑖 ∑ ℯ𝛽𝑗𝑋𝑖3𝑗=0⁄   
where 𝛽𝑗 is a vector of parameters and 𝑋𝑖  is a set of independent explanatory variables 
related to each job seeker i. Normalization of Equation (11) requires one group to be the 
reference group and against which the probability is compared. We use the group with no 
preference over employment mode j=0 as the reference. The probability of unemployed 
job-seekers having no job preference is given by setting 𝛽0=0 as follows: 
(12) P (Y = 0 | X) = 1 [1 +  ∑ ℯ(𝛽𝑗−𝛽0) 𝑋𝑖3𝑗=1 ]⁄   
Since the dependent variable has four categories, we can estimate the log odds of 
preference over full-time work, preference over part-time work and preference over self-
employment to the baseline category (no preference). Three non-redundant logit 
equations can be estimated as follows: 
(13) log[𝑃 (
preference for 
full − time work
) /  𝑃(no  preference) ] = 𝛽1𝑋𝑖 
(14) log[𝑃 (
preference for 
part − time  work
) /  𝑃(no  preference) ] = 𝛽2𝑋𝑖  
(15) log[𝑃 (
preference for 
self − employment
) /  𝑃(no  preference) ] = 𝛽3𝑋𝑖  
Including just a gender dummy as one of the independent variables is insufficient 
for studying gender differences because this implicitly assumes the effects of all other 
variables are the same for males and females (Berndt, 1990). We therefore estimate six 
sets of multinomial logit regressions on younger or older people for the male, female and 
pooled samples separately. All the estimation results are expressed in terms of marginal 
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effects for ease of inference37. This implies that an estimated parameter can be directly 
interpreted as the change in probability of the preference choice contributed by a unit 
change in the independent variable.  
4.4.2 Marginal effects on the job preferences of unemployed job-seekers 
Table 4.11 shows the marginal effects from the multinomial logits for the job 
preferences of unemployed job-seekers. The results of interest in these regressions are 
with respect to individuals’ gender, health, education, unemployment duration, benefit 
claimant status and age. Most estimated parameters are statistically significant at the 1% 
level. Males are in general more likely to prefer full-time jobs or self-employment and 
less likely to prefer part-time jobs. It is not surprising to find that people with health 
problems, regardless of age, are less likely to prefer full-time jobs and more likely to 
prefer the two modes of flexible employment. Wenger and Reynold (2009) noted that 
flexible employment can help less healthy people to maintain a work-health balance. 
The reference group for the education dummies is people with primary school 
qualifications. Younger unemployed job-seekers with secondary education or above are 
less likely to prefer full-time jobs and more likely to prefer self-employment. As noted 
by Carrasco (1999), more educated people are often better informed when it comes to 
spotting self-employment opportunities. Younger unemployed job-seekers with post-
secondary education or above are less likely to prefer part-time jobs. Comparing the two 
choices of flexible employment, more educated people prefer self-employment. In 
addition, the higher the education a job seeker has, the lower the preference for part-time 
work and the higher the preference for self-employment. This pattern is the same for both 
                                                 
37 As in Chapter 2, we calculate the marginal effects by using the command “mfx” in Stata. 
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younger and older unemployed job-seekers. A possible reason is that autonomy in work 
is more important for more educated people.  
Younger unemployed job-seekers who are unemployed for more than 1 year are 
more likely to prefer full-time jobs and less likely to prefer flexible employment. However, 
older job-seekers unemployed for more than 1 year are less likely to prefer any kind of 
employment. They tend to prefer full-time work if they are unemployed for five years or 
more. Preference for full-time work increases with unemployment duration, whereas 
preference for part-time work decreases with it. This is because the longer the job seeker’s 
unemployment duration is, the more likely he or she is to be in financial difficulty and 
therefore to need stable employment with higher earnings. Both older and younger 
unemployed job-seekers with longer unemployment durations are less likely to prefer 
self-employment. This may be because they become more reluctant to choose self-
employment if they have been unemployed for a long time.  
Unemployed job-seekers who claim state benefits or tax credits are more likely to 
prefer full-time jobs and less likely to prefer self-employment (regardless of age). This is 
because most benefit claimants do not have the funds to start their own business. As noted 
by Carrasco (1999), state benefits are the main source of income for unemployed people. 
When the benefits are exhausted, the intensity of job search rises and the chance for 
unemployed people to find work increases. Full-time employment often leads to a more 
stable income. Younger unemployed job-seekers on benefits are more likely to prefer 
part-time employment, whereas their older counterparts are less likely to do so.  
Estimates on the age dummies are the most important results in this study because 
they capture age effects when the other characteristics are controlled for. Unemployed 
job-seekers aged 20 to 49 are less likely to prefer full-time jobs and more likely to prefer 
113 
flexible employment (compared to the 16-19 control group). The disinterest of 
unemployed job-seekers for full-time jobs increases with age. In addition, for those aged 
50 or over, the preference for part-time and self-employment (i.e. flexible employment) 
increases with age. These results show that, regardless of age, unemployed job-seekers 
have an increased preference for flexible employment modes as they become older. Also, 
for any age group, unemployed job-seekers have a preference for flexible employment 
over full-time work. Nevertheless, these results may not answer the question of whether 
flexible employment is a ‘real’ preference or just a consequence of being discouraged by 
the inability to find full time employment. For a clearer picture, we also need to assess 
the results of the analyses on employment outcomes and on involuntary part-time 
employment. 
Male and female unemployed job-seekers with similar characteristics may have very 
different job preferences. We can gain a better understanding on such differences by 
running separate regressions on the male and female samples. Tables 4.12 and 4.13 repeat 
separate exercise for males and females. The results for older female unemployed job-
seekers are insignificant due to the small sample size. Some results for the male and the 
female samples, such as those on Health_problems and number-of-children variables, 
have similar patterns as those for the full sample.  
Focusing on the estimated age parameters, the results for the male and the female 
sub-samples are similar to those for the full sample. The one exception is for the age 
effects on the probability that younger males prefer part-time work. More specifically, 
younger male job seekers’ preference for part-time work decreases with age. Older males 
over 54 are more likely to prefer the two flexible employment modes and, between these 
two, they are much more likely to prefer part-time employment than self-employment. 
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This implies that self-employment is always preferred by male unemployed job-seekers. 
Younger males prefer self-employment to the other two employment modes. As for older 
male job seekers, part-time employment is preferred the most, followed by self-
employment. Female unemployed job-seekers are always more likely to prefer flexible 
employment and less likely to prefer full-time work compared to their youngest 
counterparts. These patterns of age-related preference for flexible employment and 
disinterest in full-time work are most pronounced as unemployed job seekers pass their 
respective SPAs (65 for males and 60 for females). 
4.4.3 Brief summary 
The most important factor affecting the preferences of both younger and older 
unemployed job-seekers over full-time work or part-time work is gender. The age bracket 
is another important factor affecting unemployed job-seekers’ preferences for full-time 
work. The same pattern also holds for older unemployed job-seekers’ preferences over 
part-time work. Qualifications and benefit claimant status also play important roles in 
affecting older unemployed job-seekers’ preferences over full-time work. The effects 
among the factors affecting job-seekers’ preferences over self-employment are similar. 
The effect of having a health problem is, surprisingly, not as important as the 
aforementioned factors. 
There are also gender differences in the significant variables affecting unemployed 
job-seekers’ preferences. Age is the most important factor affecting younger male job 
seekers’ preferences over full-time work. Being a widow plays an important role in 
affecting younger male job seekers’ preferences over full-time and part-time work. Age, 
qualifications, industry of the last job and benefit claimant status are important factors 
affecting older male job seekers’ preferences over full-time work. Age also plays an 
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important role in affecting older male job seekers’ preferences over part-time work after 
the age of 64. In contrast, age and the number of children are the most important factors 
affecting both younger females’ and older females’ preferences over full-time and part-
time work. There are no gender differences in the important factors affecting job-seekers’ 
preferences over self-employment. 
4.5 Multinomial logits: employment outcomes for the economically-
active 
4.5.1 Estimation framework 
In the second analysis, we estimate multinomial logit models for the employment 
outcomes of the economically-active. The estimation framework is similar to that in the 
first analysis. An economically-active individual i engages in one of j economic activities, 
where j=0 is unemployed, j=1 is working full-time, j=2 is working part-time and j=3 is 
self-employed. A multinomial logit model is estimated for the probability that an 
individual engages in one of the four distinct economic activities. Let Y be the economic 
activity engaged in (EconActivity in this case). We choose the unemployed group j=0 as 
the reference to normalize Equation (11). As in Equation (12), the probability of an 
individual being unemployed is given by setting 𝛽=0.  
Since the dependent variable EconActivity has four categories, we can estimate the 
log odds of working full-time, working part-time and being self-employed to the baseline 
category (unemployed). The three non-redundant logit equations are estimated as follows:  
(16) log[𝑃(working full − time)/  𝑃(unemployed) ] = 𝛽1𝑋𝑖  
(17) log[𝑃(working part − time)/  𝑃(unemployed) ] = 𝛽2𝑋𝑖  
(18) log[𝑃(self − employed)/  𝑃(unemployed) ] = 𝛽3𝑋𝑖  
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As in the first analysis, we estimate six sets of multinomial logit regressions on younger 
or older people for the male, female and pooled samples.  
4.5.2 Marginal effects on the employment outcomes of economically-active 
Table 4.14 shows the marginal effects from multinomial logits for different 
employment outcomes of the economically-active. Unemployed workers are the 
reference group. The regression results of interest are with respect to individuals’ gender, 
health, education, benefit claimant status and age. All males are more likely to work full-
time or be self-employed and less likely to work part-time than females. This supports 
the findings of Taylor (2011) that females are more likely to work part-time and males 
are more likely to be self-employed. Males are much more likely to work full-time than 
be self-employed at all ages.  
It is not surprising to find that less healthy younger people are less likely to work 
full-time and more likely to work part-time or be self-employed. Wenger and Reynold 
(2009) noted that flexible employment can help less healthy people maintain a work-
health balance. Less healthy older people are less likely to work full-time or be self-
employed and more likely to work part-time. This may be because less healthy older 
people are less able to run their own business than their younger counterparts.  
Younger people with secondary education or above are more likely to work full-time, 
though they are more likely to prefer self-employment as mentioned in Section 4.4.2. 
Some results for the education dummies on older people are notably different from those 
on younger people. Older people with secondary education or above are more likely to 
work full-time except for those with a degree. Older degree-holders are less likely to work 
full-time. A possible reason is that older degree-holders have earned enough during their 
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adulthood and so they are in less need of full-time earnings. They may therefore want to 
enjoy more work flexibility. This can explain why older people are more likely to be self-
employed. Older people with post-secondary or secondary-school level are also more 
likely to be self-employed. 
Younger benefit claimants are less likely to work full-time and more likely to work 
part-time. It is possible that younger benefit claimants have difficulties in finding full-
time jobs and so they end up being part-timers. It is not surprising that they are less likely 
to be self-employed, possibly due to financial reasons. Older benefit claimants are also 
less likely to work full-time, but they are more likely to engage in the two modes of 
flexible employment. 
For the younger sub-sample, people aged 20 to 49 are more likely to be self-
employed and less likely to work full-time or part-time than people aged 16 to 19. There 
is an increase in the probability of being self-employed and a decrease in the probability 
of working full-time as younger people age. The age-profile for part-time employment 
looks largely flat and slightly concave. As the younger group ages, they are more likely 
to have accumulated savings to start their own business. For the older sub-sample, people 
aged over 54 are less likely to work full-time and more likely to work part-time or be self-
employed than those in the control group 50 to 54. Older people are more likely to engage 
in part-time employment than self-employment. 
Tables 4.15 and 4.16 repeat the exercise for males and females separately. The most 
important results to note are for the age profiles. Within the younger male sub-sample, as 
respondents age they are less likely to work full-time or part-time and more likely to be 
self-employed. In the older male sub-sample, as respondents age, they are more likely to 
engage in the two flexible employment modes. Moreover, they are much more likely to 
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be self-employed than part-time. The results for females are similar to those for males. 
Females aged 30 to 49 are less likely to work full-time and part-time, and more likely to 
be self-employed compared to the reference 16-19 age group. Females aged over 54 are 
less likely to work full-time and more likely to engage in flexible employment compared 
to the 50-54 reference group. All these patterns become more pronounced when males 
and females pass their respective SPAs. 
4.5.3 Brief summary 
Many of our results support the findings in previous studies. For example, both 
younger and older males are more likely to work full-time or be self-employed and less 
likely to work part-time compared to their female counterparts. In addition, all males are 
much more likely to work full-time than to be self-employed. The most important factors 
affecting the entry of younger people into full-time work or part-time work are gender 
and benefit claimant status. Age also plays an important role in affecting younger people’s 
entry into full-time work. Gender and age are important factors affecting older people’s 
entry into full-time employment, part-time employment or self-employment. The effect 
of age is much more significant after the age of 64. Benefit claimant status is significant 
in affecting older people’s entry into full-time work. 
After running separate regressions on the male and female sub-samples, we find that 
age and benefit claimant status are the most important factors affecting all males’ entry 
into full-time work. Age also has a significant role in affecting older males’ entry into the 
three types of employment modes and younger males’ entry into self-employment. Age, 
the number of children, qualifications and benefit claimant status are important factors 
affecting younger females’ entry into full-time or part-time work. Marital status, age and 
benefit claimant status are the important factors in the case of older females. Age plays 
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an important role in affecting females’ entry into self-employment, especially for younger 
females. 
4.6 Binomial logits: working part-time involuntarily 
4.6.1 Estimation framework 
In the third analysis, we estimate binomial logit models on the probabilities of part-
timers working voluntarily or involuntarily. Consider the probability of working part-time 
involuntarily conditional on a set of independent variables 𝑋𝑖  and model parameters β 
as follows: 
(19) P (Y = 1 | X) = 
exp(𝛽,𝑋𝑖)
1+exp(𝛽,𝑋𝑖)
 
𝑃  is estimated by logit modelling with the log-likelihood function l as follows 
(StataCorp., 2005): 
(20) l (β) = ∑  {𝑌𝑖ln𝐹 [𝑋𝑖𝛽] +  (1 − 𝑌𝑖)ln(1 − 𝐹 [𝑋𝑖𝛽])}
𝑁
𝑖=1  
where F is the logistic cumulative density function, Y is the dummy for working part-
time involuntarily (InvoluntaryPT) and N is the total number of cases. We estimate six 
sets of binomial logit regressions on younger or older people for the male, female and 
pooled samples. 
4.6.2 Marginal effects on working part-time (in)voluntarily 
Table 4.17 shows the marginal effects from binomial logits for working part-time 
involuntarily on the sub-sample of part-time workers. As noted in Section 4.2, we define 
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involuntary part-timers as those who look for different or additional paid work, or who 
would like to work longer hours at their current rate of pay (UK Data Archive Study 
Group, 2011). The results of interest in these regressions are with respect to individuals’ 
gender, health, education, various job characteristics, benefit claimant status, survey year 
and age. 
Male part-timers are more likely to work involuntarily than female part-timers. The 
results of the previous two analyses show that, compared to females, males are less likely 
to prefer part-time work and less likely to actually work part-time. The results in this 
section show that males who do work part-time may not be happy with their part-time 
status. They may be unable to find their preferred employment mode (full-time work) and 
are ‘forced’ to work part-time. The probability of younger-male part-timers working 
involuntarily is higher than that of their older counterparts by about 13%.  
There are gender differences in the effect of health problems on the preferences for 
part-time work. For this sub-sample of part-timers, less healthy males are less likely to be 
part-timers involuntarily, whereas their female counterparts are more likely to be part-
timers involuntarily. Part-time work is a suitable choice considered by less healthy males 
to balance work and health. As shown in the previous two analyses, less healthy females 
are more likely to prefer part-time work or self-employment but they are more likely to 
work part-time. Less healthy females may be ‘forced’ into part-time work because they 
cannot find their preferred employment mode (self-employment).  
Part-timers with secondary school qualifications or above are increasingly likely to 
work voluntarily (except for some older-female part-timers). The higher the education 
status of a part-timer is, the lower his/her probability of working part-time involuntarily. 
As noted in the previous section, more educated people want to enjoy more work 
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flexibility. Thus they should be happier in working part-time.  
Variables related to job characteristics are included to study their effect on 
involuntary part-time work. All part-timers who work in the private sector or at home are 
less likely to do so involuntarily. Also, the longer the working hours or tenure of part-
timers, the less likely they are to do so involuntarily. It is notable that temporary part-
timers are more likely to work part-time involuntarily than permanent part-timers. This 
implies that they may be unable to find their preferred permanent jobs and are ‘forced’ 
into temporary part-time work. Younger part-timers with secondary jobs are less likely to 
work part-time involuntarily, whereas older part-timers with secondary jobs are more 
likely to do so involuntarily. It is possible that older part-timers with a secondary job work 
part-time involuntarily and so take on a secondary job to supplement their income. This 
can also explain the higher probability of being a benefit claimant among those working 
part-time involuntarily (except for younger females). Part-time work may not be their 
preferred employment mode. 
Most estimates of the year dummies show increasingly positive signs compared to 
the initial base year 2001. This shows that with the passage of time part-timers have been 
increasingly likely to be working part-time involuntarily compared to those in the early 
2000s. People aged 20 to 49 are less likely to work part-time involuntarily compared to 
those aged 16 to 19. All those over 54 are less likely to work part-time involuntarily 
compared to those aged 50 to 54. Therefore, regardless of gender, people are more willing 
to work part-time as they age. 
4.6.3 Brief summary 
The results of the binomial logits shed light on the factors affecting part-timers’ 
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attitude towards being part-timers. For younger workers, gender is the most important 
factor affecting preferences for part-time work, with females having a greater preference 
for it. For older workers, age is the most important factor affecting part-time work 
preferences and gender is much less important. After running separate regressions on 
males and females, age is still the most important factor affecting both older-male and 
older-female part-timers’ attitude towards part-time work. Part-timers aged over 54 are 
less likely to do so involuntarily, compared to the 50-to-54 reference group. Part-time 
employment is therefore more likely to be a voluntary choice for older workers. 
4.7 Conclusion 
Flexible employment is a popular employment mode among older people. As 
suggested by Morris and Mallier (2003), flexible employment can extend working lives 
by acting as a bridge between full-time employment and retirement. However, many 
studies on the employment of older people have focused on regular full-time employment. 
We extend the work of Lissenburgh and Smeaton (2003) by investigating the job 
preferences of older people (versus younger people) in addition to employment outcomes. 
The results from multinomial logit and binomial logit regressions shed light on the 
efficiency of labour markets in matching older workers’ job preferences with their labour 
market outcomes. We can also learn why older people work part-time (in)voluntarily. All 
these have implications for government policies dealing with an ageing workforce. We 
note the significant results found in the various regressions and provide some policy 
recommendations. 
We can combine the results of the first two analyses to learn the relationships 
between people’s job preferences and employment outcomes. Unemployed job-seekers 
with a particular attribute may have a greater preference for a particular employment 
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mode, but the economically-active with the same attribute may have a higher probability 
of entering a different employment mode. Full-time employment is the most popular 
employment mode among males, followed by self-employment and then part-time 
employment. Although older males over 54 are much more likely to prefer part-time 
employment than self-employment (compared to older males from 50 to 54), their 
probability of entering part-time employment is similar to that of entering self-
employment. 
Younger females are more likely to prefer part-time work but less likely to undertake 
it. As these younger females age they exhibit an increased preference for self-employment. 
In contrast, the sub-sample of older females is more likely to prefer and enter flexible 
employment. This implies that older females can meet their employment preferences 
compared to their younger counterparts and find part-time work preferable to self-
employment. Regarding the voluntary and involuntary nature of part-time employment, 
both males and females are more willing to work part-time as they age. Part-time 
employment is therefore more likely to be a voluntary choice regardless of gender and 
age. 
As noted by Loretto et al. (2009), the UK government has taken various measures 
to encourage older people into work. These include the set-up of an Extending Working 
Life Group within the Department for Work and Pensions and the increase of females’ 
SPA from 60 to 65 by 2020. Our results show that older people are more likely to prefer 
and enter flexible employment. Also, part-time employment seems to be a voluntary 
choice for them. The UK government can therefore take a larger step by promoting 
flexible employment among older people.  
We suggest two policy recommendations aimed at promoting flexible employment 
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among the ageing workforce. Firstly, the government can provide targeted help towards 
older male unemployed and those unemployed for less than 5 years. As older workers age, 
they are much more likely to prefer part-time employment to self-employment but their 
probability of entering part-time employment is similar to that of entering self-
employment. The probability of males over 65 entering part-time work is even smaller 
than that that of being self-employed. This implies that older males may have difficulties 
in finding part-time work. There are two possible reasons for this. Firstly, older males 
may have worked full-time when they were young and so they are not familiar in finding 
part-time employment. Secondly, employers are not willing to employ older males, 
especially those over 65, either as part-timers or full-timers. Furthermore, older job-
seekers unemployed for less than 5 years are more likely to have no job preferences. This 
implies that they may have difficulties in seeking either full-time or flexible work. On the 
demand side, the Government can implement measures such as the provision of financial 
subsidies to encourage firms to employ older people as part-timers. On the supply side, 
the Extending Working Life Group can help older people (especially males) to find part-
time work by providing easier access to information on part-time vacancies.  
Secondly, the Government should implement measures to encourage flexible 
employment among older benefit claimants. The results of the first analysis suggest that 
older benefit claimants are more likely to prefer full-time work and less likely to prefer 
part-time work. This may be due to the limitations of pension rules associated with part-
time work. Many pension rules around Europe forbid companies from allowing part-time 
employees to draw a part of pension to supplement their earnings (Butrica et al., 2006). 
This may discourage older benefit claimants from taking part-time work. For promoting 
part-time employment among older people, the Government should adjust the pension 
scheme to cover part-timers (and other flexible workers). If older benefit claimants are 
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allowed to receive benefits and work flexibly at the same time, they may be more willing 
to choose part-time work. In any case, self-employment is a popular choice among older 
males. However, older benefit claimants are less likely to prefer self-employment. A 
possible reason is that they do not have enough start-up funds for self-employment. The 
Government could initiate business start-up schemes such as the provision of funds or 
loans to encourage older benefit claimants into self-employment. 
There is one implication for further research. Although we can model the effect of 
various factors on employment outcomes, detailed information on when individuals leave 
the original state and transits into another state is ignored. If we wish to know the effects 
of various factors on employment duration and even unemployment duration, we need to 
conduct analyses on panel data. Further research addressing this issue is carried out in 
Chapter 6 using the BHPS data. 
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CHAPTER 5  
UNEMPLOYMENT AND EMPLOYMENT DURATIONS: A 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters provided detailed analyses on the job preferences and 
employment outcomes of older people, but these have been static analyses looking at 
employment modes at any one moment in time. In this chapter we review past research 
that has addressed similar questions from a dynamic perspective in terms of how long 
these employment modes last. In the next chapter we will carry out our own dynamic 
duration analyses on employment modes. 
As discussed in the previous chapters, since the 1990s we have observed an 
increased proportion of older people in work. The OECD (1998) noted that in 1996 
unemployment rates of people aged 45 to 64 were lower than the overall rates in most 
OECD economies. However, older people’s mobility from unemployment to re-
employment was often lower than that of younger people (Laczko and Phillipson, 1991; 
OECD, 1998). Tatsiramos (2010) suggested two possible reasons for this. First, older 
people may find re-employment difficult due to poor employment prospects. Second, 
there may be disincentives to being re-employed due to a combination of extended 
unemployment benefit periods and early retirement schemes. As older people are 
becoming increasingly important in the workforce, the duration of their unemployment 
spells before re-employment or retirement deserves policy attention. 
In addition to the issue of unemployment duration, policy makers need to pay 
attention to how long older people stay in various types of employment spells. Some older 
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people may either choose to work full-time before retirement and postpone the bulk of 
their leisure until after retirement, or choose to engage in flexible employment thus 
extending their working lives and enjoying more leisure earlier on. It is important to know 
whether older people in a particular employment mode are more likely to stay in the 
labour market, so that the Government can provide appropriate assistance to help them 
into early retirement or to support work as bridge employment before retirement.  
Chapter 3 reviews studies on flexible employment of all workers but particularly 
older ones. This chapter provides a deeper literature survey on duration studies by various 
types of economic activity. Section 5.2 provides a general overview of the various 
approaches for analyses on this theme. Section 5.3 discusses the background and various 
types of survival analyses. Sections 5.4 and 5.5 discuss past empirical studies based on 
the initial labour market states under consideration. Section 5.6 discusses studies specific 
to older people. A final section concludes. 
5.2 General overview of approaches used in duration studies 
Most of the studies discussed in next sections used panel datasets for their analyses 
because panels have information on individuals’ work history, such as unemployment 
duration, previous and current job characteristics etc. Some used regression techniques 
for cross-sectional data to study the issue of unemployment and employment durations. 
For example, Muhleisen and Zimmermann (1994) analysed the effect of unemployment 
histories on job mobility by estimating binomial probit models for German data. Bruce 
and Schuetze (2004) estimated LPM on the effect of self-employment duration on the 
probabilities of subsequent part-time employment and unemployment for the U.S. 
Hyytinen and Rouvinen (2008) estimated logit models to investigate the influence of short 
self-employment duration on Europeans’ earnings after re-entering paid employment. 
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There are also panel studies which account for unobserved heterogeneity across 
individuals in the estimation of binary dependent variable models. For instance, Corcoran 
and Hill (1985) used a fixed-effect logit model to examine whether unemployment in one 
period leads to subsequent unemployment for US men. Glocker and Steiner (2007) 
estimated fixed effects LPM to study the effect of previous unemployment on the entry 
into self-employment in Germany.   
Despite the popularity of the above techniques, Jenkins (2005) discussed various 
problems of applying the OLS regression approach in duration studies. The most pertinent 
of these is that OLS regressions generate biased estimates on censored or truncated 
survival data and many panel datasets often have censoring or truncation problems. The 
problem of censoring exists when the duration of the initial status is incomplete at the 
left/right side (left/right censoring) of the observation period. In contrast, the problem of 
truncation exists when cases are systematically excluded from the sample because their 
survival times are shorter (left truncation) or longer (right truncation) than a specified 
amount of time. OLS regressions can only be carried out by excluding all the censored or 
truncated data, or by treating all the censoring or truncation as “complete” but then the 
estimated slopes of the OLS regressions are biased. The second major problem is that 
OLS regressions cannot handle time-varying covariates. We can only choose one value 
of a time-varying covariate at a period to be included in the regressions. If we choose a 
value at the time before any transition occurs or when the spell starts, much information, 
such as individuals’ transition time, are lost.  
Cleves et al. (2010) suggested another problem when using OLS regression 
techniques in duration studies. One of the common assumptions of OLS regressions is a 
normal distribution of the residuals. However, assuming normality of time to an event in 
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duration analyses is not reasonable. The instantaneous probability of an event occurring 
should not be assumed to be constant over time. Thus they believed that the normality 
assumption is the actual problem of applying OLS regressions in duration analyses. 
Jenkins (2005) also discussed the problems of applying binomial (or multinomial) 
dependent variable models such as logit and probit models in duration studies. He 
identified two main problems. First, in binomial (or multinomial) dependent variable 
models though one can model transitions by treating the continuous survival times before 
transitions as various bands, more detailed information on when an individual leaves the 
spell are lost. Second, grouping the survival times and values of time-varying covariates 
creates measurement error. Because of the problems discussed above, common 
techniques such as OLS regressions and binomial dependent variable models are not 
suitable for studying unemployment and employment durations. As noted by Jenkins 
(2005), we need approaches which can account for the sequential and time-varying nature 
of the survival data, and also handle the censoring problem. Survival analysis is the most 
suitable approach. 
5.3 Survival analyses 
Danacica and Babucea (n.d.) noted that the use of survival analysis, which involves 
the modelling of duration data, first came from medical research. Survival analyses are 
widely used in socio-economic studies to explore issues such as unemployment, inflation, 
bank loans and life expectancy of consumer goods. There are various kinds of survival 
analyses, namely non-parametric, semi-parametric and parametric analyses. 
5.3.1 Non-parametric analyses 
 Non-parametric analyses allow the investigation of the hazard function which is 
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the instantaneous probabilities of leaving a state conditional on surviving to time t 
(Georgellis et al., 2007). The hazard function is formulated as follows (Cleves et al., 2010, 
p.7): 
(21) h (t) = lim
∆𝑡→𝑜
𝑃(𝑡+∆𝑡 > 𝑇≥𝑡 |𝑇≥𝑡)
∆𝑡
 = 
𝑓(𝑡)
𝑆(𝑡)
 
where S (t) = 1–F (t) = P (T>t) and f (t) = 
𝑑 𝐹 (𝑡)
𝑑 𝑡
 = 
𝑑
𝑑 𝑡
[1– 𝑆 (𝑡)] = – 𝑆′(t).  
T denotes the survival time or duration in a state, F (t) is the cumulative distribution 
function of T, S (t) is the survivor function which is the probability of surviving beyond 
time t, or simply the reverse cumulative distribution function and f (t) is the density 
function. Jenkins (2005) noted that these analyses are “non-parametric” in the sense that 
they make no prior assumptions on the shapes of the hazard functions. The Kaplan-Meier 
estimator, proposed by Kaplan and Meier (1958), is a popular non-parametric method38. 
Many studies discussed in previous sections have applied this method for preliminary 
evaluation on the hazard functions of the economic state (Katz and Meyer, 1990; Arrow, 
1996; Hunt, 1999; Martinez-Granado, 2002; Haardt, 2006; Georgellis et al., 2007). 
5.3.2 Parametric analyses 
Cleves et al. (2010) noted that, compared to non-parametric analyses, parametric 
analyses (and semi-parametric analyses discussed in Section 5.3.3) are “parametric” in 
the sense that they make an assumption on how the vectors of covariates 𝑥𝑖 determine 
the probability of an event. Frees (2004) noted that binomial or multinomial dependent 
variable techniques model the probability of transition from one state into another. In 
                                                 
38 There are other kinds of non-parametric methods such as the life table estimator. However, we only 
discuss the Kaplan-Meier estimator because of its popular use in duration studies. 
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contrast, parametric (and semi-parametric) proportional hazards regressions model the 
natural logarithm of the hazard rate function as follows (Cleves et al., 2010, p.129):   
(22) h (t |𝑥𝑖) = ℎ0 (𝑡) 𝑒
𝑥𝑖 𝛽𝑗   
where ℎ0 (𝑡) is the baseline hazard function which corresponds to the probability of 
state transition when all values of the regressors are equal to zero, 𝑥𝑖 is the vector of 
regressors and 𝛽𝑗 is the vector of regression coefficients. Cleves et al. (2010) explained 
that the task in parametric model is picking a functional form for ℎ0 (𝑡) . The 
exponential component is for parameterizing the shift caused by spells having different 
values of covariates. All parametric models have a corresponding hazard functions such 
as assuming constant baseline hazard over time (ℎ0 (𝑡) = 𝑒
𝑎) in exponential models, 
where a is an extra parameter to be estimated. Weibull and Gompertz models are also 
popular parametric proportional hazards models for modelling data with monotone hazard 
rates that change exponentially over time. The choice of parametric models depend on 
researchers’ assumption on the functional form of ℎ0 (𝑡). 
5.3.3 Semi-parametric analyses 
The Cox (1972) proportional hazards model is a popular semi-parametric method 
used in studies on unemployment and employment durations. There are three main 
advantages of using the Cox model (Jenkins, 2005; Georgellis et al., 2007; Cleves et al., 
2010). Firstly, parametric models make assumptions on the distribution of the baseline 
hazard function. Incorrect assumptions will produce misleading estimates of the j 
parameters. However, the Cox proportional hazards model does not need to specify the 
functional form of the baseline hazard function. Thus it is much more popular than 
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parametric models in studies of unemployment or employment duration39.  
Secondly, the Cox models can handle censoring of survival times because of their 
use of the partial likelihood function. They compute the hazard estimates only at times of 
failure using the risk pools available at each of the failure times, so as to calculate the 
likelihood function. The partial likelihood function considers probabilities of failed cases. 
It explicitly neglects probabilities of censored cases and uses the information on survival 
times before censorship instead. All those cases censored after failure time t is part of the 
risk pool used to compute the likelihood function at time t. The maximization of the 
partial likelihood loses efficiency but the estimates are robust, consistent and 
asymptotically normal (Lancaster, 1990; Smith and Smith, 2004). 
Thirdly, because of the nature of partial likelihood function discussed above, the Cox 
models can incorporate time-varying covariates into the analyses (Jenkins, 2005). For 
these reasons, the Cox proportional hazards model is preferable to the OLS and binomial 
(or multinomial) dependent variable models in studies of unemployment and employment 
durations. It is also preferable to parametric models when researchers are not sure about 
the shape of the baseline hazard function. Based on the number of exit states under 
consideration, the Cox models, and other proportional hazards models, can be classified 
as single risk or competing risks models. We compare these two kinds of hazards models 
in Section 5.3.5. 
                                                 
39 The expense of having an unspecified baseline hazard function is that the resulting estimates are not as 
efficient as those in a correctly specified parametric model (Fox, 2002). 
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5.3.4 Accounting for unobserved heterogeneity 
The models described in the previous sub-sections assume that all differences 
between observations are captured by observed explanatory variables X. Unobserved 
differences between observations can be introduced into survival analyses and they are 
usually referred to as “frailty” in biostatistics (Jenkins, 2005). Consider the hazard rate 
function as follows: 
(23) h (t, 𝑥𝑖  | 𝑣) = v · h (t, 𝑥𝑖) 
The difference between this hazard rate function and the one discussed in Section 5.3.2 is 
the introduction of unobserved heterogeneity by including a multiplicative factor 𝑣. It is 
assumed that this random variable takes on positive values, has normalized unit mean, 
has finite variance and is distributed independently of X and t. Equation (23) is referred 
to as a “mixture” model or “mixed proportional hazard model” (Jenkins, 2005). 
Individuals with values above the mean of 𝑣 will leave faster, and vice versa. Jenkins 
(2005) explained that the estimation of the mixed model depends on choosing a functional 
form for the distribution of 𝑣 such as the Gamma distribution or the Inverse Gaussian 
distribution.  
As suggested by some early literature such as Lancaster (1985), Ham and Rea (1987) 
and Meyer (1990), there are three possible consequences of not accounting for 
unobserved heterogeneity in survival analyses. Firstly, unobservable characteristics such 
as motivation, ability and social relationship may influence the duration of finding jobs 
or staying in the present work position and bias the effect of the regressors (D’Addio et 
al., 2005; Jenkins, 2005). Secondly, there may be measurement errors in the observed 
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survival times or covariates (Lancaster, 1990). Thirdly, unobserved heterogeneity may 
affect inferences about the shape of the baseline hazard function (Jenkins, 2005) 
Nevertheless, there is also literature discussing that accounting for unobserved 
heterogeneity may not be necessary for two reasons. First, Lancaster (1985), Ham and 
Rea (1987) and Meyer (1990) pointed out that if the baseline hazard function is allowed 
to be nonparametric, not accounting for unobserved heterogeneity may not bias the 
estimates. Second, Narendranathan and Stewart (1993) suggested that introducing a 
misspecified regression term to capture unobserved heterogeneity may cause distortion 
to the estimation, and so has little improvement to the estimation.  
5.3.5 Single risk versus competing risks hazards models 
Single risk models are survival models which consider one exit state from any type 
of spell. They restrict the baseline hazards and the estimates for covariates for all potential 
exit states to be the same. Studies described in Sections 5.3 to 5.5 such as Taylor (1999) 
and Booth et al. (2002) are examples of single risk models. However, D’Addio and 
Rosholm (2005) noted that individuals typically exit from unemployment into different 
states. Thus the estimates of single risk hazards models may have aggregation bias on exit 
states. Single risk models are suitable for comparing the exit from different initial states 
into the same exit state. 
In contrast, competing risks models estimate survival times jointly with more than 
one exit state. Cleves et al. (2010) stated that competing risks models consider the cause-
specific hazard function which is the instantaneous probability of leaving a state from a 
specified cause, provided that no risk from any cause has yet happened. Suppose that 
there are five causes of failure and let j be the variable denoting the cause of failure. The 
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cause-specific hazard function for cause j=1 at time t is formulated as follows (Cleves et 
al. 2010, p. 366): 
(24) ℎ1 (t) = lim
∆𝑡→0
𝑃(𝑡+∆𝑡 > 𝑇≥𝑡,𝑗=1 |𝑇≥𝑡)
∆𝑡
  
where T denotes the time to first failure from any cause. The overall hazard rate is  
h (t)=∑ ℎ𝑗(𝑡)
5
𝑗=1 . The probability of risk from j=1 is ℎ1(t) /h (t). The estimation of 
a cause-specific hazard function is similar to that of a hazard function. Examples of 
studies from Sections 5.4 to 5.6, which applied competing risks models, are Theeuwes et 
al. (1990), Boheim and Taylor (2000), Reize (2000), D’Addio and Rosholm (2005), 
Kupets (2006). Georgellis et al. (2007) and Millan et al. (2012) are among the few studies 
applying both single risk and competing risks models. Compared to single risk models, 
competing risks models avoid committing state-aggregation bias and can provide more 
detailed results on the different effects of regressors on the hazard rates by various exit 
states. 
5.4 Studies on the duration of unemployment 
The effect of elapsed spell duration is often one of the main concerns in many 
duration studies. Studies on duration dependence40 have been popular since the 1980s. 
Many of these focus on exit from unemployment and are based on job search theory41 
proposed by early studies such as McCall (1970) and Mortensen (1977). As noted by 
Yoon (1981), search theory assumes that an unemployed individual has knowledge of the 
                                                 
40 The term “duration dependence”, as defined by Pedersen and Westergard-Nielsen (1993), refers to the 
effect of the time spent in a particular labour market state on the probability of transitions into other states. 
41 Many studies on other kinds of duration dependence, such as those discussed in Sections 5.5 and 5.6, 
are also based on job search theory with different considerations of the initial and the final states. 
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job offer distribution and the fixed search cost of each offer per period. He or she draws 
a job offer and decides whether it is better than any likely future offers. If the expected 
marginal benefit gained from searching for the future offer exceeds the marginal search 
cost, the individual remains unemployed. The duration of unemployment stops when the 
individual gets an acceptable job offer. 
Pedersen and Westergard-Nielsen (1993) noted that negative duration dependence 
was the common finding in many studies on unemployment spell duration42. This means 
that the escape rate from unemployment decreases with the duration of unemployment 
spells. We discuss studies on unemployment duration in three parts. The first part focuses 
on the transition from unemployment into employment (or inactivity). The second part 
focuses on the transition from unemployment into various types of employment. The third 
part focuses on both unemployment and employment durations. 
5.4.1 From unemployment to employment (or inactivity) 
Dynarski and Sheffrin (1990) is an early study analysing the relationship between 
unemployment duration and cyclical movements in unemployment in the U.S. They used 
the PSID from 1980 to 1982 to analyse unemployment durations by using Cox 
proportional hazards models. Their results showed that individual unemployment 
duration increases with the aggregate unemployment rate. Also, under good economic 
conditions, probabilities of re-employment increase among all workers, especially among 
those with the longest unemployment duration. 
                                                 
42 There are also employment-duration studies which have reached similar results. Arrow (1996) used the 
GSOEP from 1984 to 1985 and estimated the Cox proportional hazards model to study the effect of health 
related variables on employment duration. His results showed that female workers are at a higher risk of 
being unemployed than male workers if they have long illness or chronic illness. Also, workers who had 
experienced unemployment in the past are more likely to be at risk of renewed unemployment than their 
counterparts without past unemployment experience. 
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Muhleisen and Zimmermann (1994) analysed the effect of unemployment histories 
on job mobility using the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) from 1984 to 1989. 
They estimated binomial probit models on the transitions into employment and included 
a dummy on previous unemployment duration in their analysis. A simulation estimation 
technique was used to control for unobserved heterogeneity. They found no evidence that 
foreign workers induce unemployment of locals in Germany. Foreigners and more 
educated workers escape from unemployment faster than their local or less educated 
counterparts. Age seems to have no significant influence on job mobility. Also, they found 
that past unemployment causes future unemployment, which supports similar findings in 
many other studies. 
Kupets (2006) is among the few studies examining the determinants of 
unemployment duration in developing economies. He used the Ukrainian Longitudinal 
Monitoring Survey (ULMS) from 1998 to 2002 to study the determinants of 
unemployment duration. His results on the two competing risks hazards model showed 
that there is positive duration dependence of the hazards from unemployment to 
employment. Duration dependence becomes negative after the fourteenth month of 
unemployment. This non-monotonic pattern is different from the results for many 
developed economies where negative unemployment duration dependence exists. 
There are also studies exploring the effect of a particular factor on unemployment 
duration. Katz and Meyer (1990) studied how the level and duration of unemployment 
insurance (UI) benefits affect the unemployment duration in the U.S. First, they examined 
the unemployment spells of UI recipients and non-recipients using the PSID from 1980 
to 1981. Their plots for the unemployment duration hazard functions 43  show that 
                                                 
43 Katz and Meyer (1990) parameterise these as Kaplan-Meyer hazard functions. 
138 
unemployment duration distributions differ between UI recipients and non-recipients. 
There are sharp increases in the exit rate of UI recipients from unemployment when their 
benefits are nearly exhausted. Second, they estimated hazards models of the effect of the 
level and duration of UI benefits on unemployment duration using the Continuous Wage 
and Benefit History (CWBH) UI administrative records from 1978 to 1983. Their results 
showed that a one-week increase in the benefit duration increases the mean 
unemployment duration of UI recipients by 0.16 to 0.20 weeks. 
Stewart (2001) studied the effect of health status on unemployment duration of 
Canadians. He used the 1995 Canadian Out of Employment Panel (COEP) to estimate the 
Prentice-Gloeckler-Meyer (PGM) proportional hazards model on unemployment 
duration. His results show that previous factors of job termination due to illness and 
reported health limitation have a negative influence on the hazard rate. Individuals 
reporting either illness or health limitations have lower probabilities of finding a job, 
whereas individuals with both characteristics have much longer unemployment spells. 
Haurin and Sridhar (2003) focused on the impact of local unemployment rates on 
individuals’ reservation wages and unemployment duration in the U.S. They used the 
PSID from 1984 to 1987 to estimate OLS models and selection-corrected two stage least 
squares (2SLS) models. They found that local unemployment rates have no significant 
effect on reservation wages or unemployment duration. There is no evidence that 
individuals have lower reservation wages in areas with higher unemployment rates. Thus 
policies aimed at reducing unemployment should focus on increasing labour demand.  
5.4.2 From unemployment to various employment modes 
There are also unemployment-duration studies focusing on transitions into one or 
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more types of employment. Self-employment is often the most common type of 
employment under consideration. For example, Alba-Ramirez (1994) used Spain’s 
Working and Living Conditions Survey (ECVT) in the fourth quarter of 1985 and the 
U.S.’s DWS in 1984, 1986 and 1988 to study the effect of unemployment duration on the 
entry into self-employment. He estimated two binomial probit models, one for the entry 
into self-employment from wage work and the other one for entry into self-employment 
from unemployment. Among the independent variables he included demographic and 
previous job characteristics of individuals. His results show that unemployment duration 
increases the probabilities of being self-employed in both countries. Part-time workers 
and workers not covered by any social security plans are more likely to be self-employed. 
In Spain, those self-employed who have no employees earn less than their paid 
counterparts. 
Reize (2000) examined the effect of unemployment duration on the transitions into 
self-employment. He used the first 14 waves of the GSOEP from 1983 to 1996 to estimate 
discrete time hazards models controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. His results show 
that there is no effect of unemployment duration on the transition into self-employment. 
Furthermore, unemployed individuals entering self-employment are generally more 
educated and face a lower risk of being unemployed again than those entering paid 
employment. 
However, Glocker and Steiner (2007) reached different conclusions to those of Reize 
(2000). They used a pseudo-panel dataset, self-constructed from the German Microcensus 
from 1996 to 2002, to study the effect of previous unemployment on the entry into self-
employment. Their fixed effects linear probability estimates showed that previous 
unemployment significantly increases the probability of being self-employed regardless 
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of gender. However, this effect is not significant for older people. The entry rates into 
self-employment among males are much higher than those of females. This supports the 
findings of earlier studies, such as Evans and Leighton (1989) and Blanchflower (2000) 
already discussed in Chapter 3. 
Boheim and Taylor (2000) analysed the effect of individual and labour market 
factors on the probabilities of unemployment spells ending with the transitions into four 
economic activities, namely: full-time employment, part-time employment, self-
employment and economic inactivity. They used the BHPS from 1991 to 1997 to estimate 
discrete time hazards models. Their descriptive statistics suggested that unemployment 
spells of females are shorter than those of males due to females’ tendency to transit into 
part-time employment or economic inactivity. Moreover, their results on duration 
analyses suggested that policies aimed at reducing unemployment duration and 
encouraging full-time employment should be targeted towards individuals aged 25 or over. 
Females with children have lower transition rates from unemployment into full-time work 
than males and childless females. 
5.4.3 Studies on both unemployment and employment durations 
There have been several studies on both unemployment and employment durations 
since the 1990s. These studies’ findings are similar to those focusing on either 
unemployment or employment durations but they provide a more thorough investigation 
on individuals’ work histories. Theeuwes et al. (1990) analysed the transitions among 
three economic activities (employment, unemployment and economic inactivity) in the 
Netherlands using a self-constructed pseudo-panel dataset based on the Dutch 1985 
National Survey. Their estimates of a three-state hazards model showed that significant 
duration dependence is only found in a few cases. They found age, education and work 
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experience to be the important factors affecting the transitions among economic activities 
for both genders. Family and child-related variables have important effects on the 
transitions among the economic activities of females but not of males. These results are 
similar to many findings in the employment literature such as Miller (1997) and 
Zissimopoulos and Karoly (2007). 
In contrast to other duration-dependence studies, Hunt (1999) considered not only 
employment and unemployment spell durations but also non-employment durations. He 
used the GSOEP from 1990 to 1996 to estimate Cox proportional hazards models on the 
transitions out of employment, unemployment and non-employment. He found that the 
results on unemployment and non-employment spell durations are similar. Females and 
those over 50 have longer non-employment durations, whereas individuals that are more 
educated have shorter non-employment durations. The presence of children seems not to 
be an important factor in explaining the various transitions. Furthermore, higher 
individuals’ wages in 1990 decrease non-employment and employment spell durations. 
However, the addition of covariates such as individuals’ wages in 1990 explains most of 
the gender difference in employment duration but explains little in the case of non-
employment duration. 
5.5 Studies on the durations for various types of employment 
In addition to studies on either unemployment or employment duration, there are 
also studies focusing on the durations of various types of employment. Most of these 
explore self-employment durations. As noted by Georgellis et al. (2007), there exist 
relatively few studies on the survival of, and exit from, self-employment compared to 
studies on entry into self-employment. Many studies on self-employment durations 
consider either a unique exit state (leaving self-employment) or multiple exit states such 
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as entering paid employment or unemployment.  
Carrasco (1999) used the Spanish Continuous Family Expenditure Survey (ECPF) 
from 1985 to 1991 to examine the factors influencing the entry decision into self-
employment and the probabilities of remaining self-employed. She estimated binomial 
logit models on the probabilities of transition from paid-employment into self-
employment, multinomial logit models on the probabilities of transitions from 
unemployment into self-employment or paid employment and discrete hazard models on 
self-employment duration. Her results showed that unemployed workers are more likely 
to be self-employed than working for pay. Nonetheless, they face more difficulties in 
sustaining their business than ex-employees. Moreover, the probability of exiting from 
self-employment decreases with longer self-employment duration. Individuals with more 
assets, more education and middle-aged workers are more likely to move into self-
employment. 
Taylor (1999) studied self-employment durations in the U.K. using the BHPS from 
1991 to 1995. His estimates of the Cox proportional hazards model showed that 40% of 
the self-employed who started their business since 1991 do not survive beyond the first 
year of business. A significant proportion of individuals terminate their business because 
they move into another form of employment instead of facing bankruptcy. The “fittest” 
individuals in terms of self-employment survival are those who are working before 
starting the business, that is, those who quit their previous paid work and those who have 
some start-up capital for their business. 
Bruce and Schuetze (2004) used the PSID from 1979 to 1990 to investigate the 
influence of short self-employment duration on subsequent labour market outcomes and 
wages in the U.S. Their estimation framework was in two parts. In the first part, they 
143 
estimated OLS regressions on log wages and found no evidence that short self-
employment duration increases wages relative to continued paid employment. They 
found that an additional year of self-employment experience decreases male earnings in 
subsequent paid employment by 3% to 11%. In the second part, they estimated LPM on 
the effect of self-employment duration on the probabilities of subsequent part-time 
employment and unemployment. They found that a short spell of self-employment raises 
the probabilities of part-time employment by 10% to 30% and that of unemployment by 
3% to 10%. 
Georgellis et al. (2007) studied UK self-employment durations by focusing on the 
effect of self-reported job satisfaction and non-pecuniary aspects of self-employment. 
They estimated single risk models on the probabilities of exiting from self-employment 
and competing risks models on the probabilities of exiting to various states using the 
BHPS from 1991 to 1998. Their results suggest that job satisfaction is important in 
explaining self-employment duration. Three out of the five measures of job satisfaction 
seem to be most treasured by the self-employed: satisfaction from pay, sense of job 
security and work initiative.  
Hyytinen and Rouvinen (2008), similarly to Bruce and Schuetze (2004), investigated 
the influence of short self-employment duration on individuals’ earnings after re-entering 
paid employment. They used the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) 
covering 15 European economies from 1994 to 2001 and carried out three separate 
analyses. In the first part, they conducted an unconditional difference-in-difference 
analysis on earnings from self-employment and subsequent earnings after re-entering paid 
work. Their results show that there is a large wage differential between those who 
experienced self-employment and those with continuous paid-employment. In the second 
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part, they estimated OLS regressions on log wages. Their results suggest that the self-
employed to employee wage differential is actually larger than that found in the first part 
of their analysis. In the third part, logit models on labour market outcomes were estimated. 
They found that self-employment is an involuntary choice among unemployed 
individuals, especially for more educated ones. This can explain the large ex post wage 
difference. Their results indicate that Europeans move into self-employment involuntarily. 
Millan et al. (2012) provide a recent study on the determinants of self-employment 
duration in Europe. The first part of their study considers the effect of individual-level 
factors on self-employment duration, whereas the second part considers the effect of 
macro-level factors such as regional covariates. Similarly to Hyytinen and Rouvinen 
(2008), they used the ECHP from 1994 to 2001 to estimate discrete choice models. First, 
they estimated single risk proportional hazards models on self-employment duration. 
Second, they estimated competing risks models on the transitions from self-employment 
into paid employment, unemployment, or economic inactivity. Their results show that 
education and previous paid-employment experience increase self-employment durations. 
The entry into self-employment from unemployment has a strong negative impact on self-
employment durations. Nonetheless, the macro-level factor of aggregate expenditure on 
start-up incentives also increases self-employment durations, especially for individuals 
who are unemployed before starting their business. 
There are also studies on temporary-employment duration, e.g. Booth et al. (2002), 
discussed in Chapter 3. Another example is D’Addio and Rosholm (2005) which assessed 
the effect of temporary-employment duration on the transitions into permanent 
employment and non-employment. They used the ECHP from 1994 to 1999 to estimate 
competing risks hazards models on transitions from temporary employment into 
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permanent employment and non-employment. Both specifications with and without the 
control of unobserved heterogeneity are applied. They find that there is a higher 
probability of getting a permanent job for females with longer temporary-employment 
durations. Males who have been working temporarily for more than three years are more 
likely to enter non-employment. Moreover, previous labour market status has a strong 
influence on job stability. Temporary jobs are often associated with low earnings, 
especially for incomers from non-employment. 
Finally, there are also studies which have explored unemployment durations and 
various types of employment durations. Martinez-Granado (2002) explored the effect of 
individual and time-varying economic factors on transitions among three economic 
activities: unemployment, paid employment and self-employment. He used the BHPS 
from 1991 to 1993 to estimate competing risks Weibull proportional hazards models on 
movements from any of the three states into the others. He found that both unemployed 
and employed individuals tend to enter self-employment when unemployment rates are 
high. The reasons for unemployed and employed individuals to do so are different. Under 
adverse economic conditions, unemployed individuals perceive that they are less likely 
to find waged employment and therefore seek self-employment. However, the long-term 
unemployed have lower probabilities of moving into self-employment due to a loss of 
human capital or insufficient information to start a business. Some employees may 
perceive that they may have poor career prospects and so quit their jobs in order to start 
their own business. 
5.6 Duration-dependence studies on older people 
There are a few duration-dependence studies focusing on either unemployment or 
employment durations for older people before retirement. Meghir and Whitehouse (1997) 
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explored the unemployment and employment durations of UK males over 40 and the 
determinants of their retirement age. They used the UK Retirement Survey from 1988 to 
1989 to estimate a multiple spell transition model of moving in and out of work. Their 
non-parametric analysis suggested that males in occupational pension schemes have 
longer employment duration than non-OP participants. Nevertheless, their exit rates from 
work increase after the age of 50. Furthermore, their results for multiple spell transition 
models showed that increases in wages delay job exits, whereas increased social security 
benefits delay re-employment. This implies that financial factors are important in 
determining one’s retirement age. 
Miniaci (1998) used the 1995 Italy’s Survey on Income and Wealth of Households 
(SIWH) to analyse retirement behaviour. First, he estimated multinomial logit models to 
study the effect of various socio-economic factors on the retirement age and transitions 
out of employment by gender. He found that years of pension contributions have a 
positive effect on the probabilities of both males’ and females’ retirement. The effect of 
pension-contribution years on males is positive at first but later becomes negative on the 
probability of transiting into another non-retirement state. In contrast, the effect is always 
negative for females. Second, he estimated Cox proportional hazards model with two exit 
states, which are retirement and others. His results showed that younger cohorts tend to 
retire earlier, whereas more educated and the self-employed tend to retire later. Moreover, 
females tend to exit from the labour force beyond the standard retirement age. 
Chan and Stevens (2001) used three HRS waves in 1992, 1994 and 1996 to study 
the effect of job loss on the employment probabilities of older US workers. They 
estimated discrete time hazards models on the probabilities of returning to work and 
exiting this new employment. Their results show a substantial and long-lasting effect of 
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job loss on the future employment probabilities of older displaced workers. The 
employment rate of displaced workers after four years of job loss remains 20% lower than 
that of non-displaced workers. After two years of a job loss, a worker losing his or her 
job at age 50 has a 70-75% chance of being re-employed. The return rates are lower 
among workers aged 60. Even if a displaced older worker can get a new job, their 
employment duration is short and they have a higher chance of leaving the job compared 
to their non-displaced counterparts. 
An et al. (2004) studied the joint retirement decisions of Danish spouses. They used 
1980-1990 population data collected by the Statistics Denmark and estimated a 
multivariate mixed proportional hazards model (MMPH) on the joint distribution of 
spouses’ duration until retirement. They found that low income and poor health have a 
positive effect on the probability of individuals’ retirement prior to spouse’s retirement. 
Moreover, no matter whether one retires early or late, his or her spouse tends to retire at 
a similar time. A spouse’s retirement decision has a larger effect on one’s retirement 
decision than any other factor such as income or health. They conclude that retirement is 
a household decision rather than an individual decision. 
Haardt (2006) extended the work of Meghir and Whitehouse (1997) by including 
females and OP members in their analysis, employing more independent variables and 
using a more up-to-date dataset (BHPS from 1991 to 2005). The results of their discrete 
time hazards models have several implications. Marital status is not important in 
explaining older people’s transitions between economic states. Work experience in one’s 
younger years decreases the risk of exit from employment and increases re-employment 
probabilities. Females face a lower transition risk out of, and back into, employment when 
regional unemployment rates are high. Health problems are important in explaining older 
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people’s transition states. The effects of OP membership are different between males and 
females. Having children decreases the exit risk from employment among older females. 
Finally, benefit entitlement has an important effect on the re-employment hazard rate. 
Tatsiramos (2010) used ECHP data from 1994 to 2001 to study the effect of previous 
job displacement on the transitions into re-employment and retirement for non-employed 
older workers44. His results on competing risks proportional hazards models suggest that 
in economies with generous unemployment insurance provision, such as Germany and 
Spain, older displaced workers have lower re-employment rates and higher retirement 
rates compared to their non-displaced counterparts. However, older displaced workers in 
Italy and the U.K. are less likely to exit from non-employment into retirement. These 
displaced workers return to employment much faster than their non-displaced 
counterparts due to scarce provision of unemployment or retirement benefits. 
5.7 Final remarks 
To summarise, most duration-dependence studies discussed in this chapter used 
panel datasets because of their availability of information on individuals’ work history, 
such as unemployment duration, previous and current job characteristics. Some of these 
studies used OLS or binomial/multinomial regression techniques to study the issue of 
unemployment and employment durations (Muhleisen and Zimmermann, 1994; Bruce 
and Schuetze, 2004; Hyytinen and Rouvinen, 2008). Nevertheless, they may suffer from 
estimation bias on censored or truncated survival data and cannot handle time-varying 
covariates (Jenkins, 2005). Grouping the survival times and values for time-varying 
                                                 
44 Tatsiramos (2010) defined non-employed older workers as individuals aged 45 to 64 who are either 
unemployed or economically inactive (not looking for jobs and not retired). 
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covariates creates measurement error and loses much detailed information.  
Many duration studies have implemented survival analyses techniques that can 
account for the sequential and time-varying nature of the panel data and can handle the 
censoring problem (Theeuwes et al., 1990; Boheim and Taylor, 2000; Booth et al., 2002; 
Kupets, 2006; Millan et al., 2012). Cox proportional hazards models are popular because 
they do not need to specify the functional form of the baseline hazard function. This can 
avoid estimation bias from incorrectly assuming the distribution of the baseline hazard 
function. Researchers can also choose to capture unobserved heterogeneity in their 
survival analyses or not. Based on the number of exit states under consideration, the Cox 
models, and other proportional hazards models, can be classified as either single risk or 
competing risks models. Single risk models are only suitable for comparing the hazard 
rates of exiting from different initial states into the same exit state, whereas competing 
risks models can avoid state aggregation bias of exit states. 
There are various duration studies based on the initial state before transition or the 
subsequent state(s) after exit. They are not limited to the theme of unemployment or 
employment durations. Some of these focus on the duration of various types of 
employment, especially self-employment duration (Carrasco, 1999; Bruce and Schuetze, 
2004; Hyytinen and Rouvinen, 2008; Millan et al., 2012). Studies on both unemployment 
and employment durations are similar to those focusing on either unemployment or 
employment duration, but they provide a more thorough investigation on the work history 
of individuals. There are also studies which investigate more than one type of economic 
activity (Theeuwes et al., 1990; Hunt, 1999; Martinez-Granado, 2002).  
Unemployment and employment duration for older people is still understudied and 
has been addressed by a limited number of papers: Chan and Steven (2001), Haardt (2006) 
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and Tatsiramos (2010). Many of these focus on unemployment or employment duration 
before retirement. However, they all focus on employment without distinguishing various 
employment modes. There are few studies on older people focusing on unemployment 
duration before transiting into various types of employment or inactivity, or the durations 
of various types of employment. As suggested in the previous chapters, flexible 
employment is increasingly popular among older people. Under the trend of an ageing 
society, how to help older workers to stay in their chosen employment mode for longer 
deserves policy makers’ attention. A study on older people’s unemployment and 
employment durations is needed. In the next chapter, we bring together the various ideas 
discussed above and estimate several competing risks Cox models on unemployment and 
employment durations.  
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CHAPTER 6  
SURVIVAL ANALYSES ON UNEMPLOYMENT AND 
EMPLOYMENT DURATION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides empirical analyses on the duration of unemployment and 
employment spells for people over 16 in the U.K. As in Chapter 4, we choose to 
investigate the U.K. because it acts as a benchmark between heavily regulated economies 
in Europe and less regulated economies like the U.S. We pay special attention to the 
unemployment and employment durations for older people aged 45 or over and compare 
their situation to that of younger people aged 16 to 44. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, unemployment and employment durations for older people are still understudied. 
There are only a few duration-dependence studies for older people (Chan and Stevens, 
2001; Haardt, 2006; Tatsiramos, 2010). We aim to provide new insights on the 
unemployment and employment duration for older people with three specific research 
objectives.  
Firstly, in addition to unemployment durations, we study the duration of various 
employment modes, namely full-time employment, part-time employment and self-
employment. We have discussed in the previous chapter that many studies, such as 
Meghir and Whitehouse (1997) and Haardt (2006), focus on the status of being employed 
without distinguishing various employment modes. Though there are studies which do 
focus on one type of employment mode, such as Taylor (1999) on self-employment, not 
many studies compare the duration among various employment modes. It is important to 
fill this gap because it affects policy makers’ decisions on providing appropriate 
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assistance to older workers in different employment modes, enabling them to work longer 
if they want.  
Secondly, our study aims to investigate the various exit states out of various 
economic modes. This is to avoid committing state-aggregation bias and to provide more 
detailed results on how the duration of various economic modes varies by exit states. As 
suggested in the previous chapter, Boheim and Taylor (2000) and Georgellis et al. (2007) 
are among the few studies which considered various exit states. However, they only 
studied the transition out of one economic state45. A duration study on older people’s 
transition from unemployment or employment spells into various states is therefore 
needed.  
Thirdly, we aim to investigate the effect of spell starting age if it is after the age of 
statutory retirement. As discussed in Section 1.5, the possibility of encouraging delayed 
retirement has been raised in the U.K. so as to lessen the demand on public financial 
security. It is important to understand whether there are any changes on the duration of 
current state or state transitions when one passes his or her statutory retirement age, so as 
to learn the relevance of increasing the retirement age on encouraging delayed retirement. 
We use BHPS data from 1991 to 2008 to estimate competing risks Cox proportional 
hazards models46 on four types of spell: unemployment (UE), full-time employment 
(FTE), part-time employment (PTE) and self-employment (SE). Cox proportional hazard 
models do not need a functional form to be specified for the baseline hazard function. 
This avoids estimation bias from making incorrect assumptions on its distribution. 
Because of the limited number of spells, we run the regressions on all people aged 16 to 
                                                 
45 Boheim and Taylor (2000) focused on unemployment, whereas Georgellis et al. (2007) focused on self-
employment. 
46 We use the term ‘Cox regression’ or ‘Cox models’ for brevity in the rest of this chapter. 
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64 or over. We shed light on the situation faced by older people by paying attention to the 
effects of age dummies and making comparisons with younger people. In addition, we 
estimate two Cox models on all spells of males and females and include an age dummy 
if starting a spell after statutory retirement age instead of a series of age dummies. This is 
to analyse the effect of retirement age on current economic state duration.  
This study aims to answer the following five research questions. Firstly, what are the 
significant factors affecting the cause-specific hazards of exiting from spells of 
unemployment, full-time employment, part-time employment or self-employment into 
various exit states? Secondly, are there any differences in the effect of a particular factor 
on the cause-specific hazards of exiting from a particular spell into various states? Thirdly, 
what are the directions of the effects of age on the cause-specific hazards of exiting from 
each type of spell into various states? Fourthly, what are the differences (if any) of the 
effect of retirement age on exiting into various economic states? Lastly, do the results 
above differ between males and females? The remainder of this chapter is organized as 
follows. Section 6.2 provides a discussion on the background and treatment of the data. 
Section 6.3 discusses the summary statistics for the data samples. Section 6.4 presents the 
estimation framework of the Cox models. Sections 6.5 to 6.7 discuss the estimation results 
of the Cox models on various types of spells. Section 6.8 discusses the estimation results 
on all spells to analyse the effect of retirement age. Section 6.9 concludes the discussion. 
6.2 Data 
6.2.1 The British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) 
The BHPS is an annual household survey designed to collect socio-demographic 
data on the UK population. The BHPS differs from the LFS insofar as it surveys the same 
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individuals over several years. The BHPS was conducted by the ESRC UK Longitudinal 
Studies Centre (ULSC) and the Institute for Social and Economic Research (ISER) at the 
University of Essex. It ran on an annual basis from 1991 (Wave 1) until 2008 (Wave 18) 
and was superseded by the United Kingdom Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS) in 
2009. The BHPS Wave 19 is part of the UKHLS Wave 2 (McFall, 2012). According to 
Taylor et al. (2010), the wave 1 panel recruited 10,300 individuals in 5,500 households 
drawn from 250 areas in Great Britain. An additional sample of 1,500 households from 
Scotland and Wales was added to the main sample in 1999. Another additional sample of 
2,000 households from Northern Ireland was added in 2001.  
The BHPS fieldwork started on the first of September each year. All residents aged 
over 15 and present at Wave 1 of the survey were designated as panel members. They 
were re-interviewed each successive year. Members splitting off from original households 
to form new households were followed and all adult members of these new households 
were also interviewed. New household members were also eligible for interview. 
Respondents were asked about events occurring at the time of interview and occurring in 
the previous year, termed the ‘reference year’. The BHPS used various data collection 
methods such as face-to-face interview, telephone interview and self-completion surveys.  
The BHPS is widely used for panel data analyses (Campbell, 1999; Booth et al., 
2002; Arulampalam, Booth and Bryan, 2004; Blundell et al., 2004; Stewart, 2004; Ajayi-
Obe and Parker, 2005). It covers a nationally representative sample and collects extensive 
information on respondents’ work-life histories. We use data from Wave 1 to 18 (1991 to 
2008) to construct our own spell-data file for survival analyses on individuals’ work-life 
histories. As explained by McFall (2012), starting with Wave 19, the BHPS fieldwork 
moved from a September-to-December period to a January-to-March period for the 
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UKHLS. This means that there exists a 16-to-30-month gap between Waves 18 and 19 
rather than the standard 12-month gap. There may be large recall errors in the information 
provided by respondents due to the large gap. The recalled start and end dates of any 
spells within these time gaps may be too unreliable. Therefore we choose to only use the 
BHPS data files from Waves 1 to 18 even though the BHPS data can be matched with the 
UKHLS data. The data are accessed from the UK Data Archive website47. A BHPS work-
life history file constructed by Halpin (1997) is available in the UK Data Archive. 
However, we choose to construct our own spell dataset for three reasons. First, Mare 
(2006) discovered that there are various problems with the spells in Halpin’s files such as: 
negative durations, overlapping spells and gaps between spells. Second, Halpin’s files 
only cover waves from 1991 to 2006. Third, the variables available in Halpin’s files may 
not be suitable for our analyses. We briefly explain how we construct our spell-data file 
in the Appendix. 
6.2.2 Variables and data treatment 
To identify spell types, we create the economic-activity variable EconActivity with 
five states: unemployment (UE), full-time employment (FTE), part-time employment 
(PTE), self-employment (SE) and economic inactivity (Inact). The economic status of 
employees, self-employed and unemployed is self-reported by BHPS respondents. We 
define part-time workers as employees working for less than 35 hours per week or self-
reported as part-time by the respondents48. Economic inactivity is defined as including 
retirement and other non-employment activities.  
                                                 
47 The data source for the BHPS is acknowledged in the References. 
48 We can define full-time and part-time employment by ourselves using information on working hours in 
the wINDRESP records. In contrast, there is no information on working hours in the wJOBHIST records. 
Also, there is no distinction between full-time and part-time employment for records in aJOBHIST. We 
follow the practice of Mare (2006) in assuming all employment spells in aJOBHIST are full-time. 
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We treat main employment as the only job done by the respondents for two reasons. 
First, Millan et al. (2012) noted that including individuals with a second job in the 
regressions might bias the regression estimates. Second, information on second job is 
absent in the wJOBHIST records. Moreover, there are studies treating a job change 
without changing the employment mode as starting a new employment spell (Theeuwes 
et al., 1990; Georgellis et al., 2007; Millan et al., 2012). As we are interested in how long 
an individual can stay in each economic status, we ignore any job changes with no change 
in the employment mode49. Table 6.1 summarises the categories of variables included in 
each Cox model. Variables related to demographic, household and human capital 
characteristics can be found in all the Cox regressions. As mentioned by Johnson (2002), 
96.1% of the BHPS respondents in Wave 1 are White. Other ethnicities are not well 
represented in the survey. Therefore, in contrast to the previous two studies, we do not 
include ethnicity variables in the Cox regressions. Apart for industry, some information 
on job characteristics such as firm size may not be available in the wJOBHIST and 
wINDRESP records. Therefore, we include industry dummies as the only variable for job 
characteristics in the Cox regressions on employment spells. The annual unemployment 
rate from Eurostat is matched to the BHPS data for estimating the effect of labour market 
conditions on the durations of various economic states50. We include variables on elapsed 
spell duration to study the effect of duration dependence. 
 
 
                                                 
49 We do split the spells at failure times for including the only one ‘time-varying’ regressor (elapsed spell 
duration). This is explained further in the next sub-section.  
50 We match the unemployment rates in the year of interview prior to the end of the spells to the BHPS 
data but not that prior to the start of the spells as in Boheim and Taylor (2000). This is because we consider 
unemployment rates to be completely exogenous. 
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Table 6.1: Categories of independent variables  
included in each regression analysis 
Cox regressions on spells of: UE FTE PTE SE All 
Demographic characteristics 
Gender      
Marital status      
Health status      
Age      
Retirement age      
Household characteristics 
Number of dependent children aged 4 or less      
Number of dependent children aged between 5 and 11      
Number of dependent children aged between 12 and 15      
Total unearned income      
Region of residence      
Human capital characteristics 
Education      
Previous experience of working full-time      
Previous experience of working part-time      
Previous experience of working as self-employed      
Job characteristics 
Industry      
Others 
Benefit: unemployment or income support      
Annual unemployment rate      
Elapsed duration of spells      
State of spells      
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Table 6.2: Definitions for the independent variables 
Time-fixed independent variables at the start of spells  
Male Male gender 
MS_Married* Marital-status for being married 
MS_Single Marital-status for being single 
MS_SepDivWid Marital-status for being separated, divorced or widowed 
Health_problems Health-status for having health problems limiting kinds of work 
#KidsAged_0to4 Number of dependent children in family aged 4 or less 
#KidsAged _5to11 Number of dependent children in family aged 5 to 11 
#KidsAged_12to15 Number of dependent children in family aged 12 to 15 
UnearnedY_per1000 Total unearned income = (total family income minus total personal 
income)/1000 
Benefit_UE_Ysupp Receiving unemployment benefit/Jobseeker’s Allowance and 
income support 
R_England_S* Region-of-residence for living in the southern part of England 
R_England_M Region-of-residence for living in East Anglia, E. and W. Midlands 
R_England_N Region-of-residence for living in the northern part of England 
R_nonEng Region-of-residence for living in the Wales, Scotland or N. Ireland 
Qual_Degree Qualification for having a university degree or above 
Qual_Sec_Postsec Qualification for having a sec school qual, a college or assoc 
degree 
Qual_Primary* Qualification for having a primary school qualification or below 
Ind_Sec*  Secondary industry (including manufacturing and construction) 
Ind_Tert Tertiary industry (including distribution, hotels and restaurants, 
transport and communication, banking, finance and insurance, etc) 
Ind_PubEduHealth Industry for working public sector, edu, health 
Ind_Others Other Industries (including agri and fishing, energy and water, etc)  
PrevExp_FTE_yrs Previous FTE experience before the start of spell (in years) 
PrevExp_PTE_yrs Previous PTE experience before the start of spell (in years) 
PrevExp_SE_yrs Previous SE experience before the start of spell (in years) 
ln_UE_rate Natural logarithm on annual unemployment rate (Annual_UE_rate) 
in previous year of the start of spell 
Age_16to24* Age group for being aged from 16 to 24 years old 
Age_25to34 Age group for being aged from 25 to 34 years old 
Age_35to44 Age group for being aged from 35 to 44 years old 
Age_45to54 Age group for being aged from 45 to 54 years old 
Age_over54 Age group for being aged over 54 years old 
Age_over59 Age group for being aged over 59 years old 
Age_over64 Age group for being aged over 64 years old 
Inact* Spell of economic inactivity 
UE Unemployment spell 
FTE Full-time employment spell 
PTE Part-time employment spell 
SE Self-employment 
Time-varying independent variables 
Elaps_Dur_yrs Elapsed duration of spells at failure times (in years) 
Elaps_Dur_yrs_Sq Square term of Elaps_Dur_yrs 
* Denotes control variables  
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Table 6.2 provides the definitions for the independent variables. Most variables are 
defined as ‘time-fixed’ at the start of the spells for two reasons. First, the values of some 
variables, such as gender, are unchanged over time. Second, there is potential endogeneity 
of certain variables, such as marital status, with the hazard rates of leaving a spell. In 
addition, there are not enough spells to estimate robust parameters for certain types of 
state transition. We try to minimize the problem by grouping the categories of some 
variables together. For example, we combine the categories for being separated, divorced 
or widowed together (MS_SepDivWid). The values of UnearnedY/1000 are adjusted for 
price changes, with 2012 as the base year51. 
The three variables on previous experience and elapsed spell duration are expressed 
in years52. These variables (PrevExp_FTE_yrs, PrevExp_PTE_yrs and PrevExp_SE_yrs) 
measure the number of years working in each type of employment before the start of each 
spell. The variables on elapsed spell duration are the only ‘time-varying’ independent 
variables in our analyses. We include the square term of elapsed spell duration to capture 
any non-monotonic patterns of duration dependence as suggested by Meghir and 
Whitehouse (1997) and Kupets (2006). Age_over59 and Age_over64 are different from 
other age dummies in capturing the effect of retirement age on females’ and males’ state 
duration respectively. For including the ‘time-varying’ information, we split the spells at 
the failure times53, which is close to splitting the spells into person-months. The numbers 
of person-months for each spell type are noted at the bottom of Tables 6.7 to 6.20.  
                                                 
51 Composite price index data from the Office for National Statistics is used for the price adjustment. 
52 We tried expressing these variables in months and including them in the Cox regressions, but the 
magnitude of the parameters is too small for interpretation. 
53 We do so by using the ‘stsplit’ command in Stata. 
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6.3 Summary sample statistics 
Tables 6.3 to 6.6 in the Appendix show the summary statistics for the four types of 
spell. The statistics are measured before splitting the spells into person-months. Full-time 
employment accounts for the largest number of spells (7,988), followed by 
unemployment (6,053), part-time employment (4,191) and self-employment (889). As 
mentioned in sub-section 6.2.2, the characteristics are measured at each interview date 
prior to the start of the spell. Values for the categorical variables represent the proportion 
of spells with that characteristic in the corresponding samples.  
Slightly more than half of the UE spells (about 60%) are experienced by males. This 
pattern is the same as that of FTE spells. However, around 77% of PTE spells are 
experienced by females, whereas 63% of SE spells are experienced by males. This 
supports the findings of Taylor (2011) that females are more likely to work part-time and 
males are more likely to be self-employed. The mean ages at the start of UE, FTE or PTE 
spells are around 30 years old regardless of gender. The mean starting age of SE spells is 
older (around 35 years old). The 16-to-24 and the over-54 age groups account for the 
largest and smallest proportions of UE, FTE or PTE spells respectively. There are larger 
proportions of middle-aged people (25 to 34) starting SE spells compared to younger 
people.  
In the lower part of each table, we present the proportions and mean durations (in 
months) of each spell type by exit states. Most UE spells end with full-time employment 
(around 40%). These spells have the shortest mean duration (around 9 months) compared 
to UE spells ending with other exit states. UE spells transiting into self-employment 
account for the smallest proportions among all UE spells irrespective of gender. This 
implies that self-employment is possibly the last option when unemployed people cannot 
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get full-time or part-time work. UE spells ending with economic inactivity have the 
longest mean duration. The proportion of male UE spells ending with FTE is much larger 
than that of female UE spells, while the proportion of male UE spells ending with PTE is 
much smaller than that of female UE spells. 
Most FTE spells end with unemployment regardless of gender (around 28%), and 
have the shortest mean duration (around 18 months). The proportion of female FTE spells 
ending with unemployment is smaller than that of male FTE spells. There are larger 
proportions of female FTE spells ending with part-time employment or economic 
inactivity compared to male FTE spells. This implies that when females leave their full-
time work, they tend to choose part-time employment or leave the labour market. 
The patterns in the proportions and mean durations of PTE and SE spells are different 
from those of FTE spells. Most PTE spells end with economic inactivity (24%), followed 
by full-time employment (19%) and unemployment (16%). In contrast, most SE spells 
end with full-time employment (22%), followed by unemployment (16%) and economic 
inactivity (14%). PTE spells or SE spells ending with unemployment have the shortest 
mean duration compared to spells ending with other exit states. Most male PTE or SE 
spells end with full-time employment or unemployment, whereas most female PTE or SE 
spells end with economic inactivity.  
6.4 Estimation framework of Cox proportional hazards models 
In Chapter 5 we discussed the background and theoretical framework for the Cox 
proportional hazards models. This section explains how we run the Cox regressions. We 
estimate competing risks models instead of single risk models to avoid state aggregation 
bias. The survival times of each type of spell are estimated separately by exit states. Four 
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types of spells, namely unemployment (UE), full-time employment (FTE), part-time 
employment (PTE) and self-employment (SE), are considered. The competing risks Cox 
regression techniques model the cause-specific hazard function as follows:  
(25) ℎ𝑐(t |x) = ℎ0𝑐(𝑡) 𝑒
𝑥𝛽𝑐    
where c is the cause of risk (transiting into any four states among unemployment, full-
time employment, part-time employment, self-employment or inactivity depending on 
what the initial state is 54 ). ℎ0𝑐(𝑡)  is the baseline hazard function which is the 
probability of state transition when all values of the regressors are equal to zero. The Cox 
models do not specify ℎ0𝑐(𝑡) for parameter estimation. 𝑥 is the vector of ‘time-fixed’ 
and ‘time-varying’ regressors. 𝛽𝑐 is the vector of regression coefficients. The overall 
hazard rate of any type of spell is the sum of all the cause-specific hazard rates, i.e. h(t) 
=∑ ℎ𝑐(𝑡). The probability of risk from cause c, which is the exit state in our case, is 
ℎ𝑐(t) / h(t). When we consider a particular exit state, we model the cause-specific hazard 
function by treating other exit states as censored. Under the assumption of independent 
hazards, we can estimate the effects of the regressors on the hazards of leaving the spells 
conditional on the exit states.  
Estimation of the parameters 𝛽𝑐 is based on maximum partial likelihood approach. 
The framework discussed hereafter is based on Cooke and Morales-Napoles (2006). 
Suppose the times of failures are 𝑡1,…, 𝑡𝑛 and 𝑡𝑖 < 𝑡𝑗 for i < j. The corresponding 
partial likelihood function is: 
                                                 
54  Suppose the state of spell is unemployment, the causes of risk under consideration are full-time 
employment, part-time employment, self-employment and inactivity. 
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(26) L (𝛽𝑐) = ∏ (𝑒
𝛽𝑐𝑥𝑖 ∑ 𝑒𝛽𝑐𝑥𝑗𝑛𝑗≥𝑖⁄ )
𝑁
𝑖=1   
As discussed in Section 5.3.4, unobserved heterogeneity may affect inferences about 
the shape of the baseline hazard function. Nevertheless, we follow some later works such 
as Boheim and Taylor (2000) and Kupets (2006) to estimate Cox models without 
accounting for unobserved heterogeneity for the two reasons discussed in Section 5.3.4. 
First, not accounting for unobserved heterogeneity may not bias the estimates if the 
baseline hazard function is allowed to be nonparametric (Lancaster, 1985; Ham and Rea, 
1987; Meyer, 1990). Second, introducing a misspecified regression term to capture 
unobserved heterogeneity may cause distortion to the estimation, and so has little 
improvement to the estimation (Narendranathan and Stewart, 1993). The results of the 
log-rank tests reject the hypothesis of equality in survivor functions between male and 
female spells. We therefore estimate twelve sets of competing risks Cox regressions on 
spells of unemployment, full-time employment, part-time employment and self-
employment for the pooled, male and female spells separately55. In addition, we estimate 
two Cox regressions on all spells of males and females separately and include an age 
dummy if starting a spell after the retirement age instead of a series of age dummies. This 
is to analyse the effect of retirement age on economic state duration. The Cox regressions 
are run on all spells instead of various types of spells so as to increase the sample size and 
ensure higher statistical significance of the age-dummy estimates. 
In the next three sections we discuss our Cox regression results on durations of 
unemployment, full-time employment, part-time employment and self-employment 
                                                 
55 All the estimation procedures are carried out using Stata. Once we declare the data to be survival data 
using the “stset” Stata command, the information on time spans of the spells is stored in memory. The 
command for running Cox regressions (“stcox”) uses this stored information for estimation and so there is 
no need to specify a dependent variable. 
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durations. The reference groups are spells with characteristics of being married and 
having primary school qualifications, aged 16 to 24, being in the secondary industry (for 
the three employment spells only) and in the southern part of the U.K. Although we have 
grouped some variable categories, there are not enough exits from certain types of 
employment spells into other states, such as from SE spells into PTE, for determining 
robust estimates. This problem worsens when we run the Cox regressions by gender. 
However, we still keep separate results on males and females because notable differences 
in the hazard rates between genders are noteworthy. Most estimates on key variables, such 
as age dummies, are statistically significant in the full sample. We focus on reporting just 
the results that are of key interest. All the estimation results are expressed in terms of 
hazard ratios (HR) as follows:  
(27) HR = 𝑒∑ 𝛽?̂? (𝑋𝑎 −𝑋𝑏)  
where a and b represents any two groups of spells. Hazard ratio with a value greater than 
one means higher exit probabilities or shorter duration in the initial state, with a unit 
change in the continuous regressor or compared to the treatment group of the binary 
regressor. Our main focus is the estimated results on age.  
6.5 Estimation results on unemployment (UE) spells 
6.5.1 General results 
Table 6.7 shows the hazard ratios from competing risks Cox models on exiting from 
UE spells into full-time employment, part-time employment, self-employment or 
economic inactivity for the full sample. The estimated results on male and female spells 
are shown in Tables 6.8 and 6.9 respectively. Our results support some findings in 
previous studies and provide a deeper understanding. 
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Hunt (1999) found that males face higher hazards of exiting from UE spells into 
employment than females. In contrast, we find that males face higher hazards of exiting 
from UE spells into FTE or SE, but they face lower hazards of exiting from UE spells 
into PTE or Inact than females. There are large differences in the hazard rates of leaving 
from UE spells to PTE or SE between males and females. This supports the common 
belief that males are more likely to be self-employed, whereas females are more likely to 
work part-time. 
Stewart (2001) found that individuals with a health limitation face lower hazards of 
leaving UE spells but he did not distinguish the exit states. In contrast, we find that 
individuals with health problems face lower hazards of exiting from UE spells into FTE 
and higher hazards of exiting into PTE, SE or Inact. Individuals with health limitations 
choose either giving up job hunting or working flexibly as alternative to full-time work. 
As noted by Boheim and Taylor (2000), family responsibility is important in 
affecting individuals’ working hours. Having more dependent children at the start of 
spells decreases the hazards of exiting from UE into FTE but increases the hazards of 
exiting into PTE. This pattern is much more manifest among females than among males. 
This shows that females are more willing to work part-time in order to gain more time in 
childcare. Having more dependent children (except children aged 5 to 11) increases the 
hazards of exiting from UE spells into Inact among females. This is opposite to the results 
on males. The more children a male has, the longer time he spends on job hunting before 
he chooses non-labour market activities.  
It is surprising to find that more educated individuals (with degree or above) face 
lower hazards of exiting from UE spells into FTE or PTE (except males from UE into 
PTE). They have longer unemployment durations before exiting into FTE or PTE than 
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less educated individuals. Dynarski and Sheffrin (1990) suggested that this may be 
because of the different nature of unemployment among individuals with different levels 
of education. More educated individuals are more likely to face permanent layoffs from 
regular full-time jobs. Less educated individuals may be unemployed because of 
temporary layoffs from flexible work. It is also interesting to find that more educated 
females face much higher hazards of exiting from UE into Inact compared to females 
with primary education or below. 
Irrespective of gender, having one more year of previous FTE, PTE or SE experience 
increase the hazards of exiting from UE spells into FTE, PTE or SE respectively (with 
some statistically insignificant exceptions). However, more previous FTE, PTE or SE 
experience provides no help in ending unemployment with other types of employment. 
This implies that previous FTE, PTE or SE experience is relevant for unemployed 
individuals to re-enter the corresponding mode of employment only. Previous SE 
experience is in particular very important for both unemployed males and females to be 
self-employed again, as shown by the 20% to 30% increase in hazards with an additional 
year of previous SE experience. 
Higher unemployment rates at the start of spells increase and decrease the males’ 
hazards of exiting from UE spells into FTE or PTE respectively. It is possible that the 
higher the unemployment rates a male faces at the start of UE spells, the sooner he will 
encounter an improvement in economic conditions and hence the sooner he will get a full-
time job. Thus he will not choose to engage in part-time work. For females, higher 
unemployment rates at the start of UE spells increase their hazards of exiting from UE 
spells into FTE or PTE. Moreover, higher unemployment rates increase the hazards of 
exiting from UE spells into SE regardless of gender, as found by Martinez-Granado (2002) 
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too. Those unemployed who may have financial difficulties may give up job hunting early 
and choose self-employment. 
As noted in the previous chapter, duration dependence is one of the main concerns 
in duration studies. Many previous studies found that duration dependence of 
unemployment is negative. In contrast, we find that the effect of elapsed spell duration 
shows a non-monotonic pattern. Regardless of gender, unemployed individuals face lower 
hazards of leaving UE spells to FTE or PTE in their early stage of unemployment. 
However, they face higher hazards of making such transitions in the later stage, though 
the effect is small (3% to 6%). There is negative duration dependence for unemployment 
spells at the early stage and duration dependence turns to be slightly positive later. This 
is possible when individuals in their early UE stage do not have enough market 
information for job hunting and learn more on job vacancies later. The effect of elapsed 
spell duration on females’ hazards of exiting from UE spells into SE or Inact also shows 
a non-monotonic pattern. In contrast, duration dependences for males to transit from UE 
spells into SE or Inact are always negative. This shows that males do not choose self-
employment or leave the labour market easily no matter how long they are unemployed. 
6.5.2 The effect of age 
Estimated parameters on the age dummies show interesting patterns. Age at the start 
of a spell affects the hazard of exiting from unemployment into other states. Individuals 
starting unemployment spells over 24 face lower hazards of exiting from UE spells into 
FTE or PTE compared to those starting from 16 to 24. The older an individual is when 
starting an unemployment spell, the longer he or she remains unemployed before getting 
full-time or part-time jobs. However, the trend of decreasing hazards from leaving 
unemployment spells to part-time employment reverses after the spell starting age of 54. 
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The effects of spell starting age on females’ transition of UE into FTE are stable over the 
age of 35. Females starting UE spells over 54 face higher hazards of exiting into PTE 
state compared to the youngest female group.  
Individuals starting UE spells at any age over 24 face very high hazards of exiting 
from UE spells into SE regardless of gender. This shows the importance of experience 
and financial assets on starting a new business, which can be accumulated when one 
grows older. All individuals starting UE spells at any ages over 24 face lower hazards of 
exiting into Inact regardless of gender. This is possibly because the youngest age group 
includes students who are more likely to leave the labour market and engage in non-labour 
market activities such as schooling. The estimates show a gradually decreasing trend 
along the age dummies and but then reverse for Age_over54. This supports the prediction 
by the life-cycle labour supply model that the time spent on labour market activities shows 
an inverted-U shape over one’s lifetime, though the estimate of Age_over54 is lower than 
that of Age_25to34. One possible explanation is that there is higher degree of pessimism 
in finding jobs among those aged 25 to 34 than those aged over 54 and they are more 
likely to leave the labour market for other activities such as pursuing higher education. 
6.6 Estimation results on full-time employment (FTE) spells 
6.6.1 General results 
Many previous employment-duration studies, such as Hunt (1999), did not 
differentiate various types of employment and exit states. We provide deeper 
understanding on employment duration by considering various types of employment 
spells and various exit states. Table 6.10 shows the hazard ratios from competing risks 
Cox models on exiting from FTE spells into unemployment, part-time employment, self-
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employment and economic inactivity for the full sample, whereas Tables 6.11 and 6.12 
show the estimated results on males and females respectively. 
Males face higher hazards of exiting from FTE spells into UE or SE than females. 
We have noted in the previous section that males face higher hazards of exiting from UE 
spells into FTE. This implies that males change state between unemployment and full-
time employment more easily than females. It is not surprising to see that males face 
lower hazards of exiting from FTE spells into PTE or Inact than females. There are large 
differences in the hazard rates from leaving FTE spells to PTE or SE between males and 
females. Irrespective of whether they start out as unemployed or employed full-time, 
males are more likely to become self-employed and females are more likely to work part-
time. 
It is not surprising to find that more educated individuals, irrespective of gender, face 
lower hazards of leaving from FTE spells to UE or PTE (except males from FTE to PTE, 
though these are insignificant). They face higher hazards of exiting from FTE spells into 
SE. Both males and females with one more year of previous FTE or PTE experience face 
higher hazards of exiting from FTE spells into PTE. Previous SE experience is 
particularly important for both employed males and females to leave full-time 
employment and become self-employed again, as shown by the 20% to 40% increase in 
hazards with an additional year of previous SE experience. 
Both males and females working in the tertiary industries, the public sector, 
education and health or other industries face lower hazards of leaving from FTE spells to 
UE compared to those in secondary industries. This implies that full-time jobs in the 
former three sectors are more stable. In addition, full-time employed males and females 
in the former two sectors face higher hazards of exiting into PTE or Inact and lower 
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hazards of exiting into SE. Higher unemployment rates at the start of spells increase males’ 
hazards of exiting from FTE spells into UE or SE but decrease their hazards of exiting 
into PTE. Full-time employed females face higher hazards of exiting into UE, PTE or SE 
when unemployment rates are high. Bad economic conditions hit individuals holding full-
time jobs and thus many of them lose their full-time jobs or choose to work flexibly. 
However, males are not more likely to change to work part-time even under bad economic 
conditions. 
The effect of elapsed spell duration on hazard rates of leaving FTE spells to various 
states also show a monotonic pattern similar to that of UE spells. Both full-time employed 
males and females face lower hazards of leaving FTE spells to UE, PTE or Inact in their 
early stage of unemployment, and then face higher hazards of making such transitions in 
later stage of their spells (though the effect is small). It is interesting to find that both 
males and females face higher hazards of exiting into SE in their early stage of full-time 
employment and later face lower hazards of making such transitions. As noted by 
Martinez-Granado (2002), elapsed spell duration has a decreasing positive effect on the 
exit rates from employment into self-employment (though not significant). 
6.6.2 The effect of age 
How age at the start of spell affects the hazards of exiting from FTE into various 
states deserves attention. Both males and females starting FTE spells when aged over 24 
face lower hazards of exiting from FTE spells into UE compared. The older an individual 
starts a FTE spell, the longer he or she remains employed. Both males and females starting 
FTE spells over 24 face lower hazards of leaving to PTE. However, there is an exception 
that males starting FTE spells over 54 face higher hazards of leaving to PTE (though 
insignificant compared to other estimates on age dummies). In addition, males starting 
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FTE spells from 25 to 54 face higher hazards of exiting into SE compared to the youngest 
group, whereas males starting FTE spells over 54 face lower hazards of doing so. Males 
starting full-time jobs at older ages are less likely to be self-employed compared to those 
starting full-time jobs younger. It is possible that these males have financial difficulties 
and so are unable to start a business. Both males and females with starting age over 24 
face lower hazards of leaving FTE spells to Inact (except males over 54). 
6.7 Estimation results on part-time employment (PTE) and self-
employment (SE) spells 
6.7.1 General results 
As noted in the previous chapter, many studies on flexible employment focus on SE 
duration. We discuss the estimated results on both PTE and SE spells in this section. 
Tables 6.13 and 6.16 show the hazard ratios from competing risks Cox models on PTE 
and SE spells for the full sample respectively. The results of males and females are shown 
in Tables 6.14 and 6.15 for PTE spells and in Tables 6.17 and 6.18 for SE spells. 
Georgellis et al. (2007) found that males in SE spells face higher hazards of 
becoming unemployed and lower hazards of leaving the labour market. In contrast, we 
find that both males in PTE or SE spells face much higher hazards of exiting into UE or 
FTE and much lower hazards of exiting into Inact compared to their female counterparts. 
This shows that when male flexible workers end their spells of flexible employment, they 
are more likely to stay in the labour market than females. However, males in PTE spells 
face much higher hazards of exiting into SE, whereas males in SE spells face lower 
hazards of exiting into PTE. Males in PTE spells face the highest hazard of transiting into 
SE, whereas males in SE spells face the highest hazard of transiting into FTE. This implies 
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that self-employment may be a bridge for males to transit from part-time employment 
into full-time employment. 
It is surprising that males with health problems face higher hazards of exiting from 
PTE spells into any exit state except economic inactivity. Similar patterns can be found 
for self-employed males. They face higher hazards of exiting from SE spells into any exit 
state except PTE. In contrast, females with health problems seem to be more satisfied 
with their flexible employment state than their male counterparts. They face lower 
hazards of exiting from either PTE or SE spells into UE or FTE. 
More unearned income from other family members decreases the hazards of exiting 
from PTE spells into any exit state (with some exceptions by gender). This shows that 
family financial situation can affect whether individuals can work part-time for long. 
Block and Sandner (2009) found that more household income increases the duration of 
self-employment. We find that self-employed males with more unearned income face 
lower hazards of exiting into unemployment. Nonetheless, this is opposite for self-
employed females.  
Some studies, such as Katz and Meyer (1990), Meghir and Whitehouse (1997) and 
Haardt (2006), found that benefit entitlement or increased social security benefits may 
delay re-employment. We find that both males and females receiving income support face 
much higher hazards of exiting from PTE or SE spells into UE. This implies that income 
support not only delays re-employment among the unemployed but also encourages 
flexible workers to leave their work for more financial support such as unemployment 
benefits. 
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More educated individuals are more likely to leave part-time employment and do 
something else. Males with secondary school qualifications or above face higher hazards 
of exiting from PTE spells into FTE or SE. However, for females, only those with degree 
or above face higher hazards of having such transitions. As noted by Taylor (1999), 
education may not be a good predictor for self-employment durations because 
qualifications may not be helpful for individuals in starting a business. However, we can 
still spot some patterns. Self-employed males with secondary school qualifications or 
above generally face lower hazards of exiting into FTE or PTE. This is the opposite 
pattern to that of females. More educated males tend to stay in SE spells, whereas their 
female counterparts tend to leave self-employment for other employment modes.  
Previous PTE experience is highly relevant for the self-employed to re-enter part-
time employment. Similarly, previous SE experience is highly relevant for part-timers to 
be self-employed again. Both males and females working in the tertiary industries face 
higher hazards of leaving from PTE spells to FTE or SE compared to those in secondary 
industries. Self-employed males in the tertiary industries, the sector of public, education 
and health or other industries face higher hazards of exiting into unemployment. The 
opposite is true for self-employed females. In addition, self-employed males in the tertiary 
industries face higher hazards of exiting into any states in the labour market. They face 
lower hazards of leaving the labour market. 
Bad economic conditions not only hit full-time workers but also part-timers. Higher 
unemployment rates at the start of spells increase males’ hazards of exiting from PTE 
spells into UE or FTE, whereas female part-timers face higher hazards of exiting into SE. 
However, both male and female part-timers face lower hazards of leaving the labour 
market when the economic conditions become worse. The effect of unemployment rates 
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on SE duration is different from that on PTE duration. Both self-employed males and 
females face lower hazards of exiting into any states (except males from SE into UE). 
This supports the recession-push hypothesis that individuals tend to stay in self-
employment when the economic conditions worsen (Millan et al., 2012). The effect of 
elapsed spell duration on hazard ratios of leaving PTE or SE spells to various states show 
a monotonic pattern similar to those of UE and FTE spells. However, self-employed 
females face higher hazards of exiting into part-time employment in their early stage of 
self-employment. 
6.7.2 The effect of age 
Age at the start of a spell affects PTE and SE duration differently. Both males and 
females over 24 face lower hazards of exiting from PTE spells into any states56. The older 
an individual is at the start of a PTE spell, the longer he or she remains employed. This 
shows that older individuals are more likely to stay in PTE spells longer than their 
younger counterparts. Self-employed males over 24 face lower hazards of exiting into 
any state. This is because individuals over 24 often have the networks to identify business 
opportunities and can sustain their business for longer (Millan et al., 2012). Their hazards 
of exiting into PTE are particularly low. This implies that self-employed males, no matter 
which age they start their business at, do not easily leave their SE spell for part-time 
employment.  
In contrast, self-employed females aged 25 to 34 face higher hazards of exiting into 
UE compared to their youngest counterparts. After the age of 34, the older a female is 
when starting an SE spell, the lower the hazard she faces of transiting into unemployment. 
                                                 
56 An exception is the higher hazards of exiting into self-employment faced by female part-timers aged 
25 to 44. 
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Females aged over 24 face much higher hazards of exiting from SE spells into Inact. The 
reason may be that they need to give birth and so leave the business. Older females aged 
over 54 only have 16% higher hazards of making such a transition. 
6.8 Estimation results on the effect of statutory retirement age 
Tables 6.19 and 6.20 show the hazard ratios from competing risks Cox models on 
exiting into unemployment, full-time employment, part-time employment, self-
employment or economic inactivity for the male and female sample respectively. The 
reference groups are spells with characteristics of being married, in the southern part of 
the U.K., having primary school qualifications and inactivity spells. We take into account 
the different retirement age for males and females in the U.K. and include different age 
dummies (Age_over64 and Age_over59) for capturing the effect of retirement age.  
We pay special attention to the dummies of spell state and retirement age. As 
discussed in Section 6.2.2, as we ignore any job changes with no change in the 
employment mode, there are no transition of jobs with the same employment mode (such 
as from a full-time job to another full-time job). Parameters for transition of the same 
state cannot be estimated. Male PTE spells have higher hazards of exiting into self-
employment, and vice versa for female PTE spells. In addition, male SE spells have lower 
hazards of exiting into unemployment, which is in opposite to that of female SE spells. 
These agree with the results in Section 6.6.1 that males are more likely to become and 
remain self-employed than females. Both male and female spells with starting age after 
the retirement age (65 for males and 60 for females) face higher hazards of exiting into 
part-time employment and lower hazards into any other states. This shows that part-time 
employment is a popular choice for bridge employment after reaching the retirement age. 
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6.9 Conclusion 
Older people may become a major workforce in the near future and the duration of 
their unemployment and various employment modes deserve policy attention. This 
chapter extends previous works, such as Boheim and Taylor (2000) and Haardt (2006), 
by considering spells of various economic activities and their various exit states for 
working-age people in the U.K. We pay special attention to older people aged 45 or over 
and compare their situation to that of younger people aged 44 or less. Our regression 
results provide deeper understanding on some of the findings in Chapter 4. Here we note 
the significant factors found in the Cox models before summarizing the effect of age and 
providing some policy recommendations.  
Gender is a significant factor, regardless of age, in affecting the duration of various 
types of economic activity. Whether in UE or FTE spells, both males and females face 
higher hazards of exiting into SE and PTE respectively. Males in both PTE and SE spells 
face much higher hazards of exiting into UE or FTE and much lower hazards of exiting 
into Inact compared to their female counterparts. Family responsibilities, such as child-
caring, are a possible reason for these gender differences. Having more dependent 
children decreases the hazards of exiting from UE into FTE but increases the hazards of 
exiting from UE into PTE. This pattern is stronger among females. 
In Chapter 4, we found that older males may have difficulty in finding part-time 
work. A possible reason for this is that older males have been working full-time when 
they were younger and so they are not familiar in finding part-time employment. In this 
chapter, we can see that regardless of the type of initial spell, previous FTE, PTE or SE 
experiences are relevant for re-entering the same employment mode but not other 
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employment modes. Previous SE experience, in particular, is very important for returning 
into self-employment. 
Many studies have found that employment and unemployment duration dependences 
are negative. In contrast, we find that the effect of elapsed spell duration shows a non-
monotonic pattern on the hazards of exiting from any type of spell, except SE spells. This 
implies that hazard rates decrease during the early stage of a spell and increase in the later 
stage. In Chapter 4, we find that both older and younger unemployed job-seekers with 
longer unemployment durations are less likely to prefer self-employment. Our results 
show that the longer a male is unemployed, the less likely he will start a business. 
Conversely, both males and females face higher hazards of exiting into SE at the early 
stage of full-time employment and later face lower hazards of making such transition. 
We shed light on the situation facing older people by focusing on the estimated age 
effects. The older an individual is when he or she starts a UE spell, the longer he or she 
remains unemployed before resuming full-time or part-time work. However, the trend of 
decreasing hazards from leaving UE spells to PTE reverses at the starting age of 45. Part-
time employment seems favourable for those unemployed who are over 45. In addition, 
the older an individual is when starting any type of employment spell, the longer he or 
she remains employed. This shows the higher stability for older individuals to remain 
employed compared to the youngest group. Self-employed males, no matter they start 
their business at what age, do not easily leave their SE spell for part-time employment. In 
contrast, self-employed females aged 25 to 34 face higher hazards of exiting into UE 
compared to their youngest counterparts. After the age of 34, the older a female is when 
starting a SE spell, the lower the hazard she faces in transiting into unemployment. 
Moreover, part-time employment is a popular choice for bridge employment after 
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reaching retirement age. 
Our findings lead to two policy recommendations. Firstly, income support seems to 
discourage re-employment. In addition, flexible workers receiving income support may 
quit their jobs for more financial support such as unemployment benefits. This implies 
that they may work flexibly for financial reasons or an inability to find full-time jobs. 
These add unnecessary burdens on the government budgets. The Government should 
provide assistance to benefit recipients in full-time job hunting, or only accept income 
support applicants who satisfy minimum hours of work. The current Jobseeker’s 
Allowance (JSA), which provides financial support to the unemployed or underemployed, 
has similar requirements to those we recommend. The New Deal 50 Plus serves a similar 
function for older people aged 50 or over. Recipients of these benefits have to provide 
regular evidence of seeking work or of working at a minimum level. Our results imply 
that the current requirements may not be fully effective in encouraging benefit recipients 
to find jobs or stay in work. Secondly, we find that the longer a male is unemployed, the 
less likely he will start a business. Thus any measures, which encourage unemployed 
individuals to become self-employed, should be provided at the early stage of their 
unemployment. This is especially important for older benefit claimants with little past 
experience of self-employment. 
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
Summary of results 
Through a series of static and dynamic empirical analyses, the work in this thesis 
has compared the employment patterns of older people to those of younger people in 
selected economies. In Chapter 2 we differentiate the effects of explained and 
unexplained factors on age-employment gaps using the US CPS and UK LFS in the 2000s 
and Hong Kong Census and By-census data from 1991 to 2006. Application of the 
binomial logit models and non-linear Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions has low data 
requirements and provides a good starting point for the investigation on the employment 
patterns of ageing workforces. Our binomial logit models on employment probabilities 
show that higher levels of education do not give older males significantly higher 
employment probabilities. This may be due to deterioration of skills for highly educated 
older males, leading to a lower employment premium. In contrast, older females enjoy 
higher employment probabilities from higher education in the U.S. and the U.K. but not 
in Hong Kong. This implies that, for older females, skill deterioration is greater for older 
females in Hong Kong than but not for those in the U.S. and the U.K.  
The typical age-employment profile is concave for the employment probabilities 
over one’s life-time. The result for younger people in all the three economies matches the 
typical age-employment profiles. However, older females in Hong Kong still have the 
same age-employment profile as that of younger people. Both older males and females in 
the U.K. and older males in Hong Kong have an age-employment profile opposite to the 
typical one. It is therefore possible for older people to gain from their greater working 
experience when they look for jobs. Hong Kong has the largest employment gap between 
younger and older people among all the three economies. Our Oaxaca-Blinder 
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decompositions of the U.S. and Hong Kong show that the differences in observable 
characteristics (explained factors) can explain nearly the entire negative age-employment 
gap. In contrast, there are many more uncontrolled-for factors in our UK models, which 
further enlarge the negative age-employment gap for males and females. 
Older people who search for flexible employment such as part-time jobs may have 
different employment patterns from full-time job seekers. Further empirical analyses on 
different employment modes of UK older people are reported in Chapter 4. We extend 
the work of Lissenburgh and Smeaton (2003) in three parts. Firstly, we study the 
preferences of older and younger unemployed job-seekers over various employment 
modes. Secondly, we update the analysis on the entry of older people into various 
employment modes. We consider more than one type of flexible employment, use a long 
time-span of the UK LFS from 2001q2 to 2012q1 and consider the neglected issue of 
gender. Thirdly, we investigate the factors that identify why part-time workers work part-
time involuntarily. 
Our multinomial logit models on job preferences and employment outcomes show 
that unemployed job seekers with a particular attribute may have a greater preference for 
a particular employment mode. However, the economically-active with the same 
attributes may have a higher probability of entering a different employment mode. Full-
time employment is the most popular employment mode among males, followed by self-
employment and then part-time employment. Although older males over 54 are much 
more likely to prefer part-time employment than self-employment compared to their 
counterparts from 50 to 54, their probability of entering part-time employment is similar 
to that of entering self-employment. In contrast, younger females are more likely to prefer 
part-time work but less likely to undertake it. As these younger females age they exhibit 
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an increased preference for self-employment. The sub-sample of older females is more 
likely to prefer and enter flexible employment and they prefer part-time employment to 
self-employment. Older females can meet their preferences with actual employment 
outcomes compared to their younger counterparts.  
Our binomial logit models on working part-time involuntarily show that gender is 
the most important factor affecting preferences for part-time work among younger 
workers. Younger females, in particular, express a much greater preference for part-time 
work. For older workers, age is the most important factor affecting part-time work 
preferences and gender is much less important. After running separate regressions on 
males and females, we find that both are more willing to work part-time as they age. Part-
time employment is therefore more likely to be a voluntary choice regardless of gender 
and age.  
Although we can model the effect of various factors on job preferences and 
employment outcomes, more detailed information on when an individual leaves the 
original state and transits into another state is ignored. Chapter 6 extends previous work 
on employment and unemployment duration, such as Boheim and Taylor (2000) and 
Haardt (2006), by considering spells of various economic activities and their various exit 
states for working-age people in the U.K. We use the UK BHPS data from 1991 to 2008 
to estimate competing risks Cox proportional hazards models on unemployment and 
various types of employment spells. Our empirical results show that gender is a 
significant factor, irrespective of age, in affecting duration of various types of economic 
activities. Both males and females face higher hazards of exiting into SE and PTE 
respectively, irrespective of whether they are originally in UE or FTE spells. Regardless 
of the type of initial spell, all previous employment experiences are relevant for 
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individuals re-entering the same type of employment, whether it be FTE, PTE or SE. 
Previous SE experience is particularly important for individuals returning to self-
employment. Many previous studies found that unemployment or employment duration 
dependences are negative. In contrast, we find that the effect of elapsed spell duration 
shows a non-monotonic pattern on the hazards of exiting from any type of spells except 
for SE spells. In addition, the longer a male is unemployed, the less likely he will start a 
business. On the contrary, both males and females face higher hazards of exiting into SE 
at an early stage of their full-time employment but later face lower hazards of making 
such a transition. 
We shed light on the situation facing older people by interpreting the estimates on 
age dummies. The older an individual is when he or she starts a UE spell, the longer he 
or she remains unemployed before getting full-time or part-time jobs. However, the 
general trend of decreasing hazards from leaving UE spells to PTE reverses at the spell 
starting age of 45. In addition, the older an individual is when starting any type of 
employment spell, the longer he or she remains employed. Self-employed males, no 
matter at what age they start their business, do not easily leave their SE spell for part-time 
employment. In contrast, self-employed females aged 25 to 34 face higher hazards of 
exiting into UE compared to their youngest counterparts. After the age of 34, the older a 
female is when she starts a SE spell, the lower the hazard she faces in transiting into 
unemployment. Regardless of the initial state, both male and female spells with starting 
age after the retirement age (65 for males and 60 for females) face higher hazards of 
exiting into part-time employment and lower hazards into any other states. This shows 
that part-time employment is a popular choice for bridge employment after reaching the 
retirement age. 
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Policy implications 
Many economies have enacted legislation to promote longer working lives among 
older people. For example, in the U.K., the Pensions Act (1995), the Pensions Act (2007) 
and the Employment Equality (Age) Regulations (2006) will raise the SPA to 68 by 2046 
and will allow employees not to retire at 65 (Khan, 2009). The question of how to help 
older people seek or stay in their preferred employment mode deserves attention. From 
our empirical results we can generalize four policy suggestions.  
Firstly, highly educated older people in the U.S., the U.K. and Hong Kong, especially 
males, may suffer from serious deterioration of skills and may find difficulty in obtaining 
employment. Older people can emphasize their long working experience rather than their 
education when applying for jobs. Governments can provide subsidies to employers who 
recruit and provide training for older people, or set up training programs for older people 
to update their skills.  
Secondly, in the U.K., older unemployed males and those unemployed for less than 
5 years need targeted help from the government. Older males may have worked full-time 
when they were young and so they are not familiar in finding part-time employment. Also, 
employers are not willing to employ older males, especially those over 65, either as part-
timers or full-timers. In addition, older job-seekers unemployed for less than 5 years may 
have difficulty in seeking either full-time or flexible work. On the demand side, the 
Government can implement measures such as providing financial subsidies to encourage 
firms to employ older part-timers. On the supply side, the Extending Working Life Group 
can help older people, especially males, to find part-time work by providing easier access 
to information on part-time vacancies.  
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Thirdly, older benefit claimants tend to prefer full-time work to part-time work. This 
may be due to the limitations of pension rules associated with part-time work. Pension 
rules that forbid part-time employees from drawing part of a pension may discourage 
older benefit claimants from taking part-time work. Governments should adjust the 
pension scheme to cover part-timers (and other flexible workers) so as to promote part-
time employment among older people.  
Fourthly, older benefit claimants are less likely to prefer self-employment. A 
possible reason for this is that they may not have enough start-up funds for self-
employment. Governments could initiate business start-up schemes including the 
provision of funds or loans to encourage older benefit claimants into self-employment. 
The longer a male is unemployed, the less likely he will start a business. Thus any 
measures, which encourage unemployed individuals to become self-employed, should be 
provided at the early stage of their unemployment. This is especially important for older 
benefit claimants having little past self-employment experience. 
Recommendations for further research 
This thesis has four recommendations for further research. Firstly, it may prove 
fruitful to use the quarterly General Household Survey (GHS) in Hong Kong as it has a 
higher data frequency than the Hong Kong Population Census and By-census. This would 
provide a much larger sample size for the decomposition analysis on Hong Kong. We did 
not use the GHS because of its high price (UK£125 per quarter). Any future projects 
which have enough funding could use the GHS to estimate more robust decomposition 
results. 
Secondly, the decomposition results provide good insights on the possible direction 
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of the effects of unknown factors. There are other unknown factors in the U.K. which 
further enlarge the employment gap for males and females. Further research on what these 
unobservable characteristics are could be done. 
Thirdly, we estimate the Cox models on all people aged 16 to 64 but not separately 
for younger and older people. This is because of the limited number of spells derived 
from the BHPS. According to McFall (2012), the UKHLS provides a much larger sample 
size, with 100,000 individuals in 40,000 British households, which should allow robust 
separate estimates on spells for younger and older people. This could be carried out in 
future when the period covered by the UKHLS increases. 
Fourthly, our duration analyses on the U.K. suggest that income support discourages 
re-employment. Also, flexible workers receiving income support may quit their jobs for 
more financial support such as unemployment benefits. These imply that the current 
measures in public benefits such as JSA or New Deal 50 Plus may not be effective in 
encouraging benefit recipients to find jobs or stay in work. Further policy analyses on the 
effect of those benefits on re-employment, especially of older people, can be carried out 
in the future using the UKHLS. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix for Chapter 2 
Table 2.3: Summary statistics of the sample in the U.S. (mean values) 
 Pooled Male Female 
Full 
sample 
Younger 
sample   
Older 
sample   
Full 
sample 
Younger 
sample   
Older 
sample   
Full 
sample 
Younger 
sample   
Older 
sample   
Employed 0.6335 0.7177 0.4795 0.6929 0.7715 0.5442 0.5799 0.6681 0.4234 
Older  0.3535   0.3460   0.3604   
Mean Age  43.56 33.34 62.24 43.02 33.16 61.68 44.04 33.51 62.73 
Male  0.4742 0.4798 0.4640       
MS_Married  0.5637 0.5214 0.6410 0.5911 0.5115 0.7415 0.5390 0.5305 0.5541 
MS_Single  0.2633 0.3721 0.0643 0.2895 0.4071 0.0672 0.2397 0.3399 0.061 
MS_Separ_Divor  0.1180 0.1003 0.1504 0.0967 0.0785 0.1310 0.1373 0.1204 0.1672 
MS_Widowed  0.0550 0.0061 0.1442 0.0227 0.0029 0.0603 0.0840 0.0092 0.2169 
Foreign  0.1485 0.1610 0.1257 0.1519 0.1678 0.1219 0.1454 0.1547 0.1289 
Ethn_White  0.8008 0.7997 0.8029 0.8130 0.8102 0.8183 0.7899 0.7901 0.7896 
Ethn_Black  0.1143 0.1119 0.1187 0.1031 0.1018 0.1056 0.1244 0.1212 0.1301 
Ethn_Asian  0.0469 0.0472 0.0465 0.0458 0.0464 0.0447 0.0480 0.0479 0.0481 
Ethn_Mixed  0.0203 0.0219 0.0174 0.0206 0.0223 0.0174 0.0200 0.0215 0.0174 
Ethn_Other  0.0176 0.0193 0.0144 0.0175 0.0193 0.0140 0.0177 0.0193 0.0148 
Qual_Degree  0.2475 0.2425 0.2567 0.2514 0.2285 0.2949 0.2440 0.2555 0.2237 
Qual_Postsec  0.2568 0.2680 0.2363 0.2398 0.2458 0.2285 0.2721 0.2885 0.2430 
Qual_Secondary  0.4648 0.4661 0.4625 0.4765 0.4995 0.4330 0.4543 0.4353 0.4880 
Qual_Primary  0.0308 0.0234 0.0445 0.0322 0.0262 0.0436 0.0296 0.0207 0.0453 
Exp 24.27 14.09 42.87 23.73 14.03 42.07 24.75 14.15 43.56 
UnearnedY_per1000 41.45 45.74 33.61 34.96 38.69 27.90 47.30 52.24 38.55 
R_South  0.3098 0.3046 0.3192 0.3049 0.3004 0.3135 0.3142 0.3085 0.3241 
R_West  0.2587 0.2640 0.2490 0.2633 0.2679 0.2546 0.2546 0.2604 0.2442 
R_Midwest 0.2291 0.2329 0.2221 0.2311 0.2346 0.2243 0.2272 0.2313 0.2201 
R_Northeast  0.2025 0.1985 0.2097 0.2007 0.1971 0.2075 0.2040 0.1998 0.2115 
Observations (‘000) 1,208 781 427 573 375 198 635 406 229 
Period covered: 2003 to 2010 
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Table 2.4: Summary statistics of the sample in the U.K. (mean values) 
 Pooled Male Female 
Full 
sample 
Younger 
sample   
Older 
sample   
Full 
sample 
Younger 
sample   
Older 
sample   
Full 
sample 
Younger 
sample   
Older 
sample   
Employed 0.7547 0.8011 0.6606 0.8067 0.8691 0.6917 0.7046 0.7397 0.6266 
Older  0.3303   0.3514   0.3099   
Mean Age 42.69 35.32 57.63 43.28 35.28 58.04 42.12 35.36 57.19 
Male 0.4901 0.4746 0.5215       
MS_Married 0.6011 0.5265 0.7523 0.6035 0.5089 0.7783 0.5987 0.5424 0.7240 
MS_Single 0.2890 0.3964 0.0712 0.3107 0.4323 0.0863 0.2681 0.3639 0.0546 
MS_Separ_Divor  0.0899 0.0722 0.1258 0.0742 0.0565 0.1071 0.1049 0.0864 0.1462 
MS_Widowed 0.0201 0.0050 0.0507 0.0115 0.0024 0.0283 0.0283 0.0073 0.0752 
Foreign 0.4447 0.4270 0.4807 0.4347 0.4238 0.4549 0.4543 0.4299 0.5088 
Ethn_White  0.9214 0.9039 0.9570 0.9253 0.9074 0.9582 0.9178 0.9008 0.9556 
Ethn_Black  0.0180 0.0224 0.0092 0.0160 0.0204 0.0080 0.0200 0.0242 0.0105 
Ethn_Asian  0.0423 0.0509 0.0250 0.0413 0.0499 0.0253 0.0433 0.0517 0.0247 
Ethn_Mixed 0.0055 0.0073 0.0020 0.0050 0.0067 0.0019 0.0060 0.0077 0.0022 
Ethn_Other  0.0115 0.0142 0.0060 0.0111 0.0140 0.0057 0.0118 0.0143 0.0063 
Health_problems 0.1902 0.1350 0.3022 0.1868 0.1224 0.3056 0.1934 0.1463 0.2984 
Qual_Degree  0.1850 0.2052 0.1440 0.1939 0.2076 0.1687 0.1764 0.2031 0.1171 
Qual_Postsec  0.0928 0.0884 0.1015 0.0814 0.0792 0.0854 0.1037 0.0967 0.1191 
Qual_Secondary  0.4311 0.4635 0.3653 0.4488 0.4688 0.4117 0.4140 0.4586 0.3148 
Qual_Primary  0.2833 0.2347 0.3817 0.2679 0.2361 0.3264 0.2981 0.2334 0.4421 
Exp 25.01 17.41 40.41 25.58 17.38 40.72 24.46 17.44 40.08 
#KidsAged_0to4 0.1886 0.2788 0.0057 0.1691 0.2555 0.0098 0.2074 0.3000 0.0012 
#KidsAged _5to9 0.1974 0.2859 0.0179 0.1752 0.2550 0.0279 0.2187 0.3137 0.0071 
#KidsAged_10to15 0.2602 0.3487 0.0807 0.2346 0.3066 0.1017 0.2848 0.3867 0.0579 
R_England  0.8231 0.8241 0.8210 0.8237 0.8247 0.8218 0.8225 0.8235 0.8201 
R_Wales  0.0483 0.0469 0.0511 0.0479 0.0465 0.0505 0.0487 0.0473 0.0517 
R_Scotland 0.0894 0.0886 0.0909 0.0887 0.0880 0.0900 0.0900 0.0892 0.0920 
R_NorthIreland 0.0393 0.0404 0.0370 0.0397 0.0408 0.0378 0.0388 0.0400 0.0362 
Observations (‘000) 2,628 1,760 868 1,288 835 453 1,340 925 415 
Period covered: 2nd quarter of 2001 to 4th quarter of 2010 
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Table 2.5: Summary statistics of the sample in Hong Kong (mean values) 
 
  
 Pooled Male Female 
Full 
sample 
Younger 
sample   
Older 
sample   
Full 
sample 
Younger 
sample   
Older 
sample   
Full 
sample 
Younger 
sample   
Older 
sample   
Employed 0.6141 0.7477 0.3326 0.7289 0.8511 0.4766 0.5057 0.6513 0.1929 
Older 0.3218   0.3262   0.3176   
Mean Age 43.31 33.77 63.42 43.18 33.77 62.60 43.43 33.77 64.21 
Male 0.4856 0.4824 0.4923       
MS_Married  0.6247 0.5699 0.7404 0.6456 0.5448 0.8538 0.6050 0.5932 0.6305 
MS_Single 0.2852 0.3991 0.0451 0.3108 0.4361 0.0521 0.2610 0.3646 0.0383 
MS_Separ_Divor  0.0268 0.0247 0.0311 0.0205 0.0171 0.0276 0.0327 0.0319 0.0345 
MS_Widowed  0.0633 0.0063 0.1833 0.0230 0.0020 0.0665 0.1013 0.0104 0.2967 
Foreign 0.2893 0.3733 0.1122 0.2715 0.3496 0.1101 0.3061 0.3954 0.1142 
Qual_Degree  0.1016 0.1249 0.0524 0.1167 0.1371 0.0747 0.0873 0.1135 0.0309 
Qual_Postsec  0.0511 0.0640 0.0237 0.0540 0.0664 0.0283 0.0483 0.0619 0.0192 
Qual_Secondary  0.5204 0.6391 0.2703 0.5460 0.6475 0.3365 0.4963 0.6313 0.2061 
Qual_Primary  0.3252 0.1701 0.6523 0.2820 0.1478 0.5590 0.3661 0.1909 0.7427 
Exp 26.59 16.62 47.62 26.35 16.58 46.54 26.82 16.67 48.66 
UnearnedY_per1000 17.26 17.52 16.72 13.38 12.94 14.30 20.93 21.80 19.07 
Observations (‘000) 988 670 318 480 323 157 508 347 161 
Period covered: 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006 
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Table 2.6: Marginal effects from binomial logits  
for employment probabilities in the U.S. (younger vs older) 
 
 Pooled Male Female 
Regressors Younger Older Younger Older Younger Older 
Male 0.1226*** 0.1042***     
 (119.340) (54.082)     
MS_Single -0.0426*** -0.0889*** -0.1459*** -0.1867*** 0.0416*** 0.0047 
 (-28.884) (-25.205) (-75.065) (-36.589) (19.487) (0.937) 
MS_Separ_Divor -0.0132*** -0.0070*** -0.1233*** -0.1119*** 0.0540*** 0.0712*** 
 (-6.867) (-2.634) (-36.502) (-27.491) (22.081) (20.637) 
MS_Widowed -0.1569*** -0.0731*** -0.2320*** -0.1502*** -0.1190*** -0.0310*** 
 (-20.661) (-21.470) (-13.814) (-21.285) (-13.733) (-8.079) 
Foreign -0.0182*** 0.0302*** 0.0399*** 0.0733*** -0.0786*** -0.0123*** 
 (-11.355) (9.240) (23.275) (15.467) (-31.799) (-3.020) 
Ethn_Mixed -0.0351*** -0.0694*** -0.0420*** -0.0827*** -0.0264*** -0.0565*** 
 (-9.680) (-10.590) (-9.327) (-8.067) (-4.933) (-6.967) 
Ethn_Asian -0.0451*** -0.0126** -0.0723*** -0.0525*** -0.0113*** 0.0190*** 
 (-15.923) (-2.567) (-17.526) (-6.919) (-2.932) (3.001) 
Ethn_Black -0.0749*** -0.0659*** -0.1081*** -0.1077*** -0.0466*** -0.0447*** 
 (-41.105) (-22.763) (-42.229) (-23.407) (-18.282) (-12.570) 
Ethn_Other -0.1023*** -0.0727*** -0.1201*** -0.1053*** -0.0793*** -0.0471*** 
 (-24.694) (-10.060) (-21.105) (-9.210) (-13.583) (-5.228) 
Qual_Degree 0.2293*** 0.1008*** 0.1590*** 0.0356*** 0.3011*** 0.1546*** 
 (103.893) (17.769) (59.567) (4.479) (86.206) (19.017) 
Qual_Postsec 0.1688*** 0.1023*** 0.0954*** 0.0389*** 0.2427*** 0.1566*** 
 (65.271) (18.014) (29.125) (4.853) (59.743) (19.502) 
Qual_Secondary 0.0562*** 0.0829*** 0.0148*** 0.0426*** 0.1148*** 0.1224*** 
 (17.488) (15.254) (3.638) (5.513) (22.878) (16.633) 
Exp 0.0248*** -0.0091*** 0.0271*** -0.0327*** 0.0198*** 0.0098*** 
 (108.962) (-6.804) (100.739) (-16.518) (57.044) (5.761) 
ExpSq -0.0006*** -0.0003*** -0.0008*** -0.0001*** -0.0004*** -0.0005*** 
 (-81.723) (-22.036) (-87.992) (-3.896) (-34.530) (-26.426) 
UnearnedY_per1000 -0.0006*** -0.0000 -0.0002*** 0.0007*** -0.0006*** -0.0001*** 
 (-66.603) (-0.909) (-15.679) (17.059) (-49.115) (-4.604) 
R_Northeast -0.0005 0.0296*** -0.0171*** 0.0129*** 0.0140*** 0.0380*** 
 (-0.320) (11.034) (-9.014) (3.235) (6.453) (10.961) 
R_Midwest 0.0271*** 0.0463*** 0.0043** 0.0317*** 0.0487*** 0.0554*** 
 (19.512) (17.584) (2.483) (8.223) (23.929) (16.125) 
R_West -0.0035** 0.0023 -0.0091*** -0.0041 0.0034 0.0071** 
 (-2.518) (0.901) (-5.219) (-1.076) (1.629) (2.153) 
Yr_2010 -0.0466*** 0.0014 -0.0540*** -0.0140** -0.0397*** 0.0132*** 
 (-21.438) (0.377) (-19.066) (-2.516) (-12.661) (2.740) 
Yr_2009 -0.0317*** 0.0057 -0.0424*** -0.0037 -0.0222*** 0.0120** 
 (-14.807) (1.519) (-15.296) (-0.657) (-7.188) (2.484) 
Yr_2008 0.0075*** 0.0266*** 0.0097*** 0.0253*** 0.0019 0.0255*** 
 (3.700) (7.005) (4.006) (4.540) (0.612) (5.191) 
Yr_2007 0.0162*** 0.0239*** 0.0198*** 0.0230*** 0.0087*** 0.0227*** 
 (8.134) (6.247) (8.518) (4.089) (2.900) (4.599) 
Yr_2006 0.0109*** 0.0158*** 0.0193*** 0.0186*** -0.0004 0.0121** 
 (5.448) (4.108) (8.337) (3.273) (-0.120) (2.449) 
Yr_2005 0.0049** 0.0113*** 0.0100*** 0.0128** -0.0017 0.0092* 
 (2.444) (2.941) (4.207) (2.246) (-0.551) (1.872) 
Yr_2004 -0.0004 0.0064* 0.0036 0.0042 -0.0057* 0.0076 
 (-0.191) (1.648) (1.496) (0.728) (-1.902) (1.542) 
       
Pseudo R2 0.1229 0.2783 0.2052 0.2835 0.0793 0.2705 
Observations 780,935 427,097 374,677 198,180 406,258 228,917 
Control group: MS_Married, Ethn_White, Qual_Primary, R_South, Yr_2003   
z-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.7: Marginal effects from binomial logits  
for employment probabilities in the U.K. (younger vs older) 
 
 Pooled Male Female 
Regressors Younger Older Younger Older Younger Older 
Male 0.1166*** 0.0773***     
 (212.066) (68.456)     
MS_Single -0.0926*** -0.1314*** -0.0980*** -0.2043*** -0.0780*** -0.0279*** 
 (-116.890) (-55.003) (-104.227) (-66.649) (-60.800) (-7.332) 
MS_Separ_Divor -0.0697*** -0.0179*** -0.1021*** -0.1038*** -0.0505*** 0.0510*** 
 (-50.924) (-10.608) (-45.450) (-39.921) (-26.728) (22.465) 
MS_Widowed -0.1216*** -0.0553*** -0.1780*** -0.1270*** -0.1208*** -0.0189*** 
 (-23.479) (-21.346) (-15.378) (-26.244) (-18.522) (-5.932) 
Foreign -0.0274*** -0.0423*** -0.0236*** -0.0396*** -0.0386*** -0.0443*** 
 (-19.956) (-9.398) (-15.937) (-6.524) (-16.421) (-6.657) 
Ethn_Mixed -0.0735*** 0.0125 -0.0673*** -0.0339* -0.0823*** 0.0480*** 
 (-19.152) (1.054) (-14.485) (-1.948) (-13.760) (2.855) 
Ethn_Asian -0.1116*** -0.1733*** -0.0572*** -0.1421*** -0.1844*** -0.2182*** 
 (-67.573) (-42.640) (-30.899) (-25.314) (-68.254) (-37.451) 
Ethn_Black -0.0908*** -0.0061 -0.1156*** -0.0628*** -0.0727*** 0.0296*** 
 (-39.327) (-1.038) (-35.150) (-6.900) (-21.556) (3.740) 
Ethn_Other -0.1412*** -0.1225*** -0.1118*** -0.1361*** -0.1765*** -0.1163*** 
 (-44.244) (-15.068) (-28.515) (-11.499) (-35.430) (-10.297) 
Health_problems -0.3169*** -0.3549*** -0.3180*** -0.3562*** -0.3184*** -0.3493*** 
 (-269.782) (-297.803) (-185.701) (-219.213) (-196.375) (-198.824) 
Qual_Degree 0.1497*** 0.0478*** 0.0837*** -0.0292*** 0.2115*** 0.1317*** 
 (304.049) (27.018) (154.185) (-11.899) (254.107) (51.928) 
Qual_Postsec 0.1241*** 0.0692*** 0.0672*** 0.0155*** 0.1827*** 0.1162*** 
 (253.563) (39.793) (118.262) (5.785) (223.890) (49.275) 
Qual_Secondary 0.1123*** 0.0797*** 0.0666*** 0.0479*** 0.1580*** 0.1127*** 
 (183.237) (66.686) (102.770) (30.161) (152.646) (62.832) 
Exp 0.0087*** -0.0844*** 0.0071*** -0.1051*** 0.0115*** -0.0608*** 
 (67.719) (-80.303) (57.278) (-77.191) (49.924) (-37.256) 
ExpSq -0.0002*** 0.0008*** -0.0002*** 0.0010*** -0.0003*** 0.0005*** 
 (-57.765) (63.585) (-51.218) (63.486) (-47.339) (27.776) 
#KidsAged_0to4 -0.0922*** -0.0208*** -0.0042*** -0.0155** -0.1911*** -0.2374*** 
 (-194.361) (-3.009) (-6.821) (-2.191) (-230.897) (-10.653) 
#KidsAged_5to9 -0.0536*** -0.0314*** -0.0112*** -0.0174*** -0.1040*** -0.1627*** 
 (-114.204) (-7.760) (-18.963) (-3.959) (-133.740) (-18.004) 
#KidsAged_10to15 -0.0316*** -0.0084*** -0.0085*** 0.0159*** -0.0612*** -0.0624*** 
 (-75.325) (-4.378) (-17.262) (6.738) (-88.289) (-19.344) 
R_Wales -0.0166*** -0.0481*** -0.0218*** -0.0518*** -0.0110*** -0.0435*** 
 (-12.311) (-18.630) (-14.094) (-15.049) (-4.985) (-11.329) 
R_Scotland -0.0176*** -0.0177*** -0.0247*** -0.0289*** -0.0095*** -0.0057** 
 (-16.942) (-9.117) (-20.583) (-11.118) (-5.647) (-1.991) 
R_NorthIreland -0.0400*** -0.1053*** -0.0381*** -0.0868*** -0.0391*** -0.1271*** 
 (-25.637) (-33.209) (-20.936) (-20.658) (-15.576) (-26.913) 
Yr_2010 0.0098*** -0.0730*** 0.0021 -0.0285*** 0.0250*** -0.1314*** 
 (5.788) (-13.410) (1.168) (-4.060) (8.873) (-16.235) 
Yr_2009 0.0133*** -0.0798*** 0.0047*** -0.0308*** 0.0292*** -0.1417*** 
 (8.032) (-14.616) (2.659) (-4.373) (10.563) (-17.519) 
Yr_2008 0.0288*** -0.0643*** 0.0231*** -0.0097 0.0391*** -0.1317*** 
 (18.908) (-11.941) (15.539) (-1.429) (14.659) (-16.326) 
Yr_2007 0.0278*** 0.0975*** 0.0252*** 0.0840*** 0.0343*** 0.1109*** 
 (18.185) (23.170) (17.267) (15.346) (12.724) (17.162) 
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Yr_2006 0.0038*** 0.0548*** 0.0046*** 0.0457*** 0.0019 0.0628*** 
 (3.166) (22.336) (3.628) (14.758) (0.923) (16.269) 
Yr_2005 0.0137*** 0.0497*** 0.0098*** 0.0427*** 0.0169*** 0.0555*** 
 (11.782) (19.876) (8.101) (13.522) (8.500) (14.104) 
Yr_2004 0.0042*** 0.0427*** 0.0065*** 0.0391*** 0.0006 0.0453*** 
 (3.310) (16.052) (4.969) (11.720) (0.282) (10.796) 
Yr_2003 0.0020* 0.0332*** 0.0028** 0.0305*** 0.0002 0.0354*** 
 (1.664) (13.203) (2.261) (9.617) (0.115) (8.973) 
Yr_2002 0.0003 0.0160*** 0.0005 0.0135*** -0.0004 0.0188*** 
 (0.223) (6.239) (0.403) (4.153) (-0.192) (4.738) 
       
Pseudo R2 0.1922 0.1801 0.2056 0.1970 0.1949 0.1745 
Observations 1,759,989 867,863 835,276 452,620 924,713 415,243 
Control group: MS_Married, Ethn_White, Qual_Primary, R_England, Yr_2001 
z-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.8: Marginal effects from binomial logits  
for employment probabilities in Hong Kong (younger vs older) 
 
 Pooled Male Female 
Regressors Younger Older Younger Older Younger Older 
Male 0.1892*** 0.2672***     
 (181.850) (142.700)     
MS_Single 0.1027*** -0.0065* -0.0695*** -0.1643*** 0.2489*** 0.1222*** 
 (72.722) (-1.689) (-41.897) (-28.139) (117.714) (20.206) 
MS_Separ_Divor 0.0122*** -0.0109** -0.1223*** -0.1216*** 0.0881*** 0.0351*** 
 (3.971) (-2.535) (-18.409) (-14.821) (22.084) (8.619) 
MS_Widowed 0.0139** -0.0244*** -0.1377*** -0.1252*** 0.0905*** 0.0056** 
 (2.532) (-8.085) (-7.409) (-17.140) (13.753) (2.570) 
Foreign 0.0958*** 0.0110*** 0.0248*** 0.0119** 0.1418*** 0.0101*** 
 (71.799) (3.955) (15.440) (2.242) (65.098) (4.258) 
Qual_Degree 0.2038*** -0.0474*** 0.1014*** -0.1110*** 0.2654*** -0.0033 
 (209.145) (-14.205) (103.697) (-17.853) (136.823) (-0.923) 
Qual_Postsec 0.1764*** -0.0191*** 0.0829*** -0.0768*** 0.2434*** 0.0090** 
 (164.925) (-3.900) (81.919) (-8.387) (112.101) (1.961) 
Qual_Secondary 0.1072*** 0.0252*** 0.0566*** 0.0297*** 0.1243*** 0.0127*** 
 (70.150) (12.680) (31.312) (8.352) (53.482) (7.107) 
Exp 0.0357*** -0.0316*** 0.0258*** -0.0509*** 0.0357*** -0.0140*** 
 (154.759) (-25.667) (123.757) (-22.644) (89.094) (-12.810) 
ExpSq -0.0008*** 0.0000** -0.0006*** 0.0001*** -0.0009*** -0.0000 
 (-132.409) (2.304) (-109.393) (3.794) (-80.405) (-0.921) 
UnearnedY_per1000 -0.0008*** -0.0018*** -0.0009*** -0.0033*** -0.0002*** -0.0007*** 
 (-32.657) (-39.764) (-30.137) (-35.281) (-6.353) (-21.675) 
Yr_2006 0.0035** -0.0608*** -0.0694*** -0.1480*** 0.0680*** -0.0055*** 
 (2.017) (-26.105) (-28.101) (-33.128) (24.957) (-2.621) 
Yr_2001 0.0193*** -0.0536*** -0.0546*** -0.1144*** 0.0799*** -0.0106*** 
 (11.351) (-22.571) (-23.329) (-24.856) (29.733) (-4.996) 
Yr_1996 -0.0107*** -0.0270*** -0.0107*** -0.0372*** -0.0084*** -0.0174*** 
 (-6.714) (-10.956) (-6.138) (-7.808) (-3.291) (-8.255) 
       
Pseudo R2 0.1201 0.3154 0.1901 0.3002 0.0881 0.2263 
Observations 670,219 317,964 323,318 156,535 346,901 161,429 
Control group: MS_Married, Qual_Primary, Yr_1991 
z-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.9: Marginal effects from binomial logits  
for employment probabilities in the U.S. (with age dummies) 
 
Regressors Pooled Male Female 
    
Male 0.1310***   
 (127.924)   
MS_Single -0.0539*** -0.2009*** 0.0530*** 
 (-33.698) (-86.482) (23.861) 
MS_Separ_Divor -0.0119*** -0.1306*** 0.0672*** 
 (-7.088) (-47.826) (30.828) 
MS_Widowed -0.0778*** -0.1591*** -0.0504*** 
 (-24.327) (-23.546) (-13.279) 
Foreign -0.0052*** 0.0568*** -0.0637*** 
 (-3.216) (28.533) (-27.762) 
Ethn_Mixed -0.0507*** -0.0626*** -0.0392*** 
 (-13.964) (-12.555) (-7.748) 
Ethn_Asian -0.0429*** -0.0777*** -0.0067* 
 (-15.715) (-19.040) (-1.825) 
Ethn_Black -0.0816*** -0.1230*** -0.0539*** 
 (-47.885) (-48.879) (-23.401) 
Ethn_Other -0.1070*** -0.1374*** -0.0785*** 
 (-27.342) (-23.903) (-14.770) 
Qual_Degree 0.0666*** 0.0662*** 0.0750*** 
 (17.105) (13.836) (12.537) 
Qual_Postsec 0.0550*** 0.0217*** 0.0925*** 
 (15.994) (4.778) (17.853) 
Qual_Secondary 0.0468*** 0.0189*** 0.0869*** 
 (14.954) (4.554) (18.379) 
Exp -0.0294*** -0.0162*** -0.0417*** 
 (-44.558) (-19.370) (-42.871) 
ExpSq -0.0001*** -0.0002*** -0.0001*** 
 (-18.843) (-18.262) (-7.067) 
UnearnedY_per1000 -0.0005*** -0.0001*** -0.0005*** 
 (-49.168) (-4.240) (-39.372) 
R_Northeast 0.0090*** -0.0097*** 0.0227*** 
 (6.130) (-4.861) (11.063) 
R_Midwest 0.0386*** 0.0151*** 0.0588*** 
 (27.736) (8.102) (29.906) 
R_West -0.0006 -0.0067*** 0.0065*** 
 (-0.463) (-3.615) (3.348) 
Age_20to24 0.2781*** 0.2179*** 0.3150*** 
 (189.477) (139.883) (122.739) 
Age_25to29 0.3618*** 0.2744*** 0.4310*** 
 (247.296) (164.429) (181.969) 
Age_30to34 0.4060*** 0.3017*** 0.4912*** 
 (259.903) (153.156) (214.881) 
Age_35to39 0.4457*** 0.3277*** 0.5399*** 
 (266.901) (143.435) (236.321) 
Age_40to44 0.4832*** 0.3519*** 0.5835*** 
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 (263.146) (131.777) (242.274) 
Age_45to49 0.5028*** 0.3651*** 0.6041*** 
 (264.291) (127.769) (247.874) 
Age_50to54 0.4945*** 0.3587*** 0.5941*** 
 (278.597) (134.680) (259.670) 
Age_55to59 0.4732*** 0.3408*** 0.5718*** 
 (302.965) (147.229) (277.868) 
Age_60to64 0.4441*** 0.3162*** 0.5426*** 
 (338.155) (164.699) (301.277) 
Age_over64 0.5863*** 0.3913*** 0.7280*** 
 (179.425) (83.804) (183.089) 
Yr_2010 -0.0387*** -0.0513*** -0.0275*** 
 (-18.712) (-17.909) (-9.601) 
Yr_2009 -0.0252*** -0.0379*** -0.0146*** 
 (-12.224) (-13.349) (-5.113) 
Yr_2008 0.0122*** 0.0138*** 0.0084*** 
 (6.048) (5.192) (2.924) 
Yr_2007 0.0189*** 0.0224*** 0.0131*** 
 (9.418) (8.566) (4.601) 
Yr_2006 0.0125*** 0.0209*** 0.0029 
 (6.214) (7.970) (1.004) 
Yr_2005 0.0065*** 0.0111*** 0.0013 
 (3.224) (4.151) (0.457) 
Yr_2004 0.0009 0.0040 -0.0027 
 (0.443) (1.472) (-0.941) 
    
Observations 1,208,032 572,857 635,175 
Control group: MS_Married, Ethn_White, Qual_Primary, R_South, Age_14to19, Yr_2003   
z-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.10: Marginal effects from binomial logits  
for employment probabilities in the U.K. (with age dummies) 
 
Regressors Pooled Male Female 
    
Male 0.1122***   
 (213.265)   
MS_Single -0.1017*** -0.1368*** -0.0637*** 
 (-115.823) (-115.418) (-48.430) 
MS_Separ_Divor -0.0456*** -0.0944*** -0.0093*** 
 (-44.468) (-58.818) (-6.641) 
MS_Widowed -0.0412*** -0.0977*** -0.0297*** 
 (-21.462) (-27.062) (-11.680) 
Foreign -0.0623*** -0.0531*** -0.0758*** 
 (-40.796) (-27.284) (-31.881) 
Ethn_Mixed -0.0761*** -0.0842*** -0.0744*** 
 (-18.670) (-14.909) (-12.553) 
Ethn_Asian -0.1362*** -0.0834*** -0.1987*** 
 (-81.074) (-38.093) (-78.784) 
Ethn_Black -0.0902*** -0.1291*** -0.0644*** 
 (-38.529) (-35.745) (-19.862) 
Ethn_Other -0.1581*** -0.1458*** -0.1776*** 
 (-49.513) (-32.450) (-38.292) 
Qual_Degree 0.1349*** 0.0754*** 0.1938*** 
 (211.205) (91.318) (201.131) 
Qual_Postsec 0.1214*** 0.0659*** 0.1731*** 
 (200.959) (77.999) (193.446) 
Qual_Secondary 0.1032*** 0.0672*** 0.1449*** 
 (181.639) (98.617) (161.448) 
Exp -0.0142*** -0.0118*** -0.0164*** 
 (-64.473) (-44.428) (-45.891) 
ExpSq 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
 (56.864) (40.343) (38.992) 
Health -0.3368*** -0.3307*** -0.3295*** 
 (-399.750) (-277.564) (-276.424) 
Child4s_in_Hh -0.1067*** -0.0008 -0.2046*** 
 (-189.703) (-0.930) (-227.864) 
Child5to9s_in_Hh -0.0608*** -0.0100*** -0.1108*** 
 (-109.503) (-12.148) (-131.319) 
Child10to15s_in_Hh -0.0329*** -0.0029*** -0.0636*** 
 (-67.654) (-4.481) (-85.417) 
R_Wales -0.0277*** -0.0329*** -0.0217*** 
 (-21.629) (-20.519) (-11.025) 
R_Scotland -0.0171*** -0.0259*** -0.0070*** 
 (-17.751) (-21.580) (-4.722) 
R_NorthIreland -0.0593*** -0.0536*** -0.0634*** 
 (-39.087) (-27.980) (-27.355) 
Age_20to24 0.0854*** 0.0770*** 0.0922*** 
 (66.758) (67.853) (38.075) 
Age_25to29 0.1447*** 0.1181*** 0.1729*** 
196 
 (132.424) (123.805) (83.633) 
Age_30to34 0.1754*** 0.1376*** 0.2152*** 
 (153.317) (129.957) (102.010) 
Age_35to39 0.1979*** 0.1511*** 0.2416*** 
 (158.554) (120.808) (106.195) 
Age_40to44 0.2071*** 0.1567*** 0.2478*** 
 (154.009) (112.738) (99.245) 
Age_45to49 0.2035*** 0.1564*** 0.2379*** 
 (142.751) (109.052) (86.787) 
Age_50to54 0.1882*** 0.1482*** 0.2148*** 
 (111.142) (91.964) (64.154) 
Age_55to59 0.1481*** 0.1274*** 0.1543*** 
 (59.659) (57.906) (31.157) 
Age_60to64 0.0739*** 0.0696*** 0.1206*** 
 (18.533) (16.862) (20.842) 
Age_over64 -0.0150** 0.0379*** -0.0651*** 
 (-2.390) (6.972) (-5.866) 
Yr_2010 0.0166*** 0.0159*** 0.0097*** 
 (9.544) (7.707) (3.410) 
Yr_2009 0.0171*** 0.0172*** 0.0094*** 
 (9.885) (8.414) (3.329) 
Yr_2008 0.0322*** 0.0356*** 0.0202*** 
 (19.594) (19.264) (7.297) 
Yr_2007 0.0706*** 0.0601*** 0.0818*** 
 (49.647) (37.999) (34.506) 
Yr_2006 0.0190*** 0.0171*** 0.0187*** 
 (16.622) (12.921) (10.055) 
Yr_2005 0.0242*** 0.0200*** 0.0274*** 
 (21.340) (15.167) (14.926) 
Yr_2004 0.0158*** 0.0171*** 0.0128*** 
 (12.847) (12.174) (6.433) 
Yr_2003 0.0111*** 0.0116*** 0.0098*** 
 (9.625) (8.645) (5.308) 
Yr_2002 0.0048*** 0.0046*** 0.0049*** 
 (4.154) (3.378) (2.640) 
    
Observations 2,627,852 1,287,896 1,339,956 
Control group: MS_Married, Ethn_White, Qual_Primary, R_England, Age_16to19, 
Yr_2001 
z-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.11: Marginal effects from binomial logits  
for employment probabilities in Hong Kong (with age dummies) 
 
Regressors Pooled Male Female 
    
Male 0.2954***   
 (246.121)   
MS_Single 0.1085*** -0.1483*** 0.2893*** 
 (59.261) (-54.482) (114.329) 
MS_Separ_Divor 0.0094*** -0.1426*** 0.1003*** 
 (2.708) (-22.916) (22.731) 
MS_Widowed -0.0249*** -0.1145*** 0.0518*** 
 (-6.694) (-16.294) (11.220) 
Foreign 0.0966*** 0.0377*** 0.1269*** 
 (59.200) (18.119) (54.622) 
Qual_Degree 0.1856*** 0.1161*** 0.2084*** 
 (72.679) (48.542) (45.537) 
Qual_Postsec 0.1755*** 0.0961*** 0.2129*** 
 (67.371) (36.511) (47.073) 
Qual_Secondary 0.0980*** 0.0575*** 0.0985*** 
 (63.002) (30.348) (45.289) 
Exp 0.0044*** 0.0178*** -0.0006 
 (7.962) (28.382) (-0.813) 
ExpSq -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** 
 (-40.708) (-48.129) (-24.495) 
UnearnedY_per1000 -0.0013*** -0.0019*** -0.0006*** 
 (-44.488) (-49.290) (-15.338) 
Age_20to24 0.3161*** 0.1547*** 0.4026*** 
 (192.985) (88.683) (120.154) 
Age_25to29 0.3952*** 0.1985*** 0.5163*** 
 (243.587) (97.672) (162.112) 
Age_30to34 0.3939*** 0.1868*** 0.5116*** 
 (168.434) (57.882) (113.234) 
Age_35to39 0.3967*** 0.1600*** 0.5205*** 
 (137.347) (31.965) (97.768) 
Age_40to44 0.4105*** 0.1451*** 0.5481*** 
 (137.884) (22.378) (107.336) 
Age_45to49 0.4104*** 0.1187*** 0.5600*** 
 (146.758) (14.322) (125.287) 
Age_50to54 0.3981*** 0.0918*** 0.5521*** 
 (145.422) (8.939) (129.352) 
Age_55to59 0.3743*** 0.0218 0.5283*** 
 (115.523) (1.469) (104.177) 
Age_60to64 0.3461*** -0.0874*** 0.5058*** 
 (81.030) (-4.169) (79.738) 
Age_over64 0.3272*** -0.2163*** 0.5182*** 
 (38.614) (-8.452) (43.597) 
Yr_2006 -0.0323*** -0.1199*** 0.0503*** 
 (-16.005) (-43.932) (17.889) 
Yr_2001 -0.0136*** -0.0952*** 0.0578*** 
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 (-6.715) (-35.204) (20.342) 
Yr_1996 -0.0248*** -0.0248*** -0.0192*** 
 (-13.047) (-10.550) (-7.415) 
    
Observations 988,183 479,853 508,330 
Control group: MS_Married, Qual_Primary, Age_16to19, Yr_1991 
z-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.12: Non-linear decompositions of older/younger differences  
in employment probabilities in the U.S. 
 
Overall Results 
 Pooled Male Female 
Older – Younger 
=Difference 
0.4795*** – 0.7177*** 
= -0.2382*** 
0.5442*** – 0.7715*** 
= -0.2273*** 
0.4234*** – 0.6681*** 
= -0.2446*** 
Total explained -0.2433*** -0.3584*** -0.1089*** 
Total unexplained 0.0050 0.1311*** -0.1357*** 
Detailed Results 
Regressors Explained Unexplained Explained Unexplained Explained Unexplained 
Male -
0.0018*** 
-0.0063**     
 (-16.383) (-2.095)     
MS_Single 0.0119*** -0.0005** 0.0430*** 0.0014*** -
0.0117*** 
-0.0017*** 
 (28.039) (-2.016) (67.811) (8.611) (-19.546) (-7.366) 
MS_Separ_Divor -
0.0006*** 
0.0004* -
0.0050*** 
0.0035*** 0.0026*** 0.0011** 
 (-6.912) (1.702) (-33.655) (11.602) (19.294) (2.221) 
MS_Widowed -
0.0172*** 
0.0035** -
0.0089*** 
0.0034*** -
0.0230*** 
0.0131*** 
 (-23.345) (2.079) (-16.977) (7.814) (-14.726) (9.523) 
Foreign 0.0006*** 0.0016** -
0.0018*** 
-0.0001 0.0019*** 0.0061*** 
 (11.291) (2.071) (-19.521) (-0.187) (21.265) (14.057) 
Ethn_Mixed 0.0001*** -0.0001* 0.0002*** -0.0001 0.0001*** -0.0004*** 
 (8.693) (-1.770) (7.920) (-1.151) (4.618) (-3.000) 
Ethn_Asian 0.0000 0.0005** 0.0001*** 0.0010*** -0.0000 0.0010*** 
 (1.517) (2.026) (2.868) (6.333) (-0.468) (4.141) 
Ethn_Black -
0.0004*** 
0.0007** -
0.0003*** 
0.0023*** -
0.0004*** 
0.0002 
 (-10.715) (2.003) (-4.362) (9.679) (-8.899) (0.582) 
Ethn_Other 0.0004*** 0.0002* 0.0005*** 0.0004*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 
 (16.158) (1.948) (13.075) (5.066) (9.744) (2.822) 
Qual_Degree 0.0037*** -0.0163** 0.0126*** -0.0374*** -
0.0117*** 
-0.0378*** 
 (16.727) (-2.109) (33.679) (-28.324) (-25.748) (-23.218) 
Qual_Postsec -
0.0056*** 
-0.0083** -
0.0017*** 
-0.0136*** -
0.0125*** 
-0.0240*** 
 (-31.344) (-2.103) (-12.683) (-13.799) (-30.315) (-14.389) 
Qual_Secondary -
0.0002*** 
0.0010 -
0.0009*** 
0.0028 0.0062*** -0.0006 
 (-3.767) (1.076) (-3.627) (1.555) (19.453) (-0.189) 
Exp 0.6562*** -0.4177** 0.7012*** -1.3172*** 0.5837*** -0.3419*** 
 (195.656) (-2.078) (193.134) (-42.893) (90.588) (-6.385) 
ExpSq -
0.8960*** 
0.1987** -
1.0980*** 
0.9014*** -
0.6518*** 
-0.1540*** 
 (-142.560) (2.018) (-185.363) (54.197) (-48.175) (-4.724) 
UnearnedY_per1000 0.0065*** 0.0059** 0.0018*** 0.0109*** 0.0084*** 0.0148*** 
 (53.801) (2.105) (15.195) (21.846) (39.104) (20.517) 
R_Northeast -0.0000 0.0015** -
0.0002*** 
0.0034*** 0.0002*** 0.0033*** 
 (-0.320) (2.051) (-6.555) (8.276) (5.527) (5.437) 
R_Midwest -
0.0003*** 
0.0005* -0.0000** 0.0021*** -
0.0006*** 
0.0002 
 (-11.028) (1.735) (-2.378) (4.874) (-9.315) (0.313) 
R_West 0.0000** 0.0004 0.0001*** 0.0012** -0.0001 0.0006 
 (2.499) (1.515) (4.744) (2.418) (-1.616) (0.892) 
Yr_2010 -
0.0005*** 
0.0019** -
0.0005*** 
0.0038*** -
0.0004*** 
0.0050*** 
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 (-13.728) (2.075) (-10.316) (10.512) (-9.086) (9.432) 
Yr_2009 -
0.0003*** 
0.0014** -
0.0004*** 
0.0034*** -
0.0002*** 
0.0032*** 
 (-10.752) (2.057) (-8.931) (9.401) (-6.042) (6.116) 
Yr_2008 0.0000*** 0.0005* 0.0001*** 0.0004 0.0000 0.0021*** 
 (3.485) (1.813) (3.525) (1.121) (0.610) (4.003) 
Yr_2007 0.0000*** 0.0001 0.0001*** -0.0006* 0.0000* 0.0011** 
 (3.397) (0.468) (2.908) (-1.852) (1.767) (2.259) 
Yr_2006 -
0.0000*** 
0.0000 -
0.0001*** 
-0.0008** 0.0000 0.0011** 
 (-3.283) (0.283) (-3.067) (-2.331) (0.120) (2.121) 
Yr_2005 -0.0000** 0.0001 -
0.0000*** 
-0.0002 0.0000 0.0009* 
 (-2.319) (0.926) (-3.292) (-0.731) (0.548) (1.874) 
Yr_2004 0.0000 0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000* 0.0011** 
 (0.191) (1.204) (-1.469) (-0.319) (1.876) (2.335) 
Constant  0.2354**  0.5598***  0.3693*** 
  (2.099)  (33.827)  (13.442) 
Observations 1,208,032 572,857 635,175 
Control group: MS_Married, Ethn_White, Qual_Primary, R_South, Yr_2003   
z-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.13: Non-linear decompositions of older/younger differences  
in employment probabilities in the U.K. 
 
Overall Results 
 Pooled Male Female 
Older – Younger 
=Difference 
0.6606*** – 0.8011*** 
= -0.1405*** 
0.6917*** – 0.8691*** 
= -0.1773*** 
0.6266*** – 0.7397*** 
= -0.1131*** 
Total explained -0.0753*** -0.1576*** -0.0876*** 
Total unexplained -0.0652*** -0.0197*** -0.0255*** 
Detailed Results 
Regressors Explained Unexplained Explained Unexplained Explained Unexplained 
Male 0.0078*** -0.0393***     
 (63.813) (-74.401)     
MS_Single 0.0403*** 0.0011*** 0.0583*** 0.0015*** 0.0253*** 0.0025*** 
 (110.569) (10.231) (115.327) (8.406) (63.054) (15.689) 
MS_Separ_Divor -
0.0046*** 
0.0067*** -
0.0069*** 
0.0037*** -
0.0031*** 
0.0105*** 
 (-50.816) (33.632) (-51.050) (9.209) (-27.183) (22.620) 
MS_Widowed -
0.0062*** 
0.0034*** -
0.0051*** 
0.0017*** -
0.0076*** 
0.0056*** 
 (-27.859) (17.454) (-21.913) (7.917) (-20.757) (14.650) 
Foreign -
0.0021*** 
0.0009 -
0.0014*** 
0.0032** -
0.0033*** 
0.0022 
 (-19.636) (0.567) (-14.699) (2.420) (-16.303) (0.951) 
Ethn_Mixed 0.0005*** 0.0002*** 0.0005*** 0.0001*** 0.0004*** 0.0002*** 
 (20.858) (8.717) (16.883) (4.681) (14.457) (7.236) 
Ethn_Asian 0.0033*** -0.0001 0.0021*** -0.0001** 0.0045*** 0.0000 
 (62.777) (-1.614) (33.571) (-2.258) (56.443) (0.172) 
Ethn_Black 0.0014*** 0.0007*** 0.0018*** 0.0004*** 0.0010*** 0.0008*** 
 (40.195) (18.158) (37.752) (8.441) (21.945) (11.792) 
Ethn_Other 0.0012*** 0.0003*** 0.0012*** 0.0002*** 0.0013*** 0.0003*** 
 (41.825) (8.587) (30.369) (5.362) (30.615) (7.157) 
Health_problems -
0.0517*** 
0.0059*** -
0.0584*** 
0.0118*** -
0.0420*** 
0.0005 
 (-159.902) (19.657) (-180.865) (10.169) (-147.276) (1.167) 
Qual_Degree -
0.0177*** 
-0.0267*** -
0.0083*** 
-0.0215*** -
0.0265*** 
-0.0172*** 
 (-100.200) (-94.737) (-49.944) (-10.264) (-109.512) (-27.627) 
Qual_Postsec 0.0035*** -0.0157*** 0.0012*** -0.0084*** 0.0066*** -0.0177*** 
 (32.427) (-75.427) (12.031) (-10.140) (36.363) (-27.653) 
Qual_Secondary -
0.0158*** 
-0.0251*** -
0.0072*** 
-0.0197*** -
0.0252*** 
-0.0195*** 
 (-103.153) (-62.386) (-54.099) (-10.172) (-108.147) (-24.941) 
Exp 0.2826*** -2.5444*** 0.3106*** -2.0620*** 0.2830*** -1.8946*** 
 (83.207) (-78.277) (55.946) (-10.449) (50.338) (-26.273) 
ExpSq -
0.3871*** 
1.2085*** -
0.4564*** 
1.0232*** -
0.4235*** 
0.9675*** 
 (-73.621) (81.631) (-50.290) (10.866) (-48.194) (29.928) 
#KidsAged_0to4 0.0355*** 0.0005*** 0.0019*** -0.0000 0.0619*** 0.0000 
 (165.533) (18.126) (6.806) (-0.722) (229.909) (0.846) 
#KidsAged_5to9 0.0202*** 0.0007*** 0.0048*** 0.0001** 0.0346*** -0.0001** 
 (107.787) (13.902) (18.870) (2.124) (132.922) (-2.520) 
#KidsAged_10to15 0.0119*** 0.0023*** 0.0033*** 0.0015*** 0.0218*** 0.0007*** 
 (69.606) (21.254) (17.230) (8.031) (86.330) (5.798) 
R_Wales -
0.0001*** 
-0.0006*** -
0.0001*** 
-0.0000 -
0.0001*** 
-0.0009*** 
 (-9.587) (-6.205) (-8.376) (-0.135) (-4.582) (-5.894) 
R_Scotland -
0.0001*** 
0.0006*** -
0.0001*** 
0.0010*** -
0.0000*** 
0.0004* 
 (-5.748) (4.351) (-3.614) (6.205) (-3.843) (1.893) 
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R_NorthIreland 0.0002*** -0.0009*** 0.0002*** -0.0000 0.0002*** -0.0016*** 
 (12.069) (-10.461) (8.025) (-0.021) (9.003) (-12.189) 
Yr_2010 0.0004*** -0.0066*** 0.0001 -0.0015*** 0.0011*** -0.0129*** 
 (5.645) (-14.799) (1.157) (-3.825) (8.483) (-15.985) 
Yr_2009 0.0006*** -0.0078*** 0.0002*** -0.0020*** 0.0013*** -0.0147*** 
 (7.747) (-16.945) (2.597) (-4.660) (10.001) (-17.101) 
Yr_2008 0.0011*** -0.0090*** 0.0007*** -0.0034*** 0.0016*** -0.0153*** 
 (16.872) (-19.376) (12.122) (-6.853) (13.446) (-17.487) 
Yr_2007 -
0.0004*** 
0.0035*** -
0.0002*** 
0.0010*** -
0.0005*** 
0.0040*** 
 (-13.405) (9.704) (-5.652) (2.747) (-10.936) (7.908) 
Yr_2006 -
0.0000*** 
0.0031*** -
0.0000*** 
0.0015*** -0.0000 0.0035*** 
 (-3.110) (14.924) (-3.250) (6.194) (-0.920) (11.438) 
Yr_2005 -
0.0002*** 
0.0016*** -
0.0001*** 
0.0008*** -
0.0003*** 
0.0018*** 
 (-10.428) (8.264) (-6.440) (3.835) (-7.897) (6.553) 
Yr_2004 -
0.0001*** 
0.0017*** -
0.0001*** 
0.0008*** -0.0000 0.0019*** 
 (-3.253) (10.308) (-4.427) (4.395) (-0.281) (8.224) 
Yr_2003 -0.0000* 0.0019*** -0.0001** 0.0011*** -0.0000 0.0021*** 
 (-1.655) (9.256) (-2.216) (4.711) (-0.115) (7.057) 
Yr_2002 -0.0000 0.0010*** -0.0000 0.0005*** 0.0000 0.0012*** 
 (-0.223) (4.796) (-0.403) (2.646) (0.192) (3.985) 
Constant  1.3666***  1.0450***  0.9632*** 
  (75.708)  (10.270)  (24.657) 
Observations 2,627,852 1,287,896 1,339,956 
Control group: MS_Married, Ethn_White, Qual_Primary, R_England, Yr_2001 
z-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.14: Non-linear decompositions of older/younger differences  
in employment probability in Hong Kong 
 
Overall Results 
 Pooled Male Female 
Older – Younger 
=Difference 
0.3326*** – 0.7477*** 
= -0.4151*** 
0.4766*** – 0.8511*** 
= -0.3745*** 
0.1929*** – 0.6513*** 
= -0.4584*** 
Total explained -0.5111*** -0.5535*** -0.5074*** 
Total unexplained 0.0960*** 0.1790*** 0.0490*** 
Detailed Results 
Regressors Explained Unexplained Explained Unexplained Explained Unexplained 
Male 0.0014*** 0.0119***     
 (9.173) (29.012)     
MS_Single -
0.0284*** 
-0.0019*** 0.0304*** 0.0000 -
0.0512*** 
-0.0005*** 
 (-69.452) (-27.194) (42.675) (0.349) (-87.190) (-8.687) 
MS_Separ_Divor 0.0001*** -0.0003*** -
0.0011*** 
0.0008*** 0.0001*** -0.0002*** 
 (3.800) (-4.327) (-16.388) (7.841) (4.698) (-2.983) 
MS_Widowed 0.0019** -0.0026*** -
0.0072*** 
0.0022*** 0.0165*** -0.0050*** 
 (2.465) (-5.770) (-10.036) (4.613) (12.131) (-9.064) 
Foreign -
0.0197*** 
-0.0038*** -
0.0073*** 
-0.0017*** -
0.0240*** 
-0.0027*** 
 (-61.748) (-28.994) (-14.783) (-8.096) (-51.754) (-20.871) 
Qual_Degree -
0.0169*** 
-0.0071*** -
0.0119*** 
-0.0112*** -
0.0172*** 
-0.0022*** 
 (-80.617) (-63.464) (-45.455) (-49.586) (-59.572) (-31.541) 
Qual_Postsec -
0.0083*** 
-0.0026*** -
0.0061*** 
-0.0034*** -
0.0083*** 
-0.0012*** 
 (-64.238) (-42.543) (-36.864) (-31.191) (-47.539) (-24.423) 
Qual_Secondary -
0.0285*** 
-0.0080*** -
0.0195*** 
-0.0103*** -
0.0302*** 
-0.0038*** 
 (-65.253) (-33.139) (-31.826) (-20.097) (-46.660) (-20.468) 
Exp 0.8345*** -1.1823*** 0.9228*** -1.5335*** 0.6671*** -0.6286*** 
 (288.027) (-61.591) (232.576) (-56.549) (167.013) (-30.532) 
ExpSq -
1.2480*** 
0.7624*** -
1.4479*** 
1.1236*** -
1.0620*** 
0.4019*** 
 (-319.449) (71.617) (-270.973) (75.734) (-201.712) (33.565) 
UnearnedY_per1000 0.0005*** -0.0059*** -
0.0014*** 
-0.0039*** 0.0004*** -0.0052*** 
 (15.568) (-18.628) (-19.104) (-8.262) (6.258) (-16.050) 
Yr_2006 0.0001** -0.0077*** -
0.0043*** 
0.0011* 0.0016*** -0.0051*** 
 (2.010) (-21.137) (-24.954) (1.811) (18.315) (-14.371) 
Yr_2001 0.0000 -0.0074*** -
0.0003*** 
0.0012** -
0.0002*** 
-0.0056*** 
 (0.681) (-23.616) (-4.260) (2.300) (-3.159) (-17.704) 
Yr_1996 0.0002*** -0.0013*** 0.0004*** -0.0006 0.0001*** -0.0013*** 
 (6.594) (-5.383) (6.038) (-1.396) (3.253) (-5.583) 
Constant  0.5527***  0.6149***  0.3084*** 
  (57.494)  (43.512)  (30.681) 
Observations 988,183 479,853 508,330 
Control group: MS_Married, Qual_Primary, Yr_1991 
z-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix for Chapter 4 
Table 4.5: Summary statistics for unemployed job-seekers  
in pooled sample (mean values) 
 Pooled 
Full 
sample 
Younger 
sample 
Older 
sample 
Want FTE 0.6600 0.6717 0.6108 
Want PTE 0.1965 0.1941 0.2067 
Want SE 0.0247 0.0221 0.0360 
No preference 0.1188 0.1122 0.1465 
Mean Age 36.03 31.30 55.82 
Age_16to19 0.1011 0.1252  
Age_20to24 0.1578 0.1955  
Age_25to29 0.1205 0.1492  
Age_30to34 0.1133 0.1403  
Age_35to39 0.1122 0.1390  
Age_40to44 0.1090 0.1350  
Age_45to49 0.0934 0.1157  
Age_50to54 0.0825  0.4276 
Age_55to59 0.0734  0.3809 
Age_60to64 0.0328  0.1703 
Age_over64 0.0041  0.0212 
Male  0.5853 0.5636 0.6761 
MS_Married  0.3369 0.2795 0.5774 
MS_Single  0.5488 0.6398 0.1679 
MS_Separ_Divor  0.1023 0.0757 0.2137 
MS_Widowed  0.0120 0.0051 0.0410 
Foreign  0.5680 0.5659 0.5768 
Ethn_White  0.8531 0.8404 0.9062 
Ethn_Black  0.0454 0.0498 0.0268 
Ethn_Asian  0.0658 0.0705 0.0464 
Ethn_Mixed  0.0128 0.0147 0.0050 
Ethn_Other  0.0214 0.0230 0.0146 
Health_problems 0.1880 0.1613 0.2996 
#KidsAged_0to4 0.1878 0.2300 0.0115 
#KidsAged_5to9 0.2076 0.2504 0.0284 
#KidsAged_10to15 0.2744 0.3148 0.1050 
R_England 0.8191 0.8169 0.8281 
R_Wales 0.0474 0.0477 0.0461 
R_Scotland 0.0953 0.0958 0.0932 
R_NorthIreland 0.0382 0.0396 0.0326 
Qual_Degree  0.1160 0.1127 0.1297 
Qual_Postsec  0.0542 0.0494 0.0743 
Qual_Secondary  0.4484 0.4606 0.3974 
Qual_Primary  0.3758 0.3717 0.3931 
DurUnemp_Less1 0.7066 0.7271 0.6208 
DurUnemp_1to3 0.2066 0.2000 0.2342 
DurUnemp_3to5 0.0399 0.0361 0.0562 
DurUnemp_5plus 0.0454 0.0353 0.0880 
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LInd_Manuf 0.1355 0.1243 0.1825 
LInd_Agri_Fish 0.0081 0.0083 0.0075 
LInd_Energy_Water 0.0089 0.0075 0.0149 
LInd_Constr 0.0835 0.0809 0.0944 
LInd_Dis_Hotel_Restau 0.2087 0.2228 0.1494 
LInd_Trans_Comm 0.0636 0.0606 0.0762 
LInd_Bank_Fin_Ins 0.1185 0.1166 0.1266 
LInd_Pub_Edu_Health 0.1236 0.1151 0.1593 
LInd_Others 0.0461 0.0471 0.0422 
Benefit 0.6886 0.7030 0.6284 
Observations 111,275 89,820 21,455 
Note: Sample period: 2001q2 to 2012q1 
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Table 4.6: Summary statistics for unemployed job-seekers  
in males and females sub-samples (mean values) 
 Male Female 
Full 
sample 
Younger 
sample 
Older 
sample 
Full 
sample 
Younger 
sample 
Older 
sample 
Want FTE 0.7561 0.7802 0.6720 0.5243 0.5316 0.4831 
Want PTE 0.0619 0.0482 0.1095 0.3865 0.3825 0.4096 
Want SE 0.0301 0.0263 0.0434 0.0172 0.0166 0.0206 
No preference 0.1519 0.1453 0.1751 0.0720 0.0693 0.0868 
Mean Age 36.46 30.77 56.35 35.41 31.99 54.71 
Age_16to19 0.1086 0.1397  0.0905 0.1065  
Age_20to24 0.1651 0.2124  0.1475 0.1736  
Age_25to29 0.1150 0.1479  0.1282 0.1509  
Age_30to34 0.1017 0.1308  0.1297 0.1526  
Age_35to39 0.0987 0.1270  0.1313 0.1546  
Age_40to44 0.0990 0.1274  0.1230 0.1448  
Age_45to49 0.0892 0.1147  0.0993 0.1169  
Age_50to54 0.0845  0.3794 0.0796  0.5284 
Age_55to59 0.0831  0.3733 0.0598  0.3969 
Age_60to64 0.0502  0.2255 0.0083  0.0550 
Age_over64 0.0049  0.0219 0.0030  0.0197 
Male        
MS_Married  0.3119 0.2346 0.5815 0.3723 0.3374 0.5689 
MS_Single  0.5896 0.7039 0.1907 0.4912 0.5569 0.1202 
MS_Separ_Divor  0.0908 0.0594 0.2005 0.1185 0.0967 0.2415 
MS_Widowed  0.0077 0.0021 0.0273 0.0181 0.0089 0.0695 
Foreign  0.5616 0.5582 0.5733 0.5771 0.5758 0.5841 
Ethn_White  0.8598 0.8457 0.9089 0.8436 0.8335 0.9007 
Ethn_Black  0.0417 0.0467 0.0243 0.0506 0.0538 0.0322 
Ethn_Asian  0.0643 0.0693 0.0467 0.0681 0.0720 0.0456 
Ethn_Mixed  0.0119 0.0140 0.0045 0.0141 0.0155 0.0062 
Ethn_Other  0.0206 0.0224 0.0144 0.0225 0.0239 0.0150 
Health_problems 0.1852 0.1547 0.2914 0.1920 0.1699 0.3167 
#KidsAged_0to4 0.1582 0.1989 0.0162 0.2297 0.2702 0.0017 
#KidsAged_5to9 0.1547 0.1892 0.0342 0.2823 0.3294 0.0163 
#KidsAged_10to15 0.2250 0.2574 0.1117 0.3441 0.3890 0.0909 
R_England 0.8110 0.8078 0.8219 0.8306 0.8287 0.8408 
R_Wales 0.0483 0.0491 0.0456 0.0461 0.0459 0.0471 
R_Scotland 0.0965 0.0971 0.0947 0.0935 0.0941 0.0901 
R_NorthIreland 0.0442 0.0460 0.0377 0.0299 0.0313 0.0220 
Qual_Degree  0.1093 0.1032 0.1306 0.1254 0.1250 0.1276 
Qual_Postsec  0.0499 0.0446 0.0687 0.0602 0.0556 0.0862 
Qual_Secondary  0.4405 0.4457 0.4223 0.4597 0.4799 0.3454 
Qual_Primary  0.3944 0.4008 0.3723 0.3496 0.3342 0.4365 
DurUnemp_Less1 0.6624 0.6846 0.5851 0.7691 0.7821 0.6954 
DurUnemp_1to3 0.2274 0.2227 0.2439 0.1772 0.1707 0.2140 
DurUnemp_3to5 0.0485 0.0442 0.0636 0.0278 0.0255 0.0407 
DurUnemp_5plus 0.0598 0.0465 0.1065 0.0251 0.0208 0.0495 
LInd_Manuf 0.1751 0.1625 0.2192 0.0796 0.0750 0.1059 
LInd_Agri_Fish 0.0113 0.0119 0.0090 0.0037 0.0035 0.0043 
LInd_Energy_Water 0.0122 0.0101 0.0196 0.0043 0.0041 0.0050 
LInd_Constr 0.1335 0.1340 0.1315 0.0129 0.0122 0.0168 
LInd_Dis_Hotel_Restau 0.1840 0.1987 0.1325 0.2436 0.2540 0.1848 
LInd_Trans_Comm 0.0815 0.0781 0.0931 0.0384 0.0380 0.0409 
LInd_Bank_Fin_Ins 0.1158 0.1136 0.1232 0.1224 0.1204 0.1338 
LInd_Pub_Edu_Health 0.0675 0.0580 0.1005 0.2029 0.1889 0.2821 
LInd_Others 0.0394 0.0395 0.0392 0.0558 0.0571 0.0484 
Benefit 0.6532 0.6577 0.6376 0.7386 0.7615 0.6093 
Observations 65,130 50,624 14,506 46,145 39,196 6,949 
Note: Sample period: 2001q2 to 2012q1 
207 
Table 4.7: Summary statistics for economically-active including employed  
and ILO unemployed in pooled sample (mean values) 
 
  
 Pooled 
Full 
sample 
Younger 
sample 
Older 
sample 
UE 0.0475 0.0537 0.0320 
FTE 0.6264 0.6599 0.5430 
PTE 0.1967 0.1791 0.2406 
SE 0.1293 0.1073 0.1844 
Mean Age 41.54 35.47 56.68 
Age_16to19 0.0230 0.0323  
Age_20to24 0.0729 0.1021  
Age_25to29 0.0992 0.1390  
Age_30to34 0.1168 0.1636  
Age_35to39 0.1341 0.1879  
Age_40to44 0.1395 0.1955  
Age_45to49 0.1282 0.1996  
Age_50to54 0.1148  0.4010 
Age_55to59 0.0960  0.3353 
Age_60to64 0.0541  0.1890 
Age_over64 0.0214  0.0747 
Male  0.5273 0.5175 0.5516 
MS_Married  0.5976 0.5298 0.7663 
MS_Single  0.3027 0.3969 0.0679 
MS_Separ_Divor 0.0856 0.0691 0.1266 
MS_Widowed  0.0142 0.0041 0.0392 
Foreign  0.4740 0.4700 0.4841 
Ethn_White  0.9273 0.9144 0.9596 
Ethn_Black  0.0179 0.0210 0.0101 
Ethn_Asian  0.0379 0.0445 0.0214 
Ethn_Mixed  0.0056 0.0070 0.0023 
Ethn_Other  0.0102 0.0119 0.0058 
Health_problems 0.1202 0.0923 0.1896 
#KidsAged_0to4 0.1766 0.2447 0.0068 
#KidsAged_5to9 0.1920 0.2606 0.0210 
#KidsAged_10to15 0.2630 0.3299 0.0965 
R_England 0.8279 0.8261 0.8323 
R_Wales 0.0460 0.0458 0.0467 
R_Scotland 0.0893 0.0894 0.0889 
R_NorthIreland 0.0368 0.0387 0.0321 
Qual_Degree  0.2163 0.2336 0.1731 
Qual_Postsec  0.1002 0.0963 0.1099 
Qual_Secondary 0.4514 0.4737 0.3960 
Qual_Primary  0.2249 0.1892 0.3140 
Benefit 0.3080 0.3387 0.2314 
Observations (‘000) 2,342 1,671 670 
Note: Sample period: 2001q2 to 2012q1 
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Table 4.8: Summary statistics for economically-active including employed  
and ILO unemployed in males and females sub-samples (mean values) 
 Male Female 
Full 
sample 
Younger 
sample 
Older 
sample 
Full 
sample 
Younger 
sample 
Older 
sample 
UE 0.0528 0.0585 0.0392 0.0417 0.0486 0.0231 
FTE 0.7194 0.7603 0.6236 0.5227 0.5521 0.4438 
PTE 0.0533 0.0371 0.0911 0.3568 0.3315 0.4246 
SE 0.1746 0.1441 0.2461 0.0788 0.0678 0.1085 
Mean Age 41.87 35.36 57.08 41.18 35.58 56.19 
Age_16to19 0.0250 0.0358  0.0208 0.0285  
Age_20to24 0.0731 0.1044  0.0726 0.0996  
Age_25to29 0.0953 0.1361  0.1035 0.1421  
Age_30to34 0.1147 0.1638  0.1191 0.1635  
Age_35to39 0.1324 0.1890  0.1360 0.1867  
Age_40to44 0.1352 0.1930  0.1443 0.1981  
Age_45to49 0.1246 0.1779  0.1322 0.1815  
Age_50to54 0.1123  0.3749 0.1176  0.4331 
Age_55to59 0.0977  0.3261 0.0941  0.3465 
Age_60to64 0.0642  0.2143 0.0429  0.1578 
Age_over64 0.0254  0.0847 0.0170  0.0625 
Male        
MS_Married  0.6074 0.5240 0.8024 0.5866 0.5361 0.7220 
MS_Single  0.3167 0.4200 0.0752 0.2870 0.3721 0.0590 
MS_Separ_Divor 0.0681 0.0539 0.1013 0.1051 0.0854 0.1577 
MS_Widowed  0.0078 0.0020 0.0212 0.0213 0.0063 0.0614 
Foreign  0.4702 0.4671 0.4775 0.4783 0.4731 0.4922 
Ethn_White  0.9245 0.9102 0.9580 0.9304 0.9188 0.9616 
Ethn_Black  0.0162 0.0194 0.0086 0.0197 0.0226 0.0120 
Ethn_Asian  0.0422 0.0498 0.0247 0.0331 0.0389 0.0174 
Ethn_Mixed  0.0052 0.0065 0.0021 0.0062 0.0074 0.0027 
Ethn_Other  0.0107 0.0127 0.0059 0.0096 0.0111 0.0056 
Health_problems 0.1156 0.0830 0.1916 0.1253 0.1023 0.1871 
#KidsAged_0to4 0.1894 0.2654 0.0117 0.1623 0.2226 0.0008 
#KidsAged_5to9 0.1906 0.2581 0.0328 0.1936 0.2634 0.0065 
#KidsAged_10to15 0.2488 0.3028 0.1225 0.2789 0.3589 0.0645 
R_England 0.8296 0.8283 0.8328 0.8259 0.8237 0.8318 
R_Wales 0.0454 0.0451 0.0459 0.0468 0.0465 0.0476 
R_Scotland 0.0872 0.0874 0.0869 0.0915 0.0916 0.0913 
R_NorthIreland 0.0378 0.0392 0.0344 0.0358 0.0382 0.0292 
Qual_Degree  0.2145 0.2244 0.1916 0.2182 0.2435 0.1505 
Qual_Postsec  0.0857 0.0835 0.0907 0.1164 0.1101 0.1335 
Qual_Secondary 0.4624 0.4761 0.4304 0.4392 0.4711 0.3536 
Qual_Primary  0.2301 0.2088 0.2802 0.2191 0.1682 0.3556 
Benefit 0.1623 0.1638 0.1587 0.4705 0.5264 0.3208 
Observations (‘000) 1,234 865 370 1,106 806 301 
Note: Sample period: 2001q2 to 2012q1 
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Table 4.9: Summary statistics for part-timers in pooled sample (mean values) 
 
   Pooled 
Full 
sample 
Younger 
sample 
Older 
sample 
Voluntary PTE 0.7871 0.7395 0.8755 
Involuntary PTE 0.2129 0.2605 0.1245 
Mean Age 44.08 36.53 58.09 
Age_16to19 0.0199 0.0306  
Age_20to24 0.0489 0.0752  
Age_25to29 0.0651 0.1003  
Age_30to34 0.1048 0.1613  
Age_35to39 0.1440 0.2216  
Age_40to44 0.1457 0.2242  
Age_45to49 0.1214 0.1868  
Age_50to54 0.1107  0.3161 
Age_55to59 0.1104  0.3153 
Age_60to64 0.0797  0.2275 
Age_over64 0.0494  0.1411 
Male  0.1427 0.1071 0.2088 
MS_Married  0.6956 0.6451 0.7894 
MS_Single  0.1918 0.2721 0.0428 
MS_Separ_Divor  0.0859 0.0761 0.1041 
MS_Widowed  0.0267 0.0068 0.0637 
Foreign  0.4684 0.4650 0.4746 
Ethn_White  0.9385 0.9205 0.9719 
Ethn_Black  0.0153 0.0197 0.0071 
Ethn_Asian  0.0322 0.0417 0.0146 
Ethn_Mixed  0.0048 0.0064 0.0019 
Ethn_Other  0.0085 0.0109 0.0040 
Health_problems 0.1467 0.1147 0.2059 
#KidsAged_0to4 0.2296 0.3521 0.0024 
#KidsAged_5to9 0.2748 0.4176 0.0099 
#KidsAged_10to15 0.3497 0.5001 0.0706 
R_England 0.8313 0.8253 0.8424 
R_Wales 0.0474 0.0479 0.0466 
R_Scotland 0.0891 0.0920 0.0837 
R_NorthIreland 0.0322 0.0348 0.0273 
Qual_Degree  0.1467 0.1608 0.1205 
Qual_Postsec  0.1094 0.1067 0.1145 
Qual_Secondary  0.4559 0.5135 0.3490 
Qual_Primary  0.2808 0.2118 0.4088 
Private 0.6295 0.6396 0.6109 
Ind_Manuf 0.0466 0.0432 0.0528 
Ind_Agri_Fish 0.0050 0.0043 0.0063 
Ind_Energy_Water 0.0039 0.0042 0.0033 
Ind_Constr 0.0179 0.0169 0.0196 
Ind_Dis_Hotel_Restau 0.2589 0.2740 0.2310 
Ind_Trans_Comm 0.0366 0.0360 0.0377 
Ind_Bank_Fin_Ins 0.1176 0.1202 0.1128 
Ind_Pub_Edu_Health 0.4514 0.4423 0.4684 
Ind_Others 0.0607 0.0572 0.0672 
WorkHour 20.05 20.42 19.36 
Temporary 0.0886 0.0841 0.0968 
Tenure 7.316 5.697 10.32 
Homeworker 0.0250 0.0214 0.0316 
SecJob 0.0745 0.0764 0.0710 
Benefit 0.6149 0.7285 0.4042 
Observations (‘000) 461 299 161 
Note: Sample period: 2001q2 to 2012q1 
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Table 4.10: Summary statistics for part-timers in males  
and female samples (mean values) 
 Male Female 
Full 
sample 
Younger 
sample 
Older 
sample 
Full 
sample 
Younger 
sample 
Older 
sample 
Voluntary PTE 0.6745 0.4982 0.8422 0.8059 0.7685 0.8842 
Involuntary PTE 0.3255 0.5018 0.1578 0.1941 0.2315 0.1158 
Mean Age 46.94 31.63 61.52 43.60 37.11 57.19 
Age_16to19 0.0544 0.1115  0.0141 0.0209  
Age_20to24 0.1025 0.2102  0.0399 0.0590  
Age_25to29 0.0691 0.1417  0.0645 0.0953  
Age_30to34 0.0627 0.1286  0.1118 0.1653  
Age_35to39 0.0698 0.1430  0.1564 0.2311  
Age_40to44 0.0671 0.1376  0.1587 0.2346  
Age_45to49 0.0621 0.1273  0.1312 0.1939  
Age_50to54 0.0743  0.1451 0.1168  0.3612 
Age_55to59 0.1204  0.2350 0.1088  0.3365 
Age_60to64 0.1543  0.3012 0.0673  0.2081 
Age_over64 0.1633  0.3187 0.0305  0.0942 
Male        
MS_Married  0.5872 0.3614 0.8022 0.7136 0.6791 0.7860 
MS_Single  0.3283 0.5927 0.0767 0.1691 0.2336 0.0338 
MS_Separ_Divor  0.0642 0.0429 0.0846 0.0895 0.0801 0.1093 
MS_Widowed  0.0202 0.0030 0.0366 0.0278 0.0072 0.0709 
Foreign  0.5315 0.5790 0.4862 0.4579 0.4513 0.4716 
Ethn_White  0.8714 0.7770 0.9612 0.9496 0.9377 0.9747 
Ethn_Black  0.0273 0.0474 0.0081 0.0133 0.0164 0.0068 
Ethn_Asian  0.0741 0.1265 0.0243 0.0252 0.0315 0.0121 
Ethn_Mixed  0.0069 0.0127 0.0014 0.0044 0.0056 0.0020 
Ethn_Other  0.0195 0.0351 0.0046 0.0066 0.0080 0.0038 
Health_problems 0.1939 0.1423 0.2430 0.1388 0.1114 0.1961 
#KidsAged_0to4 0.1262 0.2503 0.0082 0.2468 0.3643 0.0009 
#KidsAged_5to9 0.1272 0.2369 0.0227 0.2993 0.4392 0.0065 
#KidsAged_10to15 0.1682 0.2765 0.0652 0.3799 0.5269 0.0721 
R_England 0.8448 0.8297 0.8591 0.8290 0.8248 0.8380 
R_Wales 0.0454 0.0468 0.0441 0.0478 0.0480 0.0472 
R_Scotland 0.0850 0.0929 0.0774 0.0898 0.0919 0.0854 
R_NorthIreland 0.0248 0.0306 0.0194 0.0334 0.0354 0.0293 
Qual_Degree  0.1992 0.1850 0.2126 0.1380 0.1579 0.0962 
Qual_Postsec  0.0818 0.0676 0.0953 0.1141 0.1114 0.1195 
Qual_Secondary  0.4080 0.4392 0.3783 0.4639 0.5225 0.3413 
Qual_Primary  0.3038 0.3014 0.3060 0.2769 0.2010 0.4359 
Private 0.7544 0.8034 0.7076 0.6087 0.6199 0.5853 
Ind_Manuf 0.0740 0.0525 0.0944 0.0420 0.0421 0.0418 
Ind_Agri_Fish 0.0101 0.0088 0.0113 0.0042 0.0038 0.0050 
Ind_Energy_Water 0.0064 0.0051 0.0077 0.0035 0.0041 0.0021 
Ind_Constr 0.0324 0.0308 0.0340 0.0154 0.0153 0.0159 
Ind_Dis_Hotel_Restau 0.3144 0.4211 0.2128 0.2497 0.2564 0.2358 
Ind_Trans_Comm 0.0844 0.0815 0.0872 0.0286 0.0305 0.0246 
Ind_Bank_Fin_Ins 0.1258 0.1086 0.1422 0.1162 0.1216 0.1050 
Ind_Pub_Edu_Health 0.2677 0.2088 0.3239 0.4820 0.4703 0.5065 
Ind_Others 0.0824 0.0794 0.0852 0.0571 0.0545 0.0625 
WorkHour 20.04 20.88 19.23 20.05 20.36 19.39 
Temporary 0.1788 0.1804 0.1773 0.0736 0.0726 0.0756 
Tenure 5.879 3.180 8.449 7.556 6.000 10.81 
Homeworker 0.0214 0.0084 0.0338 0.0256 0.0230 0.0310 
SecJob 0.0870 0.0965 0.0779 0.0724 0.0740 0.0691 
Benefit 0.3377 0.2776 0.3950 0.6610 0.7826 0.4066 
Observations (‘000) 66 32 34 395 267 128 
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Note: Sample period: 2001q2 to 2012q1 
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Table 4.11: Marginal effects from multinomial logits for job preferences  
of unemployed job-seekers (full sample) 
 
 Younger Older 
JobPreference (ref: no preference): JobPreference (ref: no preference): 
Regressors FTE PTE SE FTE PTE SE 
Male 0.216*** -0.280*** 0.003*** 0.220*** -0.305*** 0.013*** 
 (61.806) (-93.884) (3.826) (26.156) (-37.836) (5.793) 
MS_Single 0.024*** -0.012*** -0.002* 0.079*** -0.054*** 0.003 
 (6.072) (-4.455) (-1.668) (8.467) (-7.872) (0.734) 
MS_Separ_Divor 0.007 -0.010*** 0.001 0.035*** -0.064*** 0.012*** 
 (1.210) (-2.921) (0.466) (4.057) (-11.388) (3.669) 
MS_Widowed -0.070*** 0.051*** 0.003 -0.033* 0.000 0.025*** 
 (-3.128) (3.410) (0.489) (-1.813) (0.015) (2.919) 
Foreign 0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.061** -0.087*** 0.004 
 (0.096) (0.035) (-1.602) (2.358) (-3.756) (0.684) 
Ethn_Mixed -0.026** 0.013 -0.001 0.102** -0.065** 0.010 
 (-2.089) (1.471) (-0.148) (2.543) (-2.480) (0.617) 
Ethn_Asian 0.028*** -0.014*** -0.004*** 0.052*** -0.059*** 0.007 
 (5.218) (-3.834) (-2.894) (3.384) (-6.443) (1.154) 
Ethn_Black 0.018*** -0.018*** 0.001 0.071*** -0.067*** -0.002 
 (2.885) (-4.479) (0.546) (3.674) (-5.823) (-0.257) 
Ethn_Other -0.017* -0.008 0.011*** 0.009 -0.047*** 0.020* 
 (-1.768) (-1.307) (3.313) (0.337) (-2.729) (1.678) 
Health_problems -0.041*** 0.043*** 0.002* -0.085*** 0.077*** 0.005* 
 (-9.974) (13.693) (1.951) (-11.039) (12.386) (1.894) 
#KidsAged_0to4 -0.076*** 0.066*** 0.005*** -0.003 0.019 0.012** 
 (-26.779) (35.515) (7.166) (-0.111) (0.801) (1.963) 
#KidsAged_5to9 -0.062*** 0.052*** 0.002*** -0.086*** 0.058*** 0.017*** 
 (-23.060) (30.587) (2.682) (-4.930) (4.338) (4.727) 
#KidsAged_10to15 -0.032*** 0.027*** 0.000 -0.075*** 0.041*** 0.003 
 (-13.683) (17.938) (0.301) (-8.507) (6.155) (1.064) 
R_Wales 0.012* -0.008* -0.003* 0.000 -0.001 0.006 
 (1.833) (-1.788) (-1.896) (0.001) (-0.050) (1.106) 
R_Scotland 0.041*** 0.001 -0.007*** 0.055*** -0.015* -0.009*** 
 (8.997) (0.276) (-6.600) (5.014) (-1.758) (-2.937) 
R_NorthIreland 0.042*** -0.035*** -0.002 0.001 -0.012 -0.007 
 (6.178) (-7.817) (-1.058) (0.074) (-0.846) (-1.337) 
Qual_Degree -0.011** -0.055*** 0.014*** -0.169*** -0.049*** 0.038*** 
 (-2.016) (-20.607) (7.200) (-13.489) (-7.141) (6.209) 
Qual_Postsec -0.070*** -0.010** 0.012*** -0.130*** -0.019** 0.021*** 
 (-8.998) (-2.164) (4.477) (-8.610) (-2.069) (3.266) 
Qual_Secondary -0.038*** 0.013*** 0.006*** -0.046*** -0.007 0.011*** 
 (-11.636) (5.446) (5.948) (-5.812) (-1.269) (3.893) 
DurUnemp_1to3 0.015*** -0.023*** -0.004*** -0.011 -0.005 -0.009*** 
 (4.010) (-9.172) (-4.422) (-1.368) (-0.829) (-3.696) 
DurUnemp_3to5 0.024*** -0.028*** -0.002 -0.005 -0.014 -0.010*** 
 (3.221) (-5.805) (-1.228) (-0.299) (-1.266) (-2.638) 
DurUnemp_5plus 0.025*** -0.033*** -0.001 0.007 -0.036*** -0.003 
 (3.244) (-6.658) (-0.646) (0.499) (-3.819) (-0.640) 
LInd_Agri_Fish -0.009 -0.062*** 0.008 -0.111*** -0.005 -0.009 
 (-0.517) (-7.214) (1.449) (-2.583) (-0.164) (-0.634) 
LInd_Energy_Water 0.057*** -0.057*** -0.006* -0.098*** 0.041 -0.003 
 (3.856) (-6.553) (-1.893) (-3.237) (1.634) (-0.394) 
LInd_Constr -0.092*** -0.066*** 0.034*** -0.099*** -0.098*** 0.059*** 
 (-13.177) (-17.375) (10.760) (-6.975) (-13.120) (6.927) 
LInd_Dis_Hotel_Restau 0.004 -0.001 -0.003*** -0.050*** 0.022*** 0.009** 
 (1.018) (-0.542) (-2.926) (-4.474) (2.606) (1.989) 
LInd_Trans_Comm 0.036*** -0.047*** 0.001 -0.024* -0.006 0.006 
 (6.064) (-12.765) (0.562) (-1.678) (-0.534) (1.192) 
LInd_Bank_Fin_Ins 0.004 -0.029*** 0.001 -0.023** -0.032*** 0.012** 
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 (0.807) (-9.776) (0.663) (-2.000) (-4.195) (2.546) 
LInd_Pub_Edu_Health 0.008 0.005* -0.007*** -0.078*** 0.083*** 0.006 
 (1.530) (1.670) (-6.239) (-6.653) (8.741) (1.326) 
LInd_Others -0.060*** -0.016*** 0.029*** -0.089*** -0.018 0.069*** 
 (-7.633) (-3.777) (8.295) (-4.705) (-1.552) (5.630) 
Benefit 0.012*** 0.022*** -0.013*** 0.155*** -0.085*** -0.029*** 
 (3.545) (8.583) (-11.915) (20.591) (-14.096) (-9.957) 
Yr_2012 -0.073*** 0.014 0.003 -0.072** 0.055 -0.018*** 
 (-5.016) (1.470) (0.776) (-1.973) (1.629) (-4.236) 
Yr_2011 -0.039*** -0.003 0.001 -0.076** 0.056* -0.011* 
 (-3.504) (-0.452) (0.226) (-2.357) (1.911) (-1.789) 
Yr_2010 -0.040*** -0.001 0.002 -0.066** 0.061** -0.010 
 (-3.600) (-0.094) (0.753) (-2.069) (2.032) (-1.643) 
Yr_2009 -0.031*** -0.010 0.004 -0.050 0.051* -0.011** 
 (-2.880) (-1.515) (1.270) (-1.575) (1.750) (-1.996) 
Yr_2008 -0.022** 0.012 0.003 -0.051 0.087*** -0.015*** 
 (-2.011) (1.602) (1.059) (-1.514) (2.639) (-2.995) 
Yr_2007 -0.004 0.011 0.002 -0.062* 0.109*** -0.009 
 (-0.371) (1.471) (0.737) (-1.801) (3.109) (-1.523) 
Yr_2006 -0.008 0.006 -0.004*** -0.018 -0.008 -0.004 
 (-1.030) (1.164) (-2.662) (-0.943) (-0.622) (-0.840) 
Yr_2005 -0.028*** 0.021*** 0.004 -0.013 0.000 0.006 
 (-3.353) (3.441) (1.593) (-0.660) (0.006) (0.989) 
Yr_2004 -0.012 0.001 0.007*** 0.015 -0.006 -0.000 
 (-1.578) (0.254) (2.772) (0.849) (-0.437) (-0.007) 
Yr_2003 -0.009 0.001 0.002 -0.010 0.007 -0.011*** 
 (-1.232) (0.229) (0.890) (-0.529) (0.539) (-2.657) 
Yr_2002 -0.008 0.003 0.002 0.007 0.002 -0.003 
 (-1.062) (0.532) (0.914) (0.375) (0.126) (-0.552) 
Age_20to24 -0.107*** 0.047*** 0.026***    
 (-13.993) (8.695) (4.858)    
Age_25to29 -0.176*** 0.062*** 0.048***    
 (-19.352) (9.971) (6.035)    
Age_30to34 -0.227*** 0.068*** 0.058***    
 (-23.704) (10.438) (6.346)    
Age_35to39 -0.249*** 0.061*** 0.081***    
 (-23.882) (9.364) (7.071)    
Age_40to44 -0.267*** 0.075*** 0.081***    
 (-25.407) (10.549) (6.976)    
Age_45to49 -0.259*** 0.068*** 0.082***    
 (-23.325) (9.136) (6.668)    
Age_55to59    -0.048*** 0.050*** 0.003 
    (-6.213) (7.996) (1.319) 
Age_60to64    -0.179*** 0.170*** 0.013*** 
    (-15.781) (14.975) (3.452) 
Age_over64    -0.534*** 0.495*** 0.056*** 
    (-32.755) (18.444) (3.740) 
       
Pseudo R2 0.1698 0.1355 
Observations 89,820 21,455 
Control group: MS_Married, Ethn_White, Age_16to19 for the younger sample,  
Age_50to54 for the older sample, R_England, Qual_Primary, DurUnemp_Less1, LInd_Manuf, Yr_2001 
z-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.12: Marginal effects from multinomial logits for job preferences  
of unemployed job-seekers (males sample) 
 
 Younger Older 
JobPreference (ref: no preference): JobPreference (ref: no preference): 
Regressors FTE PTE SE FTE PTE SE 
MS_Single 0.008 0.012*** -0.001 0.054*** -0.013** 0.000 
 (1.630) (4.926) (-0.694) (5.033) (-2.119) (0.066) 
MS_Separ_Divor -0.035*** 0.027*** 0.002 -0.006 -0.028*** 0.014*** 
 (-4.081) (4.524) (1.066) (-0.552) (-5.013) (3.343) 
MS_Widowed -0.191*** 0.167*** -0.008 -0.075*** 0.032** 0.031** 
 (-3.853) (3.680) (-1.168) (-2.882) (2.082) (2.456) 
Foreign -0.021** 0.025*** -0.004 -0.009 -0.011 0.004 
 (-2.190) (6.780) (-1.417) (-0.301) (-0.597) (0.409) 
Ethn_Mixed -0.053*** 0.029*** -0.005 0.089* -0.046* -0.004 
 (-3.163) (3.275) (-1.185) (1.765) (-1.890) (-0.261) 
Ethn_Asian -0.005 0.013*** -0.002 0.006 -0.022** 0.013 
 (-0.764) (3.408) (-0.806) (0.328) (-2.409) (1.510) 
Ethn_Black -0.030*** 0.029*** 0.001 0.068*** -0.029** -0.003 
 (-3.450) (5.501) (0.460) (2.911) (-2.329) (-0.311) 
Ethn_Other -0.037*** 0.016** 0.012*** -0.014 -0.014 0.020 
 (-2.881) (2.268) (2.590) (-0.415) (-0.831) (1.304) 
Health_problems -0.049*** 0.052*** 0.003* -0.080*** 0.068*** 0.006* 
 (-9.396) (14.938) (1.917) (-8.741) (11.296) (1.865) 
#KidsAged_0to4 -0.012*** 0.003 0.003*** -0.004 0.028* 0.013* 
 (-3.332) (1.440) (3.557) (-0.139) (1.791) (1.696) 
#KidsAged_5to9 -0.011*** 0.003* 0.001 -0.053*** 0.018* 0.020*** 
 (-3.168) (1.663) (0.881) (-2.897) (1.693) (4.512) 
#KidsAged_10to15 -0.011*** 0.006*** 0.000 -0.044*** 0.008 0.002 
 (-3.835) (4.742) (0.098) (-4.445) (1.246) (0.721) 
R_Wales 0.004 -0.005 -0.004** 0.008 -0.004 0.001 
 (0.462) (-1.442) (-2.004) (0.449) (-0.434) (0.156) 
R_Scotland 0.048*** -0.001 -0.006*** 0.066*** -0.011 -0.014*** 
 (9.010) (-0.309) (-4.015) (5.313) (-1.525) (-3.804) 
R_NorthIreland 0.016** -0.016*** 0.001 -0.011 -0.013 -0.009 
 (2.006) (-4.693) (0.293) (-0.528) (-1.106) (-1.311) 
Qual_Degree -0.044*** -0.012*** 0.007*** -0.202*** -0.021*** 0.036*** 
 (-6.238) (-4.185) (3.113) (-13.299) (-3.381) (4.860) 
Qual_Postsec -0.102*** 0.013** 0.010*** -0.133*** 0.003 0.009 
 (-9.647) (2.495) (3.063) (-7.139) (0.384) (1.299) 
Qual_Secondary -0.044*** 0.011*** 0.005*** -0.064*** 0.006 0.012*** 
 (-10.987) (5.605) (4.448) (-6.887) (1.219) (3.366) 
DurUnemp_1to3 0.008* -0.010*** -0.006*** -0.024** 0.002 -0.011*** 
 (1.785) (-5.137) (-5.008) (-2.468) (0.349) (-3.711) 
DurUnemp_3to5 0.016* -0.008** -0.004* -0.019 -0.012 -0.013*** 
 (1.939) (-2.355) (-1.888) (-1.135) (-1.341) (-2.669) 
DurUnemp_5plus 0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.008 -0.017** -0.005 
 (0.153) (-0.259) (-1.424) (-0.518) (-2.249) (-0.989) 
LInd_Agri_Fish -0.052*** -0.016** 0.013* -0.164*** -0.003 -0.007 
 (-2.664) (-2.543) (1.770) (-3.403) (-0.108) (-0.388) 
LInd_Energy_Water 0.016 -0.019*** -0.006 -0.128*** 0.042** 0.003 
 (0.921) (-3.145) (-1.517) (-3.972) (2.199) (0.246) 
LInd_Constr -0.149*** -0.027*** 0.034*** -0.156*** -0.061*** 0.068*** 
 (-20.211) (-13.412) (10.285) (-10.354) (-11.601) (6.978) 
LInd_Dis_Hotel_Restau -0.004 0.005** -0.002 -0.062*** 0.018** 0.012* 
 (-0.778) (1.970) (-1.493) (-4.437) (2.286) (1.959) 
LInd_Trans_Comm -0.001 -0.015*** 0.001 -0.032** 0.002 0.007 
 (-0.104) (-5.719) (0.650) (-2.054) (0.212) (1.039) 
LInd_Bank_Fin_Ins -0.029*** -0.009*** 0.002 -0.057*** -0.018*** 0.019*** 
 (-4.481) (-3.459) (1.146) (-3.970) (-2.696) (2.793) 
LInd_Pub_Edu_Health 0.001 0.012*** -0.009*** -0.082*** 0.080*** 0.012* 
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 (0.081) (2.979) (-5.208) (-5.209) (7.045) (1.810) 
LInd_Others -0.068*** -0.004 0.027*** -0.128*** -0.009 0.087*** 
 (-6.325) (-0.980) (5.777) (-5.319) (-0.847) (5.113) 
Benefit 0.063*** -0.021*** -0.016*** 0.163*** -0.072*** -0.033*** 
 (15.438) (-9.860) (-11.936) (18.371) (-12.340) (-8.906) 
Yr_2012 -0.048*** -0.014*** 0.002 -0.014 -0.007 -0.021*** 
 (-2.640) (-2.899) (0.360) (-0.357) (-0.303) (-3.729) 
Yr_2011 -0.027* -0.016*** -0.002 -0.031 0.011 -0.012 
 (-1.931) (-3.940) (-0.578) (-0.854) (0.482) (-1.496) 
Yr_2010 -0.041*** -0.015*** 0.005 -0.004 -0.006 -0.011 
 (-2.851) (-3.768) (1.082) (-0.116) (-0.322) (-1.433) 
Yr_2009 -0.032** -0.020*** 0.006 0.014 -0.016 -0.013* 
 (-2.278) (-5.541) (1.335) (0.405) (-0.864) (-1.679) 
Yr_2008 -0.003 -0.013*** 0.004 0.024 0.010 -0.017** 
 (-0.223) (-2.995) (0.961) (0.711) (0.430) (-2.530) 
Yr_2007 0.018 -0.010** 0.005 0.026 0.023 -0.008 
 (1.484) (-2.307) (1.070) (0.761) (0.889) (-0.973) 
Yr_2006 -0.010 0.011** -0.005** -0.031 0.002 -0.004 
 (-1.069) (2.178) (-2.515) (-1.394) (0.131) (-0.674) 
Yr_2005 -0.019* 0.009* 0.004 -0.020 -0.005 0.013 
 (-1.909) (1.673) (1.341) (-0.905) (-0.436) (1.502) 
Yr_2004 -0.004 -0.002 0.006** 0.021 0.001 0.001 
 (-0.418) (-0.503) (1.963) (1.038) (0.049) (0.082) 
Yr_2003 -0.013 0.005 0.002 -0.006 0.009 -0.011** 
 (-1.364) (1.032) (0.787) (-0.301) (0.738) (-2.116) 
Yr_2002 -0.009 0.004 0.002 0.010 0.009 -0.004 
 (-0.958) (0.865) (0.650) (0.525) (0.708) (-0.699) 
Age_20to24 -0.072*** -0.003 0.023***    
 (-7.901) (-1.085) (4.229)    
Age_25to29 -0.116*** -0.011*** 0.040***    
 (-10.382) (-4.157) (4.965)    
Age_30to34 -0.184*** -0.007** 0.060***    
 (-14.587) (-2.273) (5.714)    
Age_35to39 -0.206*** -0.005 0.077***    
 (-15.215) (-1.641) (6.172)    
Age_40to44 -0.217*** -0.010*** 0.084***    
 (-15.553) (-3.172) (6.299)    
Age_45to49 -0.214*** -0.015*** 0.083***    
 (-14.607) (-5.200) (6.015)    
Age_55to59    -0.033*** 0.042*** -0.000 
    (-3.540) (6.421) (-0.069) 
Age_60to64    -0.118*** 0.098*** 0.013*** 
    (-10.045) (10.464) (3.129) 
Age_over64    -0.541*** 0.480*** 0.060*** 
    (-25.177) (14.136) (3.204) 
       
Pseudo R2 0.0652 0.0936 
Observations 50,624 14,506 
Control group: MS_Married, Ethn_White, Age_16to19 for the younger sample,  
Age_50to54 for the older sample, R_England, Qual_Primary, DurUnemp_Less1, LInd_Manuf, Yr_2001 
z-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.13: Marginal effects from multinomial logits for job preferences  
of unemployed job-seekers (females sample) 
 
 Younger Older 
JobPreference (ref: no preference): JobPreference (ref: no preference): 
Regressors FTE PTE SE FTE PTE SE 
MS_Single 0.045*** -0.046*** -0.002 0.161 -0.166 0.005 
 (6.129) (-6.383) (-1.551) (0.001) (-0.018) (0.000) 
MS_Separ_Divor 0.066*** -0.062*** -0.001 0.137 -0.152 0.003 
 (6.855) (-6.984) (-0.909) (0.001) (-0.007) (0.000) 
MS_Widowed -0.052* 0.051* 0.004 0.028 -0.038 0.007 
 (-1.802) (1.834) (0.803) (0.000) (-0.000) (0.000) 
Foreign 0.034** -0.040*** -0.001 0.226 -0.255 0.004 
 (2.315) (-2.723) (-0.678) (0.002) (-0.011) (0.000) 
Ethn_Mixed 0.015 -0.012 0.003 0.178 -0.155 0.020 
 (0.663) (-0.530) (0.657) (0.000) (-0.001) (0.000) 
Ethn_Asian 0.049*** -0.034*** -0.004*** 0.150 -0.147 -0.003 
 (4.396) (-3.095) (-3.166) (0.024) (-0.002) (-0.000) 
Ethn_Black 0.101*** -0.098*** -0.000 0.123 -0.162 -0.003 
 (8.635) (-9.065) (-0.041) (0.018) (-0.002) (-0.000) 
Ethn_Other 0.014 -0.037** 0.006* 0.051 -0.094 0.007 
 (0.761) (-2.119) (1.869) (0.000) (-0.002) (0.000) 
Health_problems -0.067*** 0.069*** 0.001 -0.103*** 0.097 0.002 
 (-8.989) (9.467) (0.894) (-7.365) (0.001) (0.000) 
#KidsAged_0to4 -0.258*** 0.247*** 0.006*** -0.302 0.243 0.019 
 (-40.700) (42.488) (7.132) (-0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
#KidsAged_5to9 -0.175*** 0.170*** 0.002** -0.333 0.308 0.006 
 (-33.576) (35.354) (2.392) (-0.023) (0.002) (0.000) 
#KidsAged_10to15 -0.078*** 0.078*** -0.000 -0.180 0.158 0.002 
 (-17.837) (18.851) (-0.079) (-0.006) (0.002) (0.000) 
R_Wales 0.028** -0.017 -0.001 -0.014 0.013 0.010 
 (2.125) (-1.316) (-0.383) (-0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R_Scotland 0.031*** 0.000 -0.007*** 0.029 -0.019 0.002 
 (3.264) (0.048) (-6.200) (0.001) (-0.001) (0.000) 
R_NorthIreland 0.099*** -0.080*** -0.006*** 0.023 0.019 -0.007 
 (6.492) (-5.575) (-3.385) (0.000) (0.000) (-0.000) 
Qual_Degree 0.083*** -0.157*** 0.023*** -0.056 -0.120 0.032 
 (8.704) (-19.485) (6.545) (-0.000) (-0.000) (0.000) 
Qual_Postsec -0.007 -0.050*** 0.013*** -0.092 -0.058 0.035 
 (-0.520) (-4.290) (3.322) (-0.000) (-0.000) (0.000) 
Qual_Secondary -0.023*** 0.012* 0.005*** 0.003 -0.036 0.006 
 (-3.524) (1.942) (3.588) (0.000) (-0.001) (0.000) 
DurUnemp_1to3 0.020*** -0.039*** 0.000 0.023 -0.025 -0.002 
 (2.665) (-5.534) (0.025) (0.001) (-0.001) (-0.000) 
DurUnemp_3to5 0.014 -0.048*** 0.002 0.025 -0.009 -0.003 
 (0.835) (-3.081) (0.682) (0.001) (-0.000) (-0.000) 
DurUnemp_5plus 0.042** -0.080*** 0.005 0.030 -0.074 0.003 
 (2.248) (-4.742) (1.154) (0.001) (-0.023) (0.000) 
LInd_Agri_Fish 0.068 -0.177*** -0.006 0.025 0.069 -0.012 
 (1.508) (-5.021) (-1.285) (0.000) (0.001) (-0.000) 
LInd_Energy_Water 0.156*** -0.148*** -0.006 0.082 -0.078 -0.012 
 (4.099) (-4.345) (-1.315) (0.001) (-0.001) (-0.000) 
LInd_Constr 0.053** -0.079*** -0.003 0.125 -0.138 -0.006 
 (2.172) (-3.532) (-1.032) (0.002) (-0.001) (-0.000) 
LInd_Dis_Hotel_Restau 0.005 -0.002 -0.003** -0.023 0.026 -0.000 
 (0.622) (-0.254) (-2.487) (-0.002) (0.004) (-0.000) 
LInd_Trans_Comm 0.100*** -0.104*** 0.002 -0.017 -0.021 0.005 
 (7.020) (-7.959) (0.619) (-0.000) (-0.000) (0.000) 
LInd_Bank_Fin_Ins 0.059*** -0.071*** 0.000 0.055 -0.065 -0.001 
 (6.262) (-8.037) (0.191) (0.022) (-0.002) (-0.000) 
LInd_Pub_Edu_Health 0.008 0.004 -0.005*** -0.082 0.106 -0.004 
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 (0.991) (0.494) (-4.917) (-0.001) (0.003) (-0.000) 
LInd_Others -0.036*** -0.030** 0.022*** -0.001 -0.025 0.015 
 (-2.780) (-2.510) (5.604) (-0.000) (-0.000) (0.000) 
Benefit -0.053*** 0.079*** -0.008*** 0.152 -0.131 -0.013 
 (-7.054) (10.949) (-4.988) (0.001) (-0.001) (-0.000) 
Yr_2012 -0.097*** 0.061** 0.002 -0.172 0.167 -0.008 
 (-4.101) (2.521) (0.441) (-0.001) (0.002) (-0.000) 
Yr_2011 -0.045** 0.016 0.002 -0.155 0.140 -0.006 
 (-2.348) (0.844) (0.694) (-0.001) (0.002) (-0.000) 
Yr_2010 -0.039** 0.028 -0.002 -0.187 0.194 -0.006 
 (-2.019) (1.454) (-0.665) (-0.001) (0.005) (-0.000) 
Yr_2009 -0.030 0.012 0.000 -0.181 0.193 -0.006 
 (-1.560) (0.650) (0.090) (-0.001) (0.004) (-0.000) 
Yr_2008 -0.049** 0.055*** 0.000 -0.177 0.208 -0.007 
 (-2.474) (2.715) (0.152) (-0.001) (0.003) (-0.000) 
Yr_2007 -0.037* 0.046** -0.002 -0.224 0.255 -0.006 
 (-1.862) (2.304) (-0.572) (-0.002) (0.005) (-0.000) 
Yr_2006 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 0.014 -0.034 -0.002 
 (-0.094) (-0.197) (-1.335) (0.001) (-0.001) (-0.000) 
Yr_2005 -0.038** 0.039*** 0.002 0.006 0.012 -0.007 
 (-2.488) (2.624) (0.739) (0.000) (0.000) (-0.000) 
Yr_2004 -0.017 0.003 0.006* 0.014 -0.026 -0.001 
 (-1.151) (0.241) (1.865) (0.001) (-0.001) (-0.000) 
Yr_2003 -0.005 -0.002 0.001 -0.016 0.004 -0.006 
 (-0.329) (-0.145) (0.462) (-0.000) (0.000) (-0.000) 
Yr_2002 -0.009 0.004 0.002 0.003 -0.020 0.001 
 (-0.647) (0.313) (0.737) (0.000) (-0.004) (0.000) 
Age_20to24 -0.167*** 0.139*** 0.027**    
 (-12.866) (9.556) (2.209)    
Age_25to29 -0.259*** 0.180*** 0.058***    
 (-19.137) (10.148) (2.764)    
Age_30to34 -0.286*** 0.199*** 0.048***    
 (-22.522) (11.560) (2.616)    
Age_35to39 -0.312*** 0.187*** 0.079***    
 (-22.856) (9.151) (2.984)    
Age_40to44 -0.353*** 0.240*** 0.071***    
 (-28.277) (11.556) (2.845)    
Age_45to49 -0.351*** 0.238*** 0.079***    
 (-26.929) (10.312) (2.773)    
Age_55to59    -0.087 0.079 0.005 
    (-0.002) (0.001) (0.000) 
Age_60to64    -0.352 0.361 0.014 
    (-0.009) (0.001) (0.000) 
Age_over64    -0.439 0.401 0.054 
    (-0.037) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
Pseudo R2 0.1231 0.0910 
Observations 39,196 6,949 
Control group: MS_Married, Ethn_White, Age_16to19 for the younger sample,  
Age_50to54 for the older sample, R_England, Qual_Primary, DurUnemp_Less1, LInd_Manuf, Yr_2001 
z-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.14: Marginal effects from multinomial logits for employment outcomes  
of the economically-active (full sample) 
 
 Younger Older 
EconActivity (ref: UE): EconActivity (ref: UE): 
Regressors FTE PTE SE FTE PTE SE 
Male 0.149*** -0.231*** 0.067*** 0.203*** -0.350*** 0.126*** 
 (179.459) (-352.467) (119.808) (145.811) (-299.051) (121.199) 
MS_Single -0.026*** -0.013*** 0.007*** 0.039*** -0.066*** 0.003 
 (-27.453) (-22.336) (9.835) (15.549) (-38.370) (1.432) 
MS_Separ_Divor 0.007*** -0.028*** -0.002** 0.083*** -0.087*** -0.009*** 
 (4.974) (-41.226) (-2.049) (44.317) (-75.713) (-5.386) 
MS_Widowed -0.010* -0.007** 0.001 0.057*** -0.044*** -0.010*** 
 (-1.929) (-2.575) (0.139) (16.536) (-22.246) (-3.497) 
Foreign -0.011*** -0.003** 0.005*** 0.017*** -0.051*** 0.028*** 
 (-5.284) (-1.975) (3.189) (3.157) (-11.652) (6.759) 
Ethn_Mixed -0.024*** 0.001 0.002 0.035*** -0.036*** -0.014 
 (-5.518) (0.206) (0.552) (2.748) (-3.902) (-1.290) 
Ethn_Asian -0.062*** 0.008*** 0.023*** -0.007 -0.050*** 0.039*** 
 (-33.706) (6.425) (17.171) (-1.592) (-16.301) (10.251) 
Ethn_Black 0.008*** -0.013*** -0.036*** 0.151*** -0.073*** -0.099*** 
 (3.422) (-9.578) (-24.656) (27.612) (-19.055) (-25.654) 
Ethn_Other -0.053*** 0.013*** 0.003 -0.000 -0.051*** 0.027*** 
 (-15.492) (5.508) (1.229) (-0.054) (-8.834) (3.783) 
Health_problems -0.036*** 0.020*** 0.001 -0.025*** 0.026*** -0.005*** 
 (-30.078) (24.662) (1.038) (-15.171) (19.496) (-3.944) 
#KidsAged_0to4 -0.045*** 0.036*** 0.022*** -0.016** 0.001 0.021*** 
 (-64.917) (77.324) (44.575) (-2.152) (0.111) (4.277) 
#KidsAged_5to9 -0.051*** 0.032*** 0.022*** -0.020*** -0.006 0.033*** 
 (-81.273) (78.437) (48.894) (-4.751) (-1.333) (11.503) 
#KidsAged_10to15 -0.022*** 0.012*** 0.015*** 0.002 -0.001 0.011*** 
 (-39.845) (32.627) (38.467) (1.186) (-0.676) (7.768) 
R_Wales 0.009*** -0.003*** -0.006*** 0.004 -0.014*** 0.010*** 
 (6.004) (-3.019) (-5.141) (1.326) (-6.026) (4.219) 
R_Scotland 0.011*** 0.003*** -0.020*** 0.047*** -0.020*** -0.030*** 
 (9.826) (3.824) (-23.584) (21.609) (-11.791) (-17.158) 
R_NorthIreland -0.005*** -0.019*** 0.022*** -0.012*** -0.036*** 0.049*** 
 (-2.659) (-19.161) (15.555) (-3.391) (-14.147) (15.550) 
Qual_Degree 0.110*** -0.068*** -0.021*** 0.023*** -0.080*** 0.064*** 
 (123.707) (-128.797) (-29.447) (11.676) (-64.015) (37.018) 
Qual_Postsec 0.087*** -0.040*** -0.026*** 0.053*** -0.048*** 0.003 
 (81.856) (-66.120) (-30.835) (23.898) (-33.618) (1.529) 
Qual_Secondary 0.042*** -0.027*** 0.003*** 0.019*** -0.043*** 0.027*** 
 (47.151) (-45.161) (4.547) (12.598) (-37.613) (20.858) 
Benefit -0.261*** 0.131*** -0.010*** -0.209*** 0.079*** 0.012*** 
 (-254.759) (161.288) (-17.054) (-108.916) (48.974) (7.772) 
Yr_2012 -0.029*** 0.012*** 0.012*** -0.012* 0.031*** -0.021*** 
 (-8.175) (4.864) (4.409) (-1.661) (4.753) (-4.007) 
Yr_2011 -0.022*** 0.009*** 0.009*** -0.008 0.035*** -0.027*** 
 (-8.248) (5.074) (4.332) (-1.225) (6.337) (-6.224) 
Yr_2010 -0.020*** 0.009*** 0.008*** -0.006 0.034*** -0.027*** 
 (-7.411) (4.910) (4.027) (-1.012) (6.188) (-6.269) 
Yr_2009 -0.014*** 0.004** 0.008*** 0.005 0.033*** -0.038*** 
 (-5.272) (2.387) (3.781) (0.876) (6.075) (-9.027) 
Yr_2008 -0.001 0.000 0.007*** 0.006 0.036*** -0.036*** 
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 (-0.533) (0.074) (3.705) (0.965) (6.535) (-8.540) 
Yr_2007 -0.001 0.002 0.007*** 0.000 0.036*** -0.028*** 
 (-0.318) (0.905) (3.370) (0.001) (6.546) (-6.563) 
Yr_2006 -0.011*** -0.000 0.011*** 0.021*** -0.015*** -0.003 
 (-6.552) (-0.319) (8.154) (6.864) (-6.322) (-1.257) 
Yr_2005 -0.000 -0.004*** 0.008*** 0.018*** -0.013*** -0.001 
 (-0.061) (-3.495) (5.891) (5.589) (-5.262) (-0.370) 
Yr_2004 -0.007*** 0.001 0.010*** 0.010*** -0.008*** 0.001 
 (-4.526) (1.373) (7.470) (3.126) (-3.116) (0.416) 
Yr_2003 -0.009*** 0.001 0.008*** 0.003 -0.004 0.001 
 (-5.301) (1.316) (6.650) (0.970) (-1.437) (0.545) 
Yr_2002 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.006* -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.479) (-0.853) (0.600) (1.946) (-1.289) (-1.417) 
Age_20to24 -0.012*** -0.052*** 0.084***    
 (-2.704) (-54.433) (18.492)    
Age_25to29 -0.046*** -0.080*** 0.155***    
 (-9.288) (-103.619) (29.974)    
Age_30to34 -0.095*** -0.084*** 0.212***    
 (-17.964) (-103.745) (38.022)    
Age_35to39 -0.125*** -0.082*** 0.244***    
 (-23.431) (-94.730) (43.163)    
Age_40to44 -0.149*** -0.080*** 0.267***    
 (-27.398) (-88.076) (46.315)    
Age_45to49 -0.196*** -0.069*** 0.302***    
 (-34.687) (-70.215) (49.520)    
Age_55to59    -0.077*** 0.049*** 0.024*** 
    (-50.399) (37.626) (17.982) 
Age_60to64    -0.181*** 0.121*** 0.070*** 
    (-93.747) (62.100) (41.114) 
Age_over64    -0.430*** 0.272*** 0.179*** 
    (-175.326) (76.004) (53.930) 
       
Pseudo R2 0.1998 0.1520 
Observations 1,671,070 670,457 
Control group: MS_Married, Ethn_White, Age_16to19 for the younger sample,  
Age_50to54 for the older sample, R_England, Qual_Primary, Yr_2001 
z-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.15: Marginal effects from multinomial logits for employment outcomes  
of the economically-active (males sample) 
 
 Younger Older 
EconActivity (ref: UE): EconActivity (ref: UE): 
Regressors FTE PTE SE FTE PTE SE 
MS_Single -0.063*** 0.019*** 0.015*** -0.047*** 0.024*** -0.006** 
 (-53.339) (34.926) (14.340) (-14.049) (12.158) (-2.121) 
MS_Separ_Divor -0.050*** 0.013*** 0.010*** -0.029*** -0.005*** 0.015*** 
 (-23.497) (11.188) (5.703) (-10.079) (-3.782) (5.700) 
MS_Widowed -0.067*** 0.021*** 0.047*** -0.016*** 0.007*** 0.008 
 (-6.667) (4.063) (5.212) (-2.628) (2.824) (1.511) 
Foreign -0.012*** 0.018*** -0.011*** -0.014** -0.010*** 0.017*** 
 (-4.901) (21.739) (-4.734) (-2.007) (-2.731) (2.686) 
Ethn_Mixed -0.046*** 0.027*** 0.001 0.027 -0.012 -0.029* 
 (-7.951) (9.656) (0.235) (1.523) (-1.331) (-1.811) 
Ethn_Asian -0.125*** 0.058*** 0.048*** -0.090*** 0.013*** 0.060*** 
 (-52.046) (40.029) (23.484) (-15.776) (4.217) (11.358) 
Ethn_Black -0.079*** 0.066*** -0.032*** 0.092*** -0.003 -0.118*** 
 (-21.886) (27.193) (-12.934) (11.018) (-0.626) (-17.627) 
Ethn_Other -0.092*** 0.063*** 0.005 -0.073*** -0.006 0.055*** 
 (-20.522) (22.174) (1.282) (-6.430) (-1.139) (5.202) 
Health_problems -0.039*** 0.028*** 0.002* -0.016*** 0.018*** -0.001 
 (-24.157) (32.274) (1.792) (-7.570) (15.880) (-0.451) 
#KidsAged_0to4 -0.010*** -0.002*** 0.022*** -0.021*** 0.003 0.024*** 
 (-12.140) (-5.549) (31.945) (-3.141) (0.705) (4.072) 
#KidsAged_5to9 -0.016*** 0.001*** 0.019*** -0.030*** 0.007*** 0.031*** 
 (-20.576) (3.458) (28.188) (-7.296) (3.062) (8.549) 
#KidsAged_10to15 -0.015*** -0.001*** 0.020*** 0.010*** -0.012*** 0.014*** 
 (-22.294) (-3.803) (33.971) (4.394) (-8.583) (7.231) 
R_Wales -0.004* 0.004*** -0.001 -0.009** -0.008*** 0.019*** 
 (-1.926) (4.630) (-0.703) (-2.225) (-4.715) (5.041) 
R_Scotland 0.012*** 0.008*** -0.024*** 0.038*** -0.008*** -0.033*** 
 (8.016) (10.899) (-18.730) (13.103) (-5.530) (-12.682) 
R_NorthIreland -0.058*** -0.001 0.053*** -0.060*** -0.034*** 0.092*** 
 (-24.340) (-1.630) (24.140) (-12.804) (-19.914) (20.460) 
Qual_Degree 0.073*** -0.008*** -0.053*** -0.061*** 0.020*** 0.046*** 
 (68.703) (-19.175) (-54.557) (-23.780) (15.066) (19.291) 
Qual_Postsec 0.065*** -0.008*** -0.045*** -0.000 0.012*** -0.008*** 
 (47.933) (-14.564) (-36.510) (-0.120) (7.206) (-2.807) 
Qual_Secondary 0.024*** -0.011*** -0.001 -0.018*** -0.003*** 0.023*** 
 (22.913) (-26.812) (-1.170) (-8.937) (-3.318) (12.472) 
Benefit -0.216*** 0.038*** -0.046*** -0.254*** 0.062*** -0.020*** 
 (-133.408) (50.982) (-52.825) (-83.289) (31.808) (-7.625) 
Yr_2012 -0.036*** 0.002 0.031*** 0.001 0.013** -0.013 
 (-7.811) (1.510) (7.120) (0.123) (2.344) (-1.552) 
Yr_2011 -0.029*** 0.001 0.026*** 0.016** 0.007 -0.020*** 
 (-8.239) (0.684) (7.879) (2.029) (1.528) (-2.800) 
Yr_2010 -0.028*** 0.000 0.026*** 0.014* 0.009** -0.020*** 
 (-8.017) (0.439) (7.752) (1.676) (1.960) (-2.797) 
Yr_2009 -0.025*** -0.003*** 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.009** -0.032*** 
 (-7.364) (-3.293) (8.036) (3.196) (1.979) (-4.700) 
Yr_2008 -0.016*** -0.008*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.012** -0.031*** 
 (-4.685) (-8.620) (8.422) (3.493) (2.528) (-4.606) 
Yr_2007 -0.013*** -0.008*** 0.027*** 0.024*** 0.009** -0.023*** 
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 (-3.785) (-9.522) (8.202) (2.967) (1.991) (-3.361) 
Yr_2006 -0.020*** 0.006*** 0.014*** 0.013*** -0.001 -0.007* 
 (-9.390) (6.307) (7.178) (3.273) (-0.707) (-1.902) 
Yr_2005 -0.012*** 0.004*** 0.011*** 0.006 0.002 -0.003 
 (-5.849) (4.321) (5.585) (1.471) (1.080) (-0.874) 
Yr_2004 -0.015*** 0.004*** 0.015*** 0.000 0.002 0.001 
 (-7.148) (3.849) (7.529) (0.092) (1.128) (0.332) 
Yr_2003 -0.014*** 0.004*** 0.010*** -0.000 0.002 -0.000 
 (-6.748) (4.049) (5.500) (-0.061) (1.047) (-0.062) 
Yr_2002 -0.003 0.002* 0.002 0.007* -0.001 -0.006* 
 (-1.553) (1.832) (1.149) (1.748) (-0.260) (-1.759) 
Age_20to24 -0.051*** -0.017*** 0.083***    
 (-9.436) (-45.714) (15.032)    
Age_25to29 -0.109*** -0.029*** 0.159***    
 (-17.864) (-93.400) (25.772)    
Age_30to34 -0.160*** -0.033*** 0.217***    
 (-25.057) (-99.959) (33.586)    
Age_35to39 -0.191*** -0.035*** 0.252***    
 (-29.627) (-94.679) (38.559)    
Age_40to44 -0.213*** -0.035*** 0.275***    
 (-32.551) (-93.896) (41.435)    
Age_45to49 -0.256*** -0.034*** 0.315***    
 (-37.289) (-92.241) (45.346)    
Age_55to59    -0.081*** 0.051*** 0.025*** 
    (-37.864) (32.236) (12.826) 
Age_60to64    -0.206*** 0.135*** 0.067*** 
    (-82.980) (57.477) (29.116) 
Age_over64    -0.458*** 0.236*** 0.246*** 
    (-133.708) (48.973) (50.937) 
       
Pseudo R2 0.1319 0.1116 
Observations 864,841 369,816 
Control group: MS_Married, Ethn_White, Age_16to19 for the younger sample,  
Age_50to54 for the older sample, R_England, Qual_Primary, Yr_2001 
z-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.16: Marginal effects from multinomial logits for employment outcomes  
of the economically-active (females sample) 
 
 Younger Older 
EconActivity (ref: UE): EconActivity (ref: UE): 
Regressors FTE PTE SE FTE PTE SE 
MS_Single 0.040*** -0.067*** -0.002** 0.161*** -0.186*** 0.011*** 
 (24.062) (-44.497) (-2.311) (39.034) (-50.509) (4.447) 
MS_Separ_Divor 0.079*** -0.090*** -0.010*** 0.199*** -0.183*** -0.022*** 
 (38.182) (-52.155) (-11.021) (75.594) (-73.852) (-14.857) 
MS_Widowed 0.010 -0.027*** -0.012*** 0.108*** -0.083*** -0.022*** 
 (1.365) (-4.337) (-4.077) (24.698) (-20.881) (-10.522) 
Foreign 0.014*** -0.050*** 0.024*** 0.047*** -0.082*** 0.031*** 
 (3.581) (-13.331) (13.879) (6.060) (-10.409) (7.302) 
Ethn_Mixed 0.012 -0.038*** 0.002 0.041** -0.055*** 0.000 
 (1.596) (-5.798) (0.594) (2.193) (-2.938) (0.004) 
Ethn_Asian 0.018*** -0.063*** -0.002 0.112*** -0.142*** 0.010** 
 (5.463) (-22.660) (-1.175) (15.280) (-21.407) (2.111) 
Ethn_Black 0.112*** -0.114*** -0.036*** 0.209*** -0.165*** -0.060*** 
 (29.943) (-36.299) (-28.530) (23.927) (-19.916) (-16.397) 
Ethn_Other 0.006 -0.062*** 0.004 0.092*** -0.110*** -0.002 
 (0.961) (-11.992) (1.524) (7.129) (-8.992) (-0.271) 
Health_problems -0.055*** 0.030*** 0.002** -0.033*** 0.027*** -0.001 
 (-26.829) (15.960) (2.574) (-13.308) (11.104) (-0.648) 
#KidsAged_0to4 -0.179*** 0.159*** 0.029*** -0.047 0.059* -0.008 
 (-114.479) (116.829) (43.762) (-1.498) (1.955) (-0.397) 
#KidsAged_5to9 -0.153*** 0.124*** 0.027*** -0.052*** 0.006 0.049*** 
 (-116.156) (108.768) (49.839) (-4.350) (0.488) (8.798) 
#KidsAged_10to15 -0.062*** 0.054*** 0.010*** -0.027*** 0.039*** 0.001 
 (-55.425) (55.029) (20.067) (-6.880) (10.279) (0.265) 
R_Wales 0.027*** -0.015*** -0.010*** 0.020*** -0.019*** -0.001 
 (9.511) (-5.658) (-8.332) (4.279) (-4.196) (-0.286) 
R_Scotland 0.013*** -0.004** -0.013*** 0.057*** -0.035*** -0.022*** 
 (6.235) (-2.196) (-14.619) (16.807) (-10.716) (-12.034) 
R_NorthIreland 0.083*** -0.063*** -0.016*** 0.050*** -0.028*** -0.018*** 
 (27.478) (-23.546) (-12.503) (8.685) (-4.987) (-5.665) 
Qual_Degree 0.199*** -0.189*** 0.018*** 0.129*** -0.221*** 0.099*** 
 (111.071) (-129.620) (17.520) (40.513) (-87.945) (39.626) 
Qual_Postsec 0.142*** -0.112*** -0.003*** 0.105*** -0.120*** 0.024*** 
 (68.436) (-64.207) (-2.729) (33.128) (-42.634) (10.653) 
Qual_Secondary 0.075*** -0.059*** 0.008*** 0.061*** -0.089*** 0.033*** 
 (43.359) (-38.201) (9.498) (25.656) (-40.319) (20.783) 
Benefit -0.268*** 0.213*** -0.009*** -0.186*** 0.123*** 0.015*** 
 (-167.254) (144.121) (-10.995) (-70.521) (43.892) (8.505) 
Yr_2012 -0.045*** 0.049*** -0.012*** -0.022** 0.038*** -0.023*** 
 (-7.073) (7.885) (-5.294) (-2.050) (3.529) (-4.801) 
Yr_2011 -0.039*** 0.045*** -0.013*** -0.029*** 0.055*** -0.030*** 
 (-7.632) (9.148) (-7.084) (-3.269) (5.951) (-7.386) 
Yr_2010 -0.036*** 0.045*** -0.012*** -0.023** 0.050*** -0.030*** 
 (-7.211) (9.242) (-6.770) (-2.517) (5.448) (-7.503) 
Yr_2009 -0.025*** 0.038*** -0.014*** -0.011 0.046*** -0.036*** 
 (-4.981) (7.762) (-7.758) (-1.203) (4.945) (-9.472) 
Yr_2008 -0.010** 0.033*** -0.016*** -0.013 0.047*** -0.033*** 
 (-2.002) (6.939) (-9.251) (-1.398) (5.092) (-8.422) 
Yr_2007 -0.015*** 0.040*** -0.016*** -0.021** 0.051*** -0.026*** 
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 (-3.114) (8.184) (-9.414) (-2.340) (5.520) (-6.325) 
Yr_2006 0.000 -0.007*** 0.004*** 0.031*** -0.030*** -0.001 
 (0.130) (-2.680) (2.822) (6.318) (-6.392) (-0.237) 
Yr_2005 0.016*** -0.014*** 0.002 0.032*** -0.030*** 0.001 
 (5.252) (-5.057) (1.355) (6.398) (-6.397) (0.194) 
Yr_2004 -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.022*** -0.020*** 0.000 
 (-0.474) (0.686) (1.640) (4.441) (-4.165) (0.013) 
Yr_2003 -0.003 0.000 0.005*** 0.007 -0.010** 0.003 
 (-0.989) (0.170) (3.201) (1.479) (-2.137) (0.866) 
Yr_2002 0.002 -0.002 -0.000 0.005 -0.006 -0.001 
 (0.841) (-0.700) (-0.137) (1.007) (-1.240) (-0.223) 
Age_20to24 0.014 -0.118*** 0.127***    
 (1.508) (-26.951) (10.372)    
Age_25to29 0.010 -0.174*** 0.198***    
 (0.893) (-42.802) (14.071)    
Age_30to34 -0.034*** -0.174*** 0.247***    
 (-2.884) (-39.638) (16.387)    
Age_35to39 -0.080*** -0.161*** 0.285***    
 (-6.841) (-33.111) (18.381)    
Age_40to44 -0.128*** -0.144*** 0.320***    
 (-11.025) (-26.926) (20.061)    
Age_45to49 -0.194*** -0.111*** 0.349***    
 (-17.051) (-17.503) (20.857)    
Age_55to59    -0.082*** 0.063*** 0.017*** 
    (-38.187) (28.110) (11.073) 
Age_60to64    -0.154*** 0.119*** 0.055*** 
    (-50.958) (35.216) (22.160) 
Age_over64    -0.327*** 0.175*** 0.168*** 
    (-101.910) (34.140) (34.966) 
       
Pseudo R2 0.1516 0.0810 
Observations 806,229 300,641 
Control group: MS_Married, Ethn_White, Age_16to19 for the younger sample,  
Age_50to54 for the older sample, R_England, Qual_Primary, Yr_2001 
z-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.17: Marginal effects from binomial logits for working  
part-time involuntarily of part-timers 
 
 Pooled Male Female 
Regressors Younger Older Younger Older Younger Older 
Male 0.146*** 0.069***     
 (45.289) (27.685)     
MS_Single 0.059*** 0.066*** -0.001 0.046*** 0.064*** 0.078*** 
 (24.431) (15.474) (-0.104) (6.415) (25.699) (14.136) 
MS_Separ_Divor 0.087*** 0.080*** -0.028* 0.053*** 0.091*** 0.085*** 
 (25.303) (26.487) (-1.804) (7.518) (26.656) (25.661) 
MS_Widowed 0.016 0.032*** -0.265*** -0.001 0.027*** 0.035*** 
 (1.566) (8.313) (-5.814) (-0.067) (2.689) (8.697) 
Foreign 0.001 0.023*** -0.064*** 0.047*** 0.014** 0.016*** 
 (0.165) (3.984) (-4.892) (3.364) (2.558) (2.622) 
Ethn_Mixed 0.055*** 0.030* 0.046* 0.014 0.060*** 0.030* 
 (5.295) (1.791) (1.756) (0.288) (5.272) (1.757) 
Ethn_Asian 0.061*** 0.046*** 0.039*** 0.049*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 
 (13.848) (7.030) (3.979) (3.936) (8.112) (5.156) 
Ethn_Black 0.083*** 0.072*** 0.019 0.106*** 0.095*** 0.061*** 
 (13.121) (7.042) (1.347) (4.271) (13.303) (5.536) 
Ethn_Other 0.063*** 0.076*** 0.046*** 0.110*** 0.057*** 0.059*** 
 (7.626) (5.723) (2.766) (3.419) (5.926) (4.263) 
Health_problems 0.022*** 0.005*** -0.043*** -0.003 0.025*** 0.006*** 
 (8.810) (3.182) (-4.956) (-0.832) (9.587) (3.058) 
#KidsAged_0to4 -0.070*** 0.001 -0.027*** 0.009 -0.083*** -0.054** 
 (-39.210) (0.068) (-4.550) (0.777) (-43.960) (-2.294) 
#KidsAged_5to9 -0.014*** 0.003 -0.011* 0.005 -0.019*** -0.010 
 (-9.528) (0.634) (-1.956) (0.651) (-13.046) (-1.354) 
#KidsAged_10to15 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.018*** 0.006 0.001 0.003 
 (4.612) (3.275) (3.550) (1.270) (1.140) (1.229) 
R_Wales -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.016* -0.003 -0.007* 
 (-0.417) (-0.586) (0.071) (1.797) (-0.941) (-1.944) 
R_Scotland 0.014*** 0.011*** 0.027*** 0.008 0.012*** 0.011*** 
 (4.926) (4.112) (2.619) (1.284) (4.312) (4.029) 
R_NorthIreland -0.060*** -0.023*** 0.014 -0.008 -0.067*** -0.026*** 
 (-15.128) (-5.928) (0.808) (-0.669) (-17.679) (-6.626) 
Qual_Degree -0.040*** 0.000 -0.046*** -0.026*** -0.028*** 0.012*** 
 (-15.720) (0.116) (-4.923) (-5.393) (-10.656) (4.180) 
Qual_Postsec -0.034*** -0.008*** -0.029** -0.007 -0.026*** -0.008*** 
 (-11.567) (-3.348) (-2.308) (-1.185) (-8.900) (-3.146) 
Qual_Secondary -0.012*** -0.001 -0.022*** -0.010** -0.006*** 0.002 
 (-6.111) (-0.447) (-2.964) (-2.547) (-2.754) (0.959) 
Private -0.038*** -0.017*** -0.028*** -0.014*** -0.037*** -0.017*** 
 (-15.686) (-8.793) (-2.895) (-2.655) (-15.697) (-8.370) 
Ind_Agri_Fish -0.004 -0.032*** 0.010 -0.041*** -0.017 -0.028*** 
 (-0.282) (-3.990) (0.288) (-2.649) (-1.228) (-2.756) 
Ind_Energy_Water -0.064*** -0.011 -0.176*** -0.027 -0.044*** 0.004 
 (-5.392) (-0.935) (-4.472) (-1.441) (-3.402) (0.216) 
Ind_Constr -0.024*** -0.019*** -0.024 -0.023** -0.032*** -0.017** 
 (-3.319) (-3.466) (-1.157) (-2.193) (-4.064) (-2.383) 
Ind_Dis_Hotel_Restau 0.021*** 0.001 -0.011 0.002 0.025*** 0.001 
 (4.814) (0.306) (-0.847) (0.244) (5.479) (0.134) 
Ind_Trans_Comm 0.015** 0.006 0.013 0.010 0.003 0.003 
 (2.513) (1.204) (0.836) (1.108) (0.497) (0.542) 
Ind_Bank_Fin_Ins -0.009** -0.000 -0.013 0.006 -0.005 -0.002 
 (-2.018) (-0.123) (-0.852) (0.704) (-1.117) (-0.426) 
Ind_Pub_Edu_Health 0.004 0.001 -0.052*** 0.007 0.011** 0.001 
 (0.856) (0.349) (-3.372) (0.900) (2.426) (0.160) 
Ind_Others 0.018*** 0.009** -0.021 0.015 0.024*** 0.007 
 (3.299) (2.063) (-1.303) (1.630) (4.196) (1.335) 
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WorkHour -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.001** -0.002*** -0.005*** -0.002*** 
 (-38.536) (-20.733) (-2.089) (-7.401) (-42.464) (-20.470) 
Temporary 0.078*** 0.041*** 0.061*** 0.045*** 0.080*** 0.041*** 
 (24.697) (14.620) (7.722) (8.618) (23.405) (12.024) 
Tenure -0.009*** -0.004*** -0.021*** -0.005*** -0.008*** -0.003*** 
 (-54.587) (-41.791) (-24.297) (-19.613) (-46.776) (-34.848) 
Homeworker -0.105*** -0.044*** -0.099*** -0.016* -0.095*** -0.050*** 
 (-22.295) (-13.425) (-3.159) (-1.682) (-21.480) (-15.499) 
SecJob -0.013*** 0.016*** -0.124*** 0.001 -0.002 0.019*** 
 (-4.620) (6.026) (-12.396) (0.223) (-0.722) (6.343) 
Benefit -0.026*** 0.016*** 0.041*** 0.043*** -0.022*** 0.017*** 
 (-10.688) (8.366) (5.461) (7.983) (-8.958) (8.002) 
Yr_2012 0.109*** 0.032*** 0.206*** 0.008 0.077*** 0.036*** 
 (11.436) (3.461) (9.946) (0.412) (7.847) (3.367) 
Yr_2011 0.084*** 0.026*** 0.171*** -0.000 0.058*** 0.031*** 
 (11.408) (3.386) (9.861) (-0.004) (7.649) (3.539) 
Yr_2010 0.067*** 0.017** 0.169*** -0.009 0.041*** 0.022*** 
 (9.362) (2.341) (9.768) (-0.622) (5.587) (2.732) 
Yr_2009 0.050*** 0.002 0.135*** -0.023* 0.028*** 0.008 
 (7.257) (0.369) (7.533) (-1.656) (3.971) (1.093) 
Yr_2008 0.017*** -0.012** 0.046** -0.049*** 0.006 -0.003 
 (2.654) (-2.087) (2.453) (-4.409) (0.873) (-0.393) 
Yr_2007 0.012* -0.019*** 0.051*** -0.052*** -0.001 -0.010 
 (1.852) (-3.427) (2.696) (-4.754) (-0.144) (-1.605) 
Yr_2006 0.003 -0.003 -0.011 -0.014* 0.004 -0.000 
 (0.884) (-0.738) (-0.708) (-1.681) (1.049) (-0.012) 
Yr_2005 -0.016*** -0.001 -0.044*** -0.011 -0.013*** 0.001 
 (-4.160) (-0.328) (-2.837) (-1.361) (-3.352) (0.171) 
Yr_2004 -0.027*** -0.007** -0.028* -0.019** -0.027*** -0.004 
 (-7.442) (-1.990) (-1.829) (-2.482) (-7.600) (-1.058) 
Yr_2003 -0.014*** -0.000 0.003 -0.003 -0.015*** -0.000 
 (-3.717) (-0.055) (0.209) (-0.335) (-4.159) (-0.113) 
Yr_2002 -0.009** -0.004 0.004 -0.012 -0.010*** -0.003 
 (-2.567) (-1.349) (0.288) (-1.546) (-2.911) (-0.751) 
Age_20to24 -0.034***  -0.023**  -0.040***  
 (-7.889)  (-2.135)  (-8.394)  
Age_25to29 -0.079***  -0.052***  -0.087***  
 (-20.020)  (-4.218)  (-21.867)  
Age_30to34 -0.094***  -0.078***  -0.102***  
 (-23.844)  (-5.854)  (-25.019)  
Age_35to39 -0.092***  -0.080***  -0.104***  
 (-22.186)  (-5.967)  (-23.935)  
Age_40to44 -0.095***  -0.080***  -0.110***  
                                             (-22.861)  (-5.733)  (-25.465)  
Age_45to49 -0.101***  -0.092***  -0.116***  
 (-24.847)  (-6.386)  (-28.298)  
Age_55to59  -0.034***  -0.045***  -0.031*** 
  (-23.818)  (-11.770)  (-20.416) 
Age_60to64  -0.089***  -0.099***  -0.091*** 
  (-64.766)  (-25.740)  (-59.976) 
Age_over64  -0.103***  -0.189***  -0.086*** 
  (-79.906)  (-39.567)  (-63.463) 
       
Pseudo R2 0.0917 0.1048 0.0499 0.1242 0.0749 0.0990 
Observations 299,326 161,338 32,063 33,684 267,263 127,654 
Control group: MS_Married, Ethn_White, Age_16to19 for the younger sample,  
Age_50to54 for the older sample, R_England, Qual_Primary, Ind_Manuf, Yr_2001 
z-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix for Chapter 6 
Construction of the spell-data file 
The extensive data collected by the BHPS are stored in different records and so re-
organization of the data is needed before use. Our goal is to derive a consistent work-life 
history file that combines the respondents’ spell records for economic activities, from 
Wave 1 to Wave 18, with their socio-demographic and job information such as gender 
and industries of work. The data file is in ‘long format’ for survival analyses. As 
mentioned in the previous sub-section, we use the wLIFEMST, wHHRESP, wJOBHIST 
and wINDRESP files for spell-data construction57. 
Taylor et al. (2010) explained that the wLIFEMST records contain information on 
respondents’ economic activities in the period after they first left full time education up 
to their first interview. The records consist of three files: bLIFEMST, kLIFEMST and 
lLIFEMST, which contain information of the base sample and the other two additional 
samples respectively. This differs from the other three records, which have 18 files, one 
for each wave. The information in the wLIFEMST records is used to create the variables 
on previous working experience58. The wHHRESP records contain survey responses on 
household-level information at the time of interview. The information in these records is 
used to construct the variable on the number of children in the households. The 
wJOBHIST records contain information on the economic activities and job-related 
characteristics of the respondents in the period from the first of September in the reference 
year (previous wave) up to the date of interview. The wINDRESP records contain the 
                                                 
57 The prefix letter ‘w’ on the filenames refer to the waves from “a” (Wave 1) to “r” (Wave 18).  
58 The creation of variables is discussed in next subsection. 
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main annual survey data on respondents’ economic statuses and other socio-demographic 
information such as gender and number of children at the time of interview59.  
Generating our spell-data file involves seven steps similar to those of Mare (2006). 
Firstly, merge each wave’s wINDRESP and wHHRESP records, clean the variables and 
then save each wave’s merged file with the name wCHAR. Secondly, combine the 
wCHAR files from all waves into one file and save it as BHPS_CHAR containing 
respondents’ characteristics from Waves 1 to 18. Thirdly, merge the wJOBHIST and 
wINDRESP records for each wave and clean the variables needed to construct the spell 
records, saving each wave’s merged files with the name wSPELL. Fourthly, combine the 
wSPELL files into one file and save this as BHPS_SPELL containing respondents’ 
economic status history from Wave 1 to 18. Fifthly, merge the BHPS_SPELL file with 
the BHPS_CHAR file ensuring that at the start of each spell we record each respondent’s 
socio-economic characteristics and save this file as BHPS_SPELL_CHAR. This ensures 
that all ‘time-fixed’ variables are predetermined at the start of each spell and are therefore 
exogenous60. Sixthly, combine the three wLIFEMST files into a single work experience 
file called BHPS_LIFEMST61. Lastly, combine the BHPS_SPELL_CHAR file with the 
BHPS_LIFEMST file, drop the unwanted variables and save the file as BHPS_FINAL. 
This is our complete spell-data file with spell information such as start and end time and 
socio-demographic characteristics for each spell. 
We drop any spells irrelevant for our analyses. Firstly, spells starting before the date 
of interview in Wave 1 are dropped to ensure that the ‘time-fixed’ independent variables 
                                                 
59 The BHPS has XWAVEDAT records which contains respondents’ ‘time-fixed’ data such as gender. 
However, since all those information are also available in the wINDRESP records, we just use those 
information in the wINDRESP records for simplicity. 
60 All our independent variables are ‘time-fixed’ except the variable on elapsed duration of spells. More 
account is made in Section 6.2. 
61 We explain the creation of variables in Section 6.2. 
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are predetermined before the start of each spell. Secondly, spells of those whose questions 
were answered by another household member (proxy respondents) are dropped. Thirdly, 
spells with zero or negative durations are dropped. Fourthly, spells with negative 
unearned income are dropped. Lastly, spells with missing information except missing 
dates are dropped. In addition, four measures, based on Halpin (1997), Paull (2003) and 
Mare (2006), are carried out to amend any data inconsistencies such as seam effects62. 
First, left censored spells are dropped. The missing start date of any subsequent spells is 
assigned to equal the end date of their previous spell. Second, dates with missing month 
are assigned to be in June. Third, the missing end date of any spells is assigned to equal 
the start date of their next spell. Last, the end date of any spells overlapping or having 
time gaps with their subsequent spell is assigned to equal the start date of the subsequent 
spell. After spell editing, the dataset consist of 24,834 spells.  
  
                                                 
62  Seam effects refer to the inconsistencies of data between consecutive spells. They arise from 
measurement or recall errors in repeated collection of the panel data (Halpin, 1997). 
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Table 6.3: Summary statistics for the unemployment spells (mean values) 
 
 Pooled Male Female 
Mean Age 30.07 30.21 29.87 
Age_16to24 0.4523 0.4437 0.4644 
Age_25to34 0.2313 0.2429 0.2149 
Age_35to44 0.1569 0.1570 0.1569 
Age_45to54 0.1173 0.1106 0.1267 
Age_over54 0.0421 0.0458 0.0369 
Male  0.5842   
MS_Married  0.2878 0.2913 0.2829 
MS_Single  0.6460 0.6587 0.6281 
MS_SepDivWid  0.0662 0.0501 0.0890 
Health_problems 0.1127 0.1128 0.1124 
#KidsAged_0to4 0.1414 0.1550 0.1224 
#KidsAged_5to11 0.2630 0.2664 0.2582 
#KidsAged_12to15 0.1944 0.1943 0.1947 
UnearnedY_per1000 2.410 2.361 2.478 
Benef_UE_Ysupp 0.3783 0.4248 0.3131 
R_England_S 0.3055 0.2902 0.3270 
R_England_M 0.1864 0.1920 0.1784 
R_England_N 0.2070 0.2214 0.1867 
R_nonEng 0.3012 0.2964 0.3079 
Qual_Degree  0.1383 0.1343 0.1438 
Qual_Sec_Postsec  0.6588 0.6459 0.6770 
Qual_Primary  0.2029 0.2197 0.1792 
PrevExp_FTE_yrs 2.030 (4.740) 2.370 (5.297) 1.553 (3.774) 
PrevExp_PTE_yrs 0.5054 (1.822) 0.1965 (0.9408) 0.9395 (2.534) 
PrevExp_SE_yrs 0.0978 (0.6864) 0.1194 (0.7674) 0.0674 (0.5515) 
Annual_UE_rate 6.906 6.995 6.781 
Exit state:    
FTE 0.4091 0.4717 0.3210 
Duration: 9.217 (16.03) 10.22 (17.04) 7.150 (13.50) 
PTE 0.1330 0.0724 0.2181 
Duration: 9.621 (15.18) 10.79 (15.97) 9.075 (14.78) 
SE 0.0309 0.0416 0.0159 
Duration: 11.96 (17.30) 12 (16.21) 11.83 (21.07) 
Inact 0.1188 0.1080 0.1339 
Duration: 13.19 (17.76) 12.47 (16.17) 14.01 (19.40) 
Censored 0.3083 0.3063 0.3111 
Duration: 11.79 (20.98) 12.40 (21.46) 10.95 (20.29) 
Persons 4,150 2,303 1,847 
Spells 6,053 3,536 2,517 
Note: People aged 16 or over from BHPS Waves 1-18 (1991-2008) 
Previous experiences are in years and durations are in months 
Standard deviation in brackets 
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Table 6.4: Summary statistics for the full-time employment spells (mean values) 
 
 Pooled Male Female 
Mean Age 29.30 29.71 28.77  
Age_16to24 0.4561 0.4347 0.4835 
Age_25to34 0.2583 0.2702 0.2429 
Age_35to44 0.1575 0.1608 0.1533 
Age_45to54 0.0959 0.0950 0.0971 
Age_over54 0.0323 0.0394 0.0232 
Male  0.5630   
MS_Married  0.3025 0.3229 0.2761 
MS_Single  0.6462 0.6386 0.6560 
MS_SepDivWid 0.0512 0.0382 0.0679 
Health_problems 0.0865 0.0832 0.0908 
#KidsAged_0to4 0.1440 0.1788 0.0991 
#KidsAged_5to11 0.2571 0.2668 0.2446 
#KidsAged_12to15 0.1995 0.1868 0.2160 
UnearnedY_per1000 2.246 2.128 2.398 
R_England_S 0.3070 0.2918 0.3266 
R_England_M 0.1790 0.1879 0.1676 
R_England_N 0.2048 0.2184 0.1873 
R_nonEng 0.3092 0.3020 0.3185 
Qual_Degree  0.1535 0.1350 0.1773 
Qual_Sec_Postsec  0.6885 0.6891 0.6878 
Qual_Primary  0.1580 0.1759 0.1349 
PrevExp_FTE_yrs 1.648 (4.455) 1.780 (4.875) 1.479 (3.842) 
PrevExp_PTE_yrs 0.4043 (1.471) 0.1854 (0.8342) 0.6862 (1.978) 
PrevExp_SE_yrs 0.1074 (0.7704) 0.1438 (0.9202) 0.0605 (0.5135) 
Ind_Sec 0.3463 0.4232 0.2472 
Ind_Tert 0.4415 0.4038 0.4901 
Ind_PubEduHealth 0.1140 0.0738 0.1659 
Ind_Others 0.0981 0.0992 0.0968 
Annual_UE_rate 6.816 6.864 6.755 
Exit state:    
UE 0.2843 0.3322 0.2226 
Duration: 18.43 (25.39) 18.37 (25.19) 18.54 (25.78) 
PTE 0.0764 0.0463 0.1152 
Duration: 21.08 (27.06) 20.04 (26.86) 21.61 (27.19) 
SE 0.0217 0.0294 0.0117 
Duration: 29.38 (27.59) 29.86 (29.13) 27.85 (22.16) 
Inact 0.1442 0.1010 0.1999 
Duration: 26.13 (30.97) 26.25 (32.83) 26.06 (29.72) 
Censored 0.4735 0.4912 0.4506 
Duration: 36.83 (39.76) 38.61 (40.94) 34.32 (37.91) 
Persons 5,731 3,119 2,612 
Spells 7,988 4,497 3,491 
Note: People aged 16 or over from BHPS Waves 1-18 (1991-2008) 
Previous experiences are in years and durations are in months 
Standard deviation in brackets 
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Table 6.5: Summary statistics for the part-time employment spells (mean values) 
 
 Pooled Male Female 
Mean Age 32.13 30.10 32.75 
Age_16to24 0.3560 0.5307 0.3028 
Age_25to34 0.2696 0.1820 0.2963 
Age_35to44 0.1871 0.0961 0.2148 
Age_45to54 0.1150 0.0777 0.1264 
Age_over54 0.0721 0.1135 0.0594 
Male  0.2334   
MS_Married  0.4414 0.2781 0.4911 
MS_Single  0.4796 0.6861 0.4167 
MS_SepDivWid 0.0790 0.0358 0.0921 
Health_problems 0.1203 0.1135 0.1223 
#KidsAged_0to4 0.2524 0.1411 0.2863 
#KidsAged_5to11 0.4541 0.2751 0.5086 
#KidsAged_12to15 0.2202 0.2086 0.2238 
UnearnedY_per1000 2.340 2.331 2.343 
Benef_UE_Ysupp 0.1594 0.2239 0.1397 
R_England_S 0.3080 0.3384 0.2988 
R_England_M 0.1916 0.1820 0.1945 
R_England_N 0.2071 0.2065 0.2073 
R_nonEng 0.2932 0.2730 0.2994 
Qual_Degree  0.1098 0.1339 0.1024 
Qual_Sec_Postsec  0.6815 0.6769 0.6829 
Qual_Primary  0.2088 0.1892 0.2148 
PrevExp_FTE_yrs 1.441 (3.769) 1.668 (4.333) 1.373 (3.578) 
PrevExp_PTE_yrs 0.8496 (2.447) 0.2673 (1.214) 1.027 (2.689) 
PrevExp_SE_yrs 0.0816 (0.5997) 0.1098 (0.7662) 0.0730 (0.5387) 
Ind_Sec 0.2496 0.2965 0.2353 
Ind_Tert 0.4856 0.4724 0.4896 
Ind_PubEduHealth 0.1794 0.1360 0.1927 
Ind_Others 0.0854 0.0951 0.0825 
Annual_UE_rate 6.804 6.734 6.825 
Exit state:    
UE 0.1613 0.2239 0.1422 
Duration: 17.55 (23.03) 12.35 (16.94) 20.04 (25.07) 
FTE 0.1911 0.2853 0.1625 
Duration: 19.20 (23.91) 14.32 (18.49) 21.81 (26.00) 
SE 0.0162 0.0256 0.0134 
Duration: 21.99 (29.27) 14.68 (20.35) 26.23 (32.86) 
Inact 0.2422 0.1268 0.2773 
Duration: 20.61 (22.82) 13.27 (15.21) 21.64 (23.51) 
Censored 0.3892 0.3384 0.4046 
Duration: 31.58 (35.89) 20.18 (26.54) 34.49 (37.36) 
Persons 3,204 828 2,376 
Spells 4,191 978 3,213 
Note: People aged 16 or over from BHPS Waves 1-18 (1991-2008) 
Previous experiences are in years and durations are in months 
Standard deviation in brackets 
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Table 6.6: Summary statistics for the self-employment spells (mean values) 
 
 Pooled Male Female 
Mean Age 36.35 35.91 37.12 
Age_16to24 0.1474 0.1670 0.1135 
Age_25to34 0.3611 0.3517 0.3773 
Age_35to44 0.2362 0.2345 0.2393 
Age_45to54 0.1789 0.1670 0.1994 
Age_over54 0.0765 0.0799 0.0706 
Male  0.6333   
MS_Married  0.4972 0.4760 0.5337 
MS_Single  0.4151 0.4512 0.3528 
MS_SepDivWid 0.0877 0.0728 0.1135 
Health_problems 0.1181 0.1083 0.1350 
#KidsAged_0to4 0.2508 0.2433 0.2638 
#KidsAged_5to11 0.3138 0.2718 0.3865 
#KidsAged_12to15 0.1552 0.1581 0.1503 
UnearnedY_per1000 2.214 2.017 2.556 
Benef_UE_Ysupp 0.1496 0.1865 0.0859 
R_England_S 0.4229 0.4156 0.4356 
R_England_M 0.1620 0.1652 0.1564 
R_England_N 0.1755 0.1758 0.1748 
R_nonEng 0.2396 0.2433 0.2331 
Qual_Degree  0.1901 0.1652 0.2331 
Qual_Sec_Postsec  0.6344 0.6572 0.5951 
Qual_Primary  0.1755 0.1776 0.1718 
PrevExp_FTE_yrs 1.970 (4.527) 2.436 (5.262) 1.165 (2.662) 
PrevExp_PTE_yrs 0.3777 (1.459) 0.1994 (0.9298) 0.6856 (2.042) 
PrevExp_SE_yrs 0.2891 (1.394) 0.3345 (1.578) 0.2106 (0.9983) 
Ind_Sec 0.3150 0.4192 0.1350 
Ind_Tert 0.4027 0.3712 0.4571 
Ind_PubEduHealth 0.1147 0.0515 0.2239 
Ind_Others 0.1676 0.1581 0.1840 
Annual_UE_rate 7.251 7.274 7.212 
Exit state:    
UE 0.1642 0.1954 0.1104 
Duration: 17.39 (22.25) 15.73 (19.58) 22.47 (28.67) 
FTE 0.2216 0.2806 0.1196 
Duration: 24.38 (28.71) 22.96 (28.17) 30.13 (30.50) 
PTE 0.0765 0.0355 0.1472 
Duration: 25.12 (23.75) 22 (26.03) 26.42 (22.90) 
Inact 0.1474 0.1030 0.2239 
Duration: 22.18 (25.47) 26.93 (30.63) 18.41 (19.90) 
Censored 0.3903 0.3854 0.3988 
Duration: 29.39 (35.25) 26.50 (33.38) 34.23 (37.81) 
Persons 773 484 289 
Spells 889 563 326 
Note: People aged 16 or over from BHPS Waves 1-18 (1991-2008) 
Previous experiences are in years and durations are in months 
Standard deviation in brackets 
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Table 6.7: Hazard ratios from competing risks Cox model  
on exiting from unemployment (full sample) 
 
 UE spell ending with: 
Regressors FTE PTE SE Inact 
Male 1.358*** 0.318*** 2.325*** 0.788*** 
 (6.868) (-14.263) (4.510) (-3.058) 
MS_Single 1.169** 0.685*** 0.859 1.020 
 (2.448) (-3.685) (-0.745) (0.168) 
MS_SepDivWid 0.693*** 0.548*** 1.499 1.226 
 (-3.426) (-3.924) (1.626) (1.295) 
Health_problems 0.761*** 1.171 1.140 1.305** 
 (-3.895) (1.518) (0.607) (2.483) 
#KidsAged_0to4 0.781*** 1.103 1.145 0.943 
 (-4.496) (1.243) (0.891) (-0.641) 
#KidsAged_5to11 0.905*** 1.231*** 0.934 0.968 
 (-2.631) (3.834) (-0.563) (-0.481) 
#KidsAged_12to15 0.942 1.086 0.752 1.099 
 (-1.292) (1.138) (-1.412) (1.180) 
UnearnedY_per1000 1.019 0.955* 1.084** 0.916*** 
 (1.598) (-1.928) (2.063) (-3.334) 
Benef_UE_Ysupp 0.946 0.853** 0.842 0.889 
 (-1.307) (-2.035) (-1.125) (-1.484) 
R_England_M 1.049 0.936 0.569** 0.783** 
 (0.825) (-0.643) (-2.515) (-2.114) 
R_England_N 0.959 0.901 0.729 1.001 
 (-0.720) (-1.052) (-1.633) (0.011) 
R_nonEng 0.925 0.717*** 0.549*** 0.895 
 (-1.341) (-3.254) (-2.665) (-1.044) 
Qual_Degree 0.784*** 0.975 1.181 1.294* 
 (-3.093) (-0.187) (0.654) (1.775) 
Qual_Sec_Postsec 1.013 1.009 1.096 1.254** 
 (0.242) (0.095) (0.483) (2.129) 
PrevExp_FTE_yrs 1.031*** 0.987 0.977 0.995 
 (7.860) (-1.318) (-1.410) (-0.503) 
PrevExp_PTE_yrs 0.956*** 1.085*** 0.993 1.059*** 
 (-2.610) (6.357) (-0.139) (2.709) 
PrevExp_SE_yrs 0.966 1.000 1.215*** 1.023 
 (-1.005) (0.001) (3.516) (0.329) 
ln_UE_rate 1.130 0.884 1.638 0.778 
 (1.415) (-0.794) (1.454) (-1.571) 
Elaps_Dur_yrs 0.548*** 0.609*** 0.870 0.888* 
 (-19.309) (-8.820) (-1.087) (-1.827) 
Elaps_Dur_yrs_Sq 1.038*** 1.030*** 1.001 1.000 
 (12.115) (5.059) (0.088) (-0.024) 
Age_25to34 0.874** 0.832* 2.675*** 0.785** 
 (-2.385) (-1.668) (4.251) (-2.266) 
Age_35to44 0.672*** 0.764** 2.254*** 0.489*** 
 (-5.311) (-2.130) (3.023) (-5.007) 
Age_45to54 0.622*** 0.702** 2.258*** 0.376*** 
 (-5.262) (-2.382) (2.727) (-5.499) 
Age_over54 0.483*** 0.934 2.156* 0.539*** 
 (-5.060) (-0.342) (1.870) (-2.586) 
Failures (exits) 2,476 805 187 719 
UE spells 6,053 6,053 6,053 6,053 
Person-months 64,272 64,272 64,272 64,272 
Log-likelihood -15704 -4949.2 -1152.8 -4624.5 
Control group: MS_Married, Age_16to24, R_England_S, Qual_Primary  
z-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 6.8: Hazard ratios from competing risks Cox model  
on exiting from unemployment (males sample) 
 
 UE spell ending with: 
Regressors FTE PTE SE Inact 
MS_Single 1.056 0.957 0.638* 1.370* 
 (0.696) (-0.220) (-1.897) (1.860) 
MS_SepDivWid 0.707** 0.545 1.501 1.157 
 (-2.483) (-1.508) (1.419) (0.575) 
Health_problems 0.711*** 1.230 0.975 1.311* 
 (-3.968) (1.181) (-0.099) (1.886) 
#KidsAged_0to4 0.885** 0.998 1.083 0.854 
 (-2.038) (-0.016) (0.477) (-1.210) 
#KidsAged_5to11 0.914** 1.108 0.909 1.015 
 (-2.085) (1.052) (-0.721) (0.178) 
#KidsAged_12to15 0.953 1.087 0.878 0.985 
 (-0.864) (0.642) (-0.625) (-0.137) 
UnearnedY_per1000 1.003 0.922* 1.071 0.872*** 
 (0.173) (-1.827) (1.287) (-3.510) 
Benef_UE_Ysupp 0.919* 1.090 0.950 0.908 
 (-1.662) (0.664) (-0.304) (-0.914) 
R_England_M 0.992 0.856 0.627* 0.569*** 
 (-0.107) (-0.880) (-1.857) (-3.309) 
R_England_N 0.995 0.893 0.821 1.016 
 (-0.070) (-0.656) (-0.908) (0.116) 
R_nonEng 1.019 0.544*** 0.651* 0.868 
 (0.256) (-3.193) (-1.686) (-0.946) 
Qual_Degree 0.780*** 1.561** 1.053 1.182 
 (-2.579) (1.992) (0.172) (0.853) 
Qual_Sec_Postsec 1.030 1.108 1.129 1.191 
 (0.457) (0.622) (0.580) (1.309) 
PrevExp_FTE_yrs 1.025*** 1.005 0.978 0.994 
 (5.440) (0.359) (-1.240) (-0.453) 
PrevExp_PTE_yrs 0.958 1.110*** 1.067 0.967 
 (-1.305) (2.817) (1.032) (-0.495) 
PrevExp_SE_yrs 0.971 1.062 1.202*** 0.943 
 (-0.762) (0.623) (2.743) (-0.556) 
ln_UE_rate 1.027 0.448*** 1.352 0.641** 
 (0.250) (-3.023) (0.788) (-2.043) 
Elaps_Dur_yrs 0.610*** 0.674*** 0.902 0.924 
 (-13.167) (-3.498) (-0.685) (-0.803) 
Elaps_Dur_yrs_Sq 1.030*** 1.030** 0.999 0.991 
 (7.902) (2.097) (-0.043) (-0.742) 
Age_25to34 0.831*** 0.627** 2.449*** 0.684*** 
 (-2.712) (-2.541) (3.366) (-2.630) 
Age_35to44 0.623*** 0.455*** 1.823* 0.557*** 
 (-5.212) (-3.257) (1.939) (-3.120) 
Age_45to54 0.564*** 0.572** 1.768* 0.453*** 
 (-5.192) (-2.033) (1.671) (-3.239) 
Age_over54 0.419*** 0.742 1.726 0.628 
 (-4.962) (-0.828) (1.190) (-1.505) 
     
Failures (exits) 1,668 256 147 382 
UE spells 3,536 3,536 3,536 3,536 
Person-months 39,758 39,758 39,758 39,758 
Log-likelihood -9828.9 -1527.4 -854.98 -2263.9 
Control group: MS_Married, Age_16to24, R_England_S, Qual_Primary 
z-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6.9: Hazard ratios from competing risks Cox model  
on exiting from unemployment (females sample) 
 
 UE spell ending with: 
Regressors FTE PTE SE Inact 
MS_Single 1.500*** 0.595*** 2.607** 0.795 
 (3.510) (-4.215) (2.069) (-1.381) 
MS_SepDivWid 0.722* 0.494*** 1.606 1.229 
 (-1.881) (-4.184) (0.846) (0.987) 
Health_problems 0.799* 1.160 2.005 1.250 
 (-1.795) (1.129) (1.541) (1.361) 
#KidsAged_0to4 0.451*** 1.283** 1.466 1.107 
 (-5.485) (2.552) (0.923) (0.782) 
#KidsAged_5to11 0.848** 1.357*** 1.089 0.903 
 (-2.067) (4.392) (0.262) (-0.882) 
#KidsAged_12to15 0.933 1.094 0.199 1.234* 
 (-0.804) (1.017) (-1.630) (1.851) 
UnearnedY_per1000 1.044** 0.943** 1.072 0.946 
 (2.517) (-1.996) (1.322) (-1.552) 
Benef_UE_Ysupp 1.001 0.776** 0.364** 0.837 
 (0.011) (-2.492) (-2.372) (-1.444) 
R_England_M 1.143 0.933 0.411 1.105 
 (1.340) (-0.540) (-1.645) (0.617) 
R_England_N 0.912 0.865 0.421* 0.976 
 (-0.883) (-1.176) (-1.773) (-0.149) 
R_nonEng 0.822* 0.737** 0.323** 0.893 
 (-1.946) (-2.472) (-2.237) (-0.739) 
Qual_Degree 0.858 0.762 1.479 1.638** 
 (-1.075) (-1.560) (0.723) (2.158) 
Qual_Sec_Postsec 1.094 0.968 0.910 1.436** 
 (0.816) (-0.282) (-0.192) (1.995) 
PrevExp_FTE_yrs 1.059*** 0.977 0.990 1.006 
 (6.670) (-1.641) (-0.216) (0.316) 
PrevExp_PTE_yrs 0.975 1.064*** 0.935 1.090*** 
 (-1.234) (4.199) (-0.722) (3.633) 
PrevExp_SE_yrs 0.984 0.993 1.304* 1.172* 
 (-0.181) (-0.077) (1.957) (1.654) 
ln_UE_rate 1.373** 1.139 3.297 0.953 
 (2.077) (0.671) (1.537) (-0.201) 
Elaps_Dur_yrs 0.397*** 0.598*** 0.706 0.855* 
 (-14.782) (-7.613) (-1.355) (-1.678) 
Elaps_Dur_yrs_Sq 1.063*** 1.031*** 1.017 1.009 
 (10.251) (4.427) (0.604) (0.840) 
Age_25to34 0.942 0.903 3.303** 0.880 
 (-0.559) (-0.730) (2.411) (-0.791) 
Age_35to44 0.727** 1.001 3.647** 0.421*** 
 (-2.357) (0.005) (2.256) (-3.853) 
Age_45to54 0.740* 0.845 4.984** 0.319*** 
 (-1.871) (-0.933) (2.432) (-4.264) 
Age_over54 0.725 1.118 2.371 0.525* 
 (-1.269) (0.447) (0.756) (-1.685) 
     
Failures (exits) 808 549 40 337 
UE spells 2,517 2,517 2,517 2,517 
Person-months 24,514 24,514 24,514 24,514 
Log-likelihood -4243.5 -2882.4 -186.61 -1838.5 
Control group: MS_Married, Age_16to24, R_England_S, Qual_Primary 
z-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6.10: Hazard ratios from competing risks Cox model  
on exiting from full-time employment (full sample) 
 
 FTE spell ending with: 
Regressors UE PTE SE Inact 
Male 1.420*** 0.425*** 2.080*** 0.505*** 
 (7.548) (-9.492) (3.907) (-10.740) 
MS_Single 1.688*** 1.257* 1.306 1.002 
 (7.957) (1.816) (1.217) (0.017) 
MS_SepDivWid 1.228* 1.267 1.077 1.024 
 (1.883) (1.315) (0.190) (0.165) 
Health_problems 1.309*** 1.322** 1.464 1.553*** 
 (3.720) (2.035) (1.432) (4.608) 
#KidsAged_0to4 0.921 1.175 1.181 0.997 
 (-1.488) (1.644) (0.961) (-0.036) 
#KidsAged_5to11 1.077** 1.316*** 0.850 1.012 
 (1.989) (4.314) (-1.060) (0.212) 
#KidsAged_12to15 0.924 0.911 1.161 1.037 
 (-1.635) (-1.031) (0.926) (0.554) 
UnearnedY_per1000 0.909*** 0.910*** 0.987 0.950*** 
 (-6.418) (-3.318) (-0.255) (-2.693) 
R_England_M 1.099 1.110 0.677* 0.892 
 (1.572) (0.877) (-1.746) (-1.302) 
R_England_N 0.950 1.140 0.662* 0.855* 
 (-0.850) (1.160) (-1.952) (-1.875) 
R_nonEng 0.978 0.975 0.675* 0.838** 
 (-0.369) (-0.222) (-1.792) (-2.174) 
Qual_Degree 0.463*** 0.507*** 1.397 1.042 
 (-9.002) (-3.934) (1.130) (0.345) 
Qual_Sec_Postsec 0.674*** 0.776** 1.180 0.984 
 (-6.929) (-2.145) (0.691) (-0.170) 
PrevExp_FTE_yrs 1.022*** 1.023*** 1.009 1.021*** 
 (5.088) (2.633) (0.551) (3.142) 
PrevExp_PTE_yrs 0.974 1.141*** 0.979 0.995 
 (-1.341) (7.358) (-0.231) (-0.221) 
PrevExp_SE_yrs 0.966 1.028 1.220*** 1.081** 
 (-1.081) (0.376) (4.490) (2.315) 
Ind_Tert 0.866*** 1.134 0.671** 1.152* 
 (-3.013) (1.245) (-2.286) (1.912) 
Ind_PubEduHealth 0.770*** 1.390** 0.412*** 1.376*** 
 (-3.248) (2.445) (-2.639) (3.236) 
Ind_Others 0.979 1.380** 1.322 1.487*** 
 (-0.279) (2.202) (1.170) (3.753) 
ln_UE_rate 1.319*** 1.143 2.698*** 0.856 
 (3.137) (0.775) (2.997) (-1.257) 
Elaps_Dur_yrs 0.599*** 0.622*** 1.083 0.838*** 
 (-16.816) (-7.729) (0.566) (-4.292) 
Elaps_Dur_yrs_Sq 1.026*** 1.040*** 0.984 1.008** 
 (9.303) (6.361) (-1.114) (2.337) 
Age_25to34 0.731*** 0.598*** 1.068 0.711*** 
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 (-5.288) (-4.301) (0.307) (-4.096) 
Age_35to44 0.683*** 0.495*** 1.106 0.509*** 
 (-4.914) (-4.585) (0.368) (-5.968) 
Age_45to54 0.748*** 0.550*** 1.107 0.489*** 
 (-3.065) (-3.137) (0.310) (-5.034) 
Age_over54 0.522*** 0.649 0.397 0.878 
 (-3.919) (-1.475) (-1.207) (-0.679) 
     
Failures (exits) 2,271 610 173 1,152 
FTE spells 7,988 7,988 7,988 7,988 
Person-months 228,997 228,997 228,997 228,997 
Log-likelihood -16,752 -4413.3 -1248.0 -8445.0 
Control group: MS_Married, Age_16to24, R_England_S,  
Qual_Primary, Ind_Sec,  
z-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6.11: Hazard ratios from competing risks Cox model  
on exiting from full-time employment (males sample) 
 
 FTE spell ending with: 
Regressors UE PTE SE Inact 
MS_Single 1.639*** 2.079*** 1.485 1.816*** 
 (6.174) (3.155) (1.555) (4.035) 
MS_SepDivWid 1.416** 2.565*** 1.253 1.622* 
 (2.401) (2.580) (0.464) (1.900) 
Health_problems 1.217** 1.642** 1.323 1.814*** 
 (2.145) (2.258) (0.873) (4.104) 
#KidsAged_0to4 1.018 1.085 1.330 0.863 
 (0.286) (0.474) (1.528) (-1.156) 
#KidsAged_5to11 1.125*** 1.158 0.800 1.009 
 (2.698) (1.167) (-1.256) (0.103) 
#KidsAged_12to15 0.939 0.873 1.232 0.912 
 (-1.029) (-0.768) (1.129) (-0.803) 
UnearnedY_per1000 0.892*** 0.896** 0.989 0.895*** 
 (-5.887) (-2.176) (-0.195) (-3.261) 
R_England_M 1.165** 0.893 0.582** 0.902 
 (2.022) (-0.550) (-2.125) (-0.777) 
R_England_N 1.035 1.137 0.514*** 0.721** 
 (0.469) (0.701) (-2.648) (-2.433) 
R_nonEng 1.125 0.705* 0.615* 0.722** 
 (1.532) (-1.646) (-1.920) (-2.408) 
Qual_Degree 0.483*** 0.505** 1.031 0.903 
 (-7.019) (-2.230) (0.089) (-0.549) 
Qual_Sec_Postsec 0.689*** 1.012 1.167 1.082 
 (-5.551) (0.059) (0.589) (0.564) 
PrevExp_FTE_yrs 1.024*** 1.028** 1.003 1.026*** 
 (4.745) (2.073) (0.154) (3.230) 
PrevExp_PTE_yrs 1.007 1.230*** 1.065 1.035 
 (0.216) (4.655) (0.474) (0.635) 
PrevExp_SE_yrs 0.945 0.972 1.225*** 1.061 
 (-1.574) (-0.250) (4.206) (1.358) 
Ind_Tert 0.906* 1.302* 0.583*** 1.087 
 (-1.719) (1.653) (-2.680) (0.765) 
Ind_PubEduHealth 0.837 1.770** 0.404** 1.641*** 
 (-1.611) (2.243) (-2.071) (2.924) 
Ind_Others 0.946 1.492 1.494 1.553*** 
 (-0.586) (1.628) (1.551) (2.785) 
ln_UE_rate 1.367*** 0.730 2.630** 0.707* 
 (2.820) (-1.058) (2.510) (-1.731) 
Elaps_Dur_yrs 0.565*** 0.664*** 1.156 0.847** 
 (-15.101) (-4.014) (0.893) (-2.425) 
Elaps_Dur_yrs_Sq 1.028*** 1.030*** 0.995 1.011** 
 (7.729) (2.936) (-0.344) (2.039) 
Age_25to34 0.726*** 0.590*** 1.004 0.628*** 
 (-4.429) (-2.637) (0.014) (-3.427) 
Age_35to44 0.696*** 0.508** 1.237 0.691** 
 (-3.783) (-2.433) (0.680) (-2.138) 
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Age_45to54 0.669*** 0.494* 1.149 0.826 
 (-3.350) (-1.953) (0.370) (-0.913) 
Age_over54 0.574*** 1.198 0.472 1.362 
 (-2.961) (0.444) (-0.967) (1.162) 
     
Failures (exits) 1,494 208 132 454 
FTE spells 4,497 4,497 4,497 4,497 
Person-months 132,651 132,651 132,651 132,651 
Log-likelihood -10171 -1384.5 -879.64 -3061.3 
Control group: MS_Married, Age_16to24, R_England_S,  
Qual_Primary, Ind_Sec 
z-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6.12: Hazard ratios from competing risks Cox model  
on exiting from full-time employment (females sample) 
 
 FTE spell ending with: 
Regressors UE PTE SE Inact 
MS_Single 1.776*** 0.990 1.044 0.712*** 
 (4.833) (-0.067) (0.097) (-3.050) 
MS_SepDivWid 1.101 0.954 0.932 0.871 
 (0.559) (-0.228) (-0.102) (-0.789) 
Health_problems 1.562*** 1.079 1.881 1.322** 
 (3.697) (0.424) (1.298) (2.170) 
#KidsAged_0to4 0.559*** 1.344** 0.758 1.183* 
 (-3.823) (2.472) (-0.502) (1.765) 
#KidsAged_5to11 1.002 1.419*** 1.108 1.010 
 (0.027) (4.663) (0.333) (0.144) 
#KidsAged_12to15 0.951 0.938 1.165 1.140 
 (-0.642) (-0.599) (0.441) (1.623) 
UnearnedY_per1000 0.946** 0.896*** 1.001 0.971 
 (-2.387) (-3.080) (0.006) (-1.221) 
R_England_M 1.015 1.234 1.237 0.863 
 (0.147) (1.432) (0.452) (-1.254) 
R_England_N 0.828* 1.107 1.472 0.932 
 (-1.793) (0.704) (0.931) (-0.653) 
R_nonEng 0.784** 1.094 0.825 0.881 
 (-2.480) (0.639) (-0.422) (-1.227) 
Qual_Degree 0.438*** 0.513*** 3.868** 1.064 
 (-5.275) (-3.166) (1.993) (0.384) 
Qual_Sec_Postsec 0.672*** 0.660*** 1.560 0.883 
 (-3.555) (-2.801) (0.742) (-0.909) 
PrevExp_FTE_yrs 1.020** 1.018 1.037 1.008 
 (2.201) (1.499) (0.977) (0.728) 
PrevExp_PTE_yrs 0.992 1.133*** 0.946 0.976 
 (-0.303) (6.118) (-0.390) (-0.887) 
PrevExp_SE_yrs 1.042 1.142 1.373 1.141** 
 (0.524) (1.143) (1.271) (2.336) 
Ind_Tert 0.797*** 1.043 0.972 1.194* 
 (-2.620) (0.319) (-0.071) (1.704) 
Ind_PubEduHealth 0.659*** 1.204 0.380 1.293** 
 (-3.419) (1.137) (-1.628) (2.022) 
Ind_Others 0.992 1.315 0.908 1.492*** 
 (-0.066) (1.488) (-0.158) (2.770) 
ln_UE_rate 1.248 1.328 3.278* 0.944 
 (1.502) (1.335) (1.772) (-0.364) 
Elaps_Dur_yrs 0.678*** 0.613*** 2.582** 0.857*** 
 (-7.312) (-6.320) (1.968) (-2.926) 
Elaps_Dur_yrs_Sq 1.021*** 1.046*** 0.888** 1.004 
 (4.661) (5.662) (-2.042) (0.911) 
Age_25to34 0.724*** 0.601*** 1.182 0.746*** 
 (-3.092) (-3.430) (0.391) (-2.771) 
Age_35to44 0.630*** 0.508*** 0.818 0.414*** 
 (-3.368) (-3.607) (-0.339) (-5.858) 
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Age_45to54 0.868 0.605** 1.295 0.356*** 
 (-0.890) (-2.195) (0.389) (-5.293) 
Age_over54 0.363*** 0.390**  0.650 
 (-2.667) (-2.046)  (-1.479) 
     
Failures (exits) 777 402 41 698 
FTE spells 3,491 3,491 3,491 3,491 
Person-months 96,346 96,346 96,346 96,346 
Log-likelihood -5087.8 -2605.6 -261.40 -4562.2 
Control group: MS_Married, Age_16to24, R_England_S,  
Qual_Primary, Ind_Sec 
A dash indicates that the variable has been dropped due to collinearity 
z-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6.13: Hazard ratios from competing risks Cox model  
on exiting from part-time employment (full sample) 
 
 PTE spell ending with: 
Regressors UE FTE SE Inact 
Male 1.951*** 1.949*** 2.958*** 0.678*** 
 (7.306) (8.089) (3.781) (-3.818) 
MS_Single 1.398*** 1.563*** 0.966 0.913 
 (2.848) (4.002) (-0.098) (-0.989) 
MS_SepDivWid 1.012 1.295 0.937 0.873 
 (0.074) (1.571) (-0.117) (-0.996) 
Health_problems 0.983 1.093 1.758 1.282*** 
 (-0.137) (0.767) (1.583) (2.608) 
#KidsAged_0to4 0.806** 0.497*** 0.875 1.123* 
 (-2.421) (-7.024) (-0.504) (1.916) 
#KidsAged_5to11 0.948 0.953 0.795 1.052 
 (-0.886) (-0.869) (-1.142) (1.111) 
#KidsAged_12to15 0.976 0.937 0.468* 1.031 
 (-0.293) (-0.853) (-1.851) (0.442) 
UnearnedY_per1000 0.926*** 0.994 0.928 0.942*** 
 (-2.996) (-0.317) (-0.967) (-2.969) 
Benef_UE_Ysupp 1.776*** 0.998 0.824 0.895 
 (6.031) (-0.015) (-0.536) (-1.113) 
R_England_M 1.173 1.016 0.696 0.838* 
 (1.435) (0.157) (-1.047) (-1.931) 
R_England_N 0.974 0.900 0.368*** 0.921 
 (-0.239) (-1.065) (-2.614) (-0.954) 
R_nonEng 0.992 0.839* 0.533* 0.738*** 
 (-0.071) (-1.726) (-1.807) (-3.338) 
Qual_Degree 0.897 1.151 2.701** 1.014 
 (-0.697) (0.919) (2.326) (0.112) 
Qual_Sec_Postsec 0.770** 1.061 1.013 0.875 
 (-2.554) (0.538) (0.034) (-1.556) 
PrevExp_FTE_yrs 1.012 1.073*** 0.943 1.002 
 (1.113) (9.328) (-1.134) (0.159) 
PrevExp_PTE_yrs 1.079*** 1.026 1.044 1.032*** 
 (5.703) (1.389) (0.878) (2.625) 
PrevExp_SE_yrs 1.098 1.055 1.457*** 1.012 
 (1.413) (0.706) (3.243) (0.176) 
Ind_Tert 0.879 1.219** 2.364** 1.289*** 
 (-1.306) (2.110) (2.024) (2.879) 
Ind_PubEduHealth 0.916 0.960 1.736 1.289** 
 (-0.686) (-0.319) (1.099) (2.362) 
Ind_Others 1.085 1.138 5.342*** 1.537*** 
 (0.537) (0.864) (3.480) (3.312) 
ln_UE_rate 1.210 1.094 1.085 0.795 
 (1.121) (0.565) (0.147) (-1.625) 
Elaps_Dur_yrs 0.712*** 0.750*** 0.651*** 0.850*** 
 (-6.477) (-5.829) (-2.606) (-3.567) 
Elaps_Dur_yrs_Sq 1.022*** 1.019*** 1.039** 1.003 
 (4.337) (3.759) (2.324) (0.681) 
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Age_25to34 0.665*** 0.703*** 0.898 0.627*** 
 (-3.386) (-3.243) (-0.291) (-4.747) 
Age_35to44 0.688*** 0.552*** 0.965 0.465*** 
 (-2.614) (-4.365) (-0.078) (-6.362) 
Age_45to54 0.571*** 0.263*** 0.545 0.492*** 
 (-3.372) (-7.284) (-1.134) (-5.152) 
Age_over54 0.239*** 0.095*** 0.209** 0.375*** 
 (-6.039) (-7.759) (-2.148) (-5.638) 
     
Failures (exits) 676 801 68 1,015 
PTE spells 4,191 4,191 4,191 4,191 
Person-months 101,088 101,088 101,088 101,088 
Log-likelihood -4368.8 -5044.8 -406.09 -6683.8 
Control group: MS_Married, Age_16to24, R_England_S,  
Qual_Primary, Ind_Sec 
z-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6.14: Hazard ratios from competing risks Cox model  
on exiting from part-time employment (males sample) 
 
 PTE spell ending with: 
Regressors UE FTE SE Inact 
MS_Single 0.960 1.154 1.166 1.707 
 (-0.165) (0.618) (0.195) (1.344) 
MS_SepDivWid 1.525 0.894  1.748 
 (1.034) (-0.261)  (0.988) 
Health_problems 1.433 1.444* 1.242 0.975 
 (1.534) (1.766) (0.309) (-0.071) 
#KidsAged_0to4 1.034 0.727* 1.424 1.423 
 (0.190) (-1.727) (0.717) (1.440) 
#KidsAged_5to11 1.212* 1.109 0.697 0.679* 
 (1.763) (0.960) (-0.762) (-1.667) 
#KidsAged_12to15 0.972 0.806 0.844 0.707 
 (-0.219) (-1.583) (-0.367) (-1.561) 
UnearnedY_per1000 0.963 0.997 0.870 1.056 
 (-0.859) (-0.098) (-0.952) (1.218) 
Benef_UE_Ysupp 1.708*** 0.913 1.554 0.790 
 (3.386) (-0.582) (0.901) (-0.837) 
R_England_M 1.674*** 1.367* 0.769 0.558* 
 (2.646) (1.752) (-0.419) (-1.816) 
R_England_N 1.080 0.879 0.469 0.775 
 (0.385) (-0.751) (-1.299) (-1.031) 
R_nonEng 1.163 0.901 0.292* 0.560** 
 (0.751) (-0.583) (-1.900) (-2.236) 
Qual_Degree 0.728 1.035 2.256 0.979 
 (-1.173) (0.125) (1.000) (-0.058) 
Qual_Sec_Postsec 0.706* 1.403 1.249 0.781 
 (-1.828) (1.595) (0.308) (-0.879) 
PrevExp_FTE_yrs 1.008 1.013 0.974 0.999 
 (0.462) (0.737) (-0.362) (-0.025) 
PrevExp_PTE_yrs 1.091* 1.072 1.041 0.883 
 (1.787) (1.173) (0.256) (-0.715) 
PrevExp_SE_yrs 1.228*** 1.006 1.630*** 0.547 
 (2.727) (0.044) (2.832) (-1.067) 
Ind_Tert 0.942 1.345* 1.471 1.200 
 (-0.334) (1.944) (0.654) (0.771) 
Ind_PubEduHealth 1.622** 0.698 1.819 1.239 
 (2.144) (-1.452) (0.795) (0.664) 
Ind_Others 1.399 1.399 4.565** 1.638 
 (1.244) (1.341) (2.107) (1.394) 
ln_UE_rate 2.691*** 1.879** 0.574 0.673 
 (3.198) (2.302) (-0.605) (-0.924) 
Elaps_Dur_yrs 0.596*** 0.743*** 0.537* 0.789 
 (-4.364) (-3.265) (-1.934) (-1.200) 
Elaps_Dur_yrs_Sq 1.034** 1.017 1.081** 0.992 
 (2.271) (1.540) (1.991) (-0.235) 
Age_25to34 0.523*** 1.150 0.644 0.567* 
 (-2.786) (0.726) (-0.677) (-1.765) 
245 
Age_35to44 0.374*** 0.810 0.918 0.553 
 (-3.210) (-0.790) (-0.101) (-1.231) 
Age_45to54 0.427*** 0.301*** 0.248 0.438 
 (-2.646) (-3.332) (-1.113) (-1.612) 
Age_over54 0.104*** 0.091*** 0.121 0.525 
 (-5.107) (-5.067) (-1.525) (-1.278) 
     
Failures (exits) 219 279 25 124 
PTE spells 978 978 978 978 
Person-months 15,384 15,384 15,384 15,384 
Log-likelihood -1027.0 -1297.0 -94.984 -586.59 
Control group: MS_Married, Age_16to24, R_England_S,  
Qual_Primary, Ind_Sec 
A dash indicates that the variable has been dropped due to collinearity 
z-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6.15: Hazard ratios from competing risks Cox model  
on exiting from part-time employment (females sample) 
 
 PTE spell ending with: 
Regressors UE FTE SE Inact 
MS_Single 1.574*** 1.771*** 0.854 0.864 
 (3.317) (4.316) (-0.380) (-1.510) 
MS_SepDivWid 0.967 1.394* 1.289 0.781* 
 (-0.178) (1.801) (0.440) (-1.740) 
Health_problems 0.799 0.933 1.889 1.341*** 
 (-1.419) (-0.483) (1.430) (2.951) 
#KidsAged_0to4 0.688*** 0.451*** 0.717 1.137** 
 (-3.515) (-6.742) (-1.026) (2.008) 
#KidsAged_5to11 0.834** 0.920 0.800 1.086* 
 (-2.408) (-1.240) (-0.960) (1.725) 
#KidsAged_12to15 0.926 1.022 0.236** 1.116 
 (-0.721) (0.228) (-1.998) (1.458) 
UnearnedY_per1000 0.917*** 1.004 0.947 0.912*** 
 (-2.761) (0.169) (-0.606) (-4.002) 
Benef_UE_Ysupp 1.675*** 1.033 0.284* 0.961 
 (4.106) (0.241) (-1.690) (-0.365) 
R_England_M 1.006 0.853 0.697 0.871 
 (0.041) (-1.241) (-0.847) (-1.423) 
R_England_N 0.979 0.893 0.263** 0.936 
 (-0.158) (-0.921) (-2.397) (-0.712) 
R_nonEng 0.947 0.768** 0.697 0.765*** 
 (-0.410) (-2.093) (-0.851) (-2.721) 
Qual_Degree 0.945 1.209 3.274** 1.054 
 (-0.283) (1.008) (2.240) (0.375) 
Qual_Sec_Postsec 0.839 0.967 0.967 0.883 
 (-1.414) (-0.259) (-0.071) (-1.378) 
PrevExp_FTE_yrs 1.004 1.097*** 0.886 1.004 
 (0.289) (10.634) (-1.303) (0.397) 
PrevExp_PTE_yrs 1.079*** 1.024 1.037 1.032** 
 (5.433) (1.156) (0.679) (2.547) 
PrevExp_SE_yrs 0.868 1.078 1.395* 1.049 
 (-0.991) (0.831) (1.657) (0.737) 
Ind_Tert 0.853 1.230* 4.910** 1.284*** 
 (-1.306) (1.702) (2.138) (2.610) 
Ind_PubEduHealth 0.787 1.110 2.889 1.261** 
 (-1.496) (0.680) (1.305) (2.007) 
Ind_Others 0.998 1.104 10.355*** 1.470*** 
 (-0.010) (0.518) (2.913) (2.736) 
ln_UE_rate 0.869 0.916 1.501 0.810 
 (-0.679) (-0.441) (0.565) (-1.399) 
Elaps_Dur_yrs 0.768*** 0.782*** 0.668* 0.861*** 
 (-4.282) (-4.063) (-1.950) (-3.067) 
Elaps_Dur_yrs_Sq 1.017*** 1.017*** 1.032 1.003 
 (3.064) (2.888) (1.608) (0.554) 
Age_25to34 0.766* 0.602*** 1.044 0.613*** 
 (-1.827) (-3.769) (0.084) (-4.666) 
247 
Age_35to44 0.895 0.482*** 1.036 0.452*** 
 (-0.654) (-4.406) (0.059) (-6.232) 
Age_45to54 0.603** 0.244*** 0.699 0.507*** 
 (-2.508) (-6.442) (-0.551) (-4.696) 
Age_over54 0.326*** 0.107*** 0.350 0.396*** 
 (-3.731) (-5.428) (-1.150) (-4.734) 
     
Failures (exits) 457 522 43 891 
PTE spells 3,213 3,213 3,213 3,213 
Person-months 85,704 85,704 85,704 85,704 
Log-likelihood -2886.2 -3193.8 -244.36 -5700.9 
Control group: MS_Married, Age_16to24, R_England_S,  
Qual_Primary, Ind_Sec 
z-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6.16: Hazard ratios from competing risks Cox model  
on exiting from self-employment (full sample) 
 
 SE spell ending with: 
Regressors UE FTE PTE Inact 
Male 1.883*** 2.257*** 0.381*** 0.564*** 
 (2.924) (4.152) (-3.164) (-2.812) 
MS_Single 1.027 0.849 1.155 1.008 
 (0.117) (-0.809) (0.431) (0.036) 
MS_SepDivWid 1.790* 1.385 0.934 1.081 
 (1.888) (1.100) (-0.122) (0.217) 
Health_problems 1.153 0.909 1.107 1.085 
 (0.504) (-0.361) (0.271) (0.310) 
#KidsAged_0to4 0.943 0.837 1.472 1.496** 
 (-0.324) (-1.092) (1.548) (2.302) 
#KidsAged_5to11 0.932 0.954 1.055 0.887 
 (-0.483) (-0.377) (0.257) (-0.772) 
#KidsAged_12to15 1.138 1.358* 0.984 1.077 
 (0.628) (1.874) (-0.048) (0.325) 
UnearnedY_per1000 0.843** 0.964 1.055 1.033 
 (-2.419) (-0.710) (0.711) (0.625) 
Benef_UE_Ysupp 2.283*** 1.352 1.271 1.238 
 (4.107) (1.526) (0.609) (0.755) 
R_England_M 0.892 1.058 0.607 0.976 
 (-0.446) (0.257) (-1.172) (-0.091) 
R_England_N 1.030 1.110 1.259 0.849 
 (0.135) (0.528) (0.707) (-0.608) 
R_nonEng 0.722 1.037 1.052 0.850 
 (-1.291) (0.169) (0.145) (-0.651) 
Qual_Degree 1.151 0.746 1.207 1.101 
 (0.451) (-1.067) (0.414) (0.292) 
Qual_Sec_Postsec 1.137 1.046 1.097 1.225 
 (0.528) (0.219) (0.256) (0.746) 
PrevExp_FTE_yrs 1.012 1.053*** 1.027 1.007 
 (0.614) (3.931) (0.800) (0.283) 
PrevExp_PTE_yrs 1.076 0.915 1.169*** 1.067 
 (1.202) (-0.944) (3.004) (1.217) 
PrevExp_SE_yrs 1.024 1.016 1.062 1.115* 
 (0.357) (0.258) (0.456) (1.824) 
Ind_Tert 1.020 1.379* 1.111 1.211 
 (0.096) (1.836) (0.290) (0.773) 
Ind_PubEduHealth 1.085 0.537 2.233** 1.201 
 (0.247) (-1.606) (2.077) (0.564) 
Ind_Others 1.065 1.371 1.337 2.137*** 
 (0.242) (1.423) (0.663) (2.759) 
ln_UE_rate 0.795 0.705 1.108 0.215*** 
 (-0.598) (-1.005) (0.173) (-3.779) 
Elaps_Dur_yrs 0.693*** 0.762*** 0.920 0.862 
 (-3.123) (-3.019) (-0.441) (-1.189) 
Elaps_Dur_yrs_Sq 1.024** 1.018** 1.005 1.017 
 (2.006) (2.173) (0.218) (1.371) 
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Age_25to34 0.853 0.820 0.580 0.913 
 (-0.606) (-0.874) (-1.422) (-0.286) 
Age_35to44 0.679 0.402*** 0.486 0.831 
 (-1.250) (-3.230) (-1.600) (-0.526) 
Age_45to54 0.446** 0.370*** 0.873 1.189 
 (-2.224) (-3.203) (-0.291) (0.482) 
Age_over54 0.199*** 0.167*** 0.397 0.701 
 (-2.919) (-3.742) (-1.250) (-0.735) 
     
Failures (exits) 146 197 68 131 
SE spells 889 889 889 889 
Person-months 22,153 22,153 22,153 22,153 
Log-likelihood -703.90 -939.76 -319.92 -634.44 
Control group: MS_Married, Age_16to24, R_England_S,  
Qual_Primary, Ind_Sec 
z-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6.17: Hazard ratios from competing risks Cox model  
on exiting from self-employment (males sample) 
 
 SE spell ending with: 
Regressors UE FTE PTE Inact 
MS_Single 0.859 0.682 0.469 0.884 
 (-0.557) (-1.639) (-1.056) (-0.280) 
MS_SepDivWid 1.602 1.447 0.447 0.740 
 (1.149) (1.089) (-0.698) (-0.450) 
Health_problems 1.532 1.079 0.534 1.691 
 (1.373) (0.263) (-0.575) (1.335) 
#KidsAged_0to4 1.072 0.939 0.778 1.012 
 (0.356) (-0.360) (-0.384) (0.033) 
#KidsAged_5to11 0.996 0.937 1.265 0.601 
 (-0.024) (-0.452) (0.528) (-1.451) 
#KidsAged_12to15 1.039 1.290 0.452 1.559 
 (0.148) (1.333) (-1.001) (1.449) 
UnearnedY_per1000 0.698*** 1.035 1.018 0.993 
 (-3.521) (0.595) (0.099) (-0.065) 
Benef_UE_Ysupp 2.410*** 1.386 1.269 1.527 
 (3.910) (1.476) (0.383) (1.163) 
R_England_M 0.690 1.079 0.089* 1.274 
 (-1.202) (0.312) (-1.866) (0.636) 
R_England_N 0.938 1.145 0.795 0.596 
 (-0.244) (0.613) (-0.343) (-1.152) 
R_nonEng 0.632 0.913 1.311 0.930 
 (-1.538) (-0.365) (0.450) (-0.192) 
Qual_Degree 0.928 0.647 0.926 1.056 
 (-0.182) (-1.348) (-0.092) (0.108) 
Qual_Sec_Postsec 1.247 1.006 0.674 1.078 
 (0.782) (0.028) (-0.588) (0.194) 
PrevExp_FTE_yrs 1.014 1.046*** 0.967 1.001 
 (0.671) (3.192) (-0.432) (0.047) 
PrevExp_PTE_yrs 1.180* 0.981 1.374* 1.255*** 
 (1.811) (-0.177) (1.957) (2.948) 
PrevExp_SE_yrs 0.922 1.007 0.976 1.010 
 (-0.895) (0.114) (-0.085) (0.102) 
Ind_Tert 1.010 1.372 1.666 0.898 
 (0.040) (1.641) (0.814) (-0.318) 
Ind_PubEduHealth 1.222 0.290* 8.525*** 0.508 
 (0.407) (-1.699) (3.180) (-0.882) 
Ind_Others 1.374 1.533* 0.456 1.357 
 (1.090) (1.752) (-0.701) (0.759) 
ln_UE_rate 1.057 0.776 0.834 0.269** 
 (0.121) (-0.649) (-0.166) (-2.020) 
Elaps_Dur_yrs 0.659*** 0.757*** 0.663 0.925 
 (-2.945) (-2.716) (-1.099) (-0.388) 
Elaps_Dur_yrs_Sq 1.025 1.017* 1.030 1.012 
 (1.612) (1.782) (0.658) (0.527) 
Age_25to34 0.860 0.768 0.303* 0.420* 
 (-0.494) (-0.999) (-1.664) (-1.781) 
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Age_35to44 0.721 0.414*** 0.237* 0.633 
 (-0.898) (-2.707) (-1.765) (-0.853) 
Age_45to54 0.420** 0.309*** 0.198* 0.638 
 (-2.027) (-3.202) (-1.785) (-0.776) 
Age_over54 0.189** 0.165*** 0.219 0.470 
 (-2.570) (-3.525) (-1.383) (-1.054) 
     
Failures (exits) 110 158 20 58 
SE spells 563 563 563 563 
Person-months 13,109 13,109 13,109 13,109 
Log-likelihood -471.34 -689.15 -74.545 -245.61 
Control group: MS_Married, Age_16to24, R_England_S,  
Qual_Primary, Ind_Sec 
z-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6.18: Hazard ratios from competing risks Cox model  
on exiting from self-employment (females sample) 
 
 SE spell ending with: 
Regressors UE FTE PTE Inact 
MS_Single 1.383 2.238* 1.586 0.945 
 (0.686) (1.697) (1.162) (-0.183) 
MS_SepDivWid 2.653 1.016 1.076 1.066 
 (1.421) (0.022) (0.107) (0.125) 
Health_problems 0.457 0.330 1.345 0.656 
 (-1.046) (-1.472) (0.695) (-1.016) 
#KidsAged_0to4 0.192** 0.343* 2.322*** 1.728** 
 (-2.182) (-1.907) (2.825) (2.319) 
#KidsAged_5to11 0.779 0.990 1.028 1.015 
 (-0.831) (-0.036) (0.107) (0.079) 
#KidsAged_12to15 1.084 3.206*** 1.262 0.823 
 (0.188) (3.007) (0.568) (-0.507) 
UnearnedY_per1000 1.036 0.768** 0.986 1.103 
 (0.333) (-2.206) (-0.161) (1.424) 
Benef_UE_Ysupp 1.259 1.443 0.792 0.895 
 (0.385) (0.651) (-0.387) (-0.217) 
R_England_M 1.388 1.355 1.051 0.540 
 (0.505) (0.518) (0.101) (-1.276) 
R_England_N 1.674 0.829 1.689 1.191 
 (0.994) (-0.357) (1.304) (0.469) 
R_nonEng 1.247 1.843 0.596 0.928 
 (0.388) (1.166) (-0.981) (-0.215) 
Qual_Degree 1.068 1.241 1.524 1.068 
 (0.100) (0.296) (0.695) (0.128) 
Qual_Sec_Postsec 0.761 1.558 1.350 1.398 
 (-0.502) (0.752) (0.636) (0.765) 
PrevExp_FTE_yrs 0.993 1.151** 1.118** 0.950 
 (-0.094) (2.382) (2.128) (-0.715) 
PrevExp_PTE_yrs 1.049 0.818 1.228*** 0.932 
 (0.465) (-1.027) (3.114) (-0.799) 
PrevExp_SE_yrs 1.221 1.217 1.100 1.499** 
 (0.943) (0.675) (0.419) (2.571) 
Ind_Tert 0.719 2.990** 0.927 1.923 
 (-0.657) (1.966) (-0.155) (1.383) 
Ind_PubEduHealth 0.825 1.247 1.465 2.051 
 (-0.330) (0.324) (0.778) (1.435) 
Ind_Others 0.512 1.301 1.901 3.978*** 
 (-1.014) (0.395) (1.191) (2.778) 
ln_UE_rate 0.530 0.858 0.722 0.185*** 
 (-0.722) (-0.168) (-0.428) (-2.986) 
Elaps_Dur_yrs 0.817 0.905 1.093 0.764 
 (-0.609) (-0.463) (0.369) (-1.310) 
Elaps_Dur_yrs_Sq 1.017 1.026 0.999 1.010 
 (0.446) (1.195) (-0.033) (0.388) 
Age_25to34 1.273 1.373 0.813 2.420 
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 (0.412) (0.595) (-0.405) (1.587) 
Age_35to44 0.708 0.256* 0.681 2.026 
 (-0.513) (-1.882) (-0.634) (1.193) 
Age_45to54 0.409 0.827 1.795 2.297 
 (-1.199) (-0.296) (0.949) (1.360) 
Age_over54 0.262  0.350 1.168 
 (-1.086)  (-0.882) (0.174) 
     
Failures (exits) 36 39 48 73 
SE spells 326 326 326 326 
Person-months 9,044 9,044 9,044 9,044 
Log-likelihood -126.73 -133.57 -185.51 -272.31 
Control group: MS_Married, Age_16to24, R_England_S,  
Qual_Primary, Ind_Sec 
A dash indicates that the variable has been dropped due to collinearity 
z-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6.19: Hazard ratios from competing risks Cox model on exiting  
into various states with retirement age dummy (male sample) 
 
 Spell ending with: 
Regressors UE FTE PTE SE Inact 
MS_Single 2.057*** 1.531*** 1.552*** 0.933 1.916*** 
 (13.735) (8.727) (4.485) (-0.568) (8.286) 
MS_SepDivWid 1.528*** 0.870 0.815 1.620** 1.256 
 (3.687) (-1.258) (-0.851) (2.203) (1.400) 
Health_problems 1.073 0.782*** 1.319** 1.096 1.504*** 
 (1.005) (-3.767) (2.396) (0.550) (4.386) 
#KidsAged_0to4 1.026 1.018 1.019 1.276** 0.898 
 (0.530) (0.387) (0.200) (2.345) (-1.367) 
#KidsAged_5to11 1.172*** 0.983 1.027 0.927 0.946 
 (4.732) (-0.522) (0.395) (-0.824) (-0.971) 
#KidsAged_12to15 0.982 0.975 0.955 0.979 0.969 
 (-0.384) (-0.589) (-0.519) (-0.184) (-0.444) 
UnearnedY_per1000 0.908*** 1.014 0.973 1.014 0.941*** 
 (-6.675) (1.237) (-1.113) (0.420) (-2.883) 
R_England_M 1.149** 1.064 0.973 0.586*** 0.771*** 
 (2.266) (1.097) (-0.246) (-3.456) (-2.757) 
R_England_N 1.079 1.028 0.942 0.645*** 0.843** 
 (1.287) (0.503) (-0.554) (-3.090) (-1.976) 
R_nonEng 1.113* 1.036 0.686*** 0.589*** 0.764*** 
 (1.768) (0.622) (-3.235) (-3.380) (-3.005) 
Qual_Degree 0.566*** 0.937 0.891 1.208 0.988 
 (-7.006) (-0.845) (-0.756) (0.992) (-0.100) 
Qual_Sec_Postsec 0.718*** 1.181*** 1.026 1.161 1.096 
 (-6.186) (3.108) (0.242) (1.034) (1.058) 
PrevExp_FTE_yrs 1.018*** 1.022*** 1.006 1.003 1.011* 
 (4.292) (5.989) (0.731) (0.250) (1.652) 
PrevExp_PTE_yrs 1.038 0.963* 1.139*** 1.028 1.003 
 (1.618) (-1.694) (5.749) (0.581) (0.101) 
PrevExp_SE_yrs 0.953* 0.964 0.915 1.179*** 1.020 
 (-1.699) (-1.400) (-1.242) (6.386) (0.545) 
ln_UE_rate 1.438*** 1.105 0.676** 1.811*** 0.653*** 
 (4.141) (1.207) (-2.378) (2.586) (-3.209) 
Elaps_Dur_yrs 0.601*** 0.636*** 0.663*** 0.824** 0.825*** 
 (-16.762) (-15.996) (-6.765) (-2.364) (-4.359) 
Elaps_Dur_yrs_Sq 1.026*** 1.028*** 1.033*** 1.010 1.011*** 
 (8.713) (9.588) (5.012) (1.108) (2.840) 
UE 0.000 2.959*** 1.626*** 2.338*** 1.122e+10*** 
 (.) (21.258) (4.627) (5.357) (161.987) 
FTE 1.199*** 0.000 0.508*** 0.725** 4.828e+09*** 
 (3.319) (.) (-6.174) (-1.987) (157.175) 
PTE 1.114 1.269*** 0.000 1.078 9.089e+09*** 
 (1.295) (3.185) (.) (0.311) (142.028) 
SE 0.744*** 0.969 0.456*** 0.000 6.008e+09 
 (-2.739) (-0.342) (-3.263) (.) (.) 
Age_over64 0.152*** 0.197*** 3.794*** 0.727 1.699 
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 (-3.246) (-3.232) (4.355) (-0.444) (1.612) 
      
Failures (exits) 2,289 2,638 641 363 1,018 
Spells 11,592 11,592 11,592 11,592 11,592 
Person-months 239,730 239,730 239,730 239,730 239,730 
Log-likelihood -16766 -17684 -4743.2 -2664.8 -7412.6 
Control group: MS_Married, R_England_S, Qual_Primary, Inact 
z-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6.20: Hazard ratios from competing risks Cox model on exiting  
into various states with retirement age dummy (female sample) 
 
 Spell ending with: 
Regressors UE FTE PTE SE Inact 
MS_Single 2.149*** 2.128*** 0.779*** 0.850 1.130** 
 (12.312) (13.040) (-4.940) (-0.969) (2.328) 
MS_SepDivWid 1.276** 1.034 0.667*** 1.320 0.839* 
 (2.355) (0.334) (-4.607) (1.103) (-1.925) 
Health_problems 1.103 0.837** 1.038 1.443* 1.284*** 
 (1.242) (-2.385) (0.555) (1.818) (3.637) 
#KidsAged_0to4 0.683*** 0.500*** 1.267*** 0.987 1.244*** 
 (-5.809) (-10.521) (5.728) (-0.092) (4.953) 
#KidsAged_5to11 0.929* 0.924** 1.372*** 1.059 1.029 
 (-1.781) (-2.057) (10.449) (0.494) (0.858) 
#KidsAged_12to15 1.030 1.052 0.968 0.549*** 1.069 
 (0.597) (1.075) (-0.691) (-2.755) (1.423) 
UnearnedY_per1000 0.945*** 1.026** 0.945*** 1.042 0.945*** 
 (-3.759) (2.319) (-3.911) (1.253) (-3.970) 
R_England_M 1.017 1.071 1.125* 0.648** 0.937 
 (0.238) (1.082) (1.839) (-2.070) (-0.981) 
R_England_N 0.873* 0.899* 1.036 0.591*** 0.945 
 (-1.941) (-1.670) (0.571) (-2.633) (-0.910) 
R_nonEng 0.903 0.792*** 0.864** 0.490*** 0.817*** 
 (-1.540) (-3.733) (-2.316) (-3.496) (-3.211) 
Qual_Degree 0.726*** 1.264** 0.769*** 2.803*** 1.309*** 
 (-3.312) (2.576) (-2.903) (4.126) (3.162) 
Qual_Sec_Postsec 0.830*** 1.297*** 0.942 1.114 1.135* 
 (-2.728) (3.754) (-1.014) (0.486) (1.946) 
PrevExp_FTE_yrs 1.010 1.077*** 1.009 0.997 0.998 
 (1.422) (14.449) (1.370) (-0.130) (-0.349) 
PrevExp_PTE_yrs 1.038*** 0.984 1.070*** 0.971 1.021** 
 (3.425) (-1.348) (9.183) (-0.717) (2.148) 
PrevExp_SE_yrs 1.052 1.049 1.020 1.498*** 1.125*** 
 (1.025) (0.998) (0.453) (5.948) (3.335) 
ln_UE_rate 1.005 0.962 1.110 1.608 0.875 
 (0.053) (-0.411) (1.102) (1.558) (-1.417) 
Elaps_Dur_yrs 0.726*** 0.648*** 0.758*** 0.818* 0.853*** 
 (-9.445) (-13.679) (-9.076) (-1.844) (-5.095) 
Elaps_Dur_yrs_Sq 1.020*** 1.034*** 1.018*** 1.013 1.007** 
 (6.412) (10.698) (6.145) (1.067) (2.326) 
UE 0.000 3.176*** 1.894*** 1.709*** 2.512e+10*** 
 (.) (20.975) (11.454) (2.626) (182.146) 
FTE 1.583*** 0.000 0.422*** 0.519*** 1.533e+10*** 
 (7.380) (.) (-14.191) (-3.251) (186.875) 
PTE 1.343*** 1.026 0.000 0.649** 2.163e+10*** 
 (4.289) (0.424) (.) (-2.198) (194.034) 
SE 1.028 0.695** 0.408*** 0.000 1.650e+10 
 (0.160) (-2.186) (-6.027) (.) (.) 
Age_over59 0.215*** 0.367*** 1.297 0.716 0.652* 
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 (-3.408) (-2.623) (1.300) (-0.454) (-1.675) 
      
Failures (exits) 1,693 2,011 2,060 199 1,999 
Spells 13,242 13,242 13,242 13,242 13,242 
Person-months 305,221 305,221 305,221 305,221 305,221 
Log-likelihood -12920 -14200 -14855 -1479.6 -14769 
Control group: MS_Married, R_England_S, Qual_Primary, Inact 
z-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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